Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Tamera A. McDonald v. Robert M. McDonald :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Suzanne Benson; McDonald, West & Benson; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
James Watts; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee; Edwin F. Guyon; Pro Se, Non-Party Judgment
Creditor.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McDonald v. McDonald, No. 920313 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4242

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

TMiEBJi

r,,

"T

vs,
ROBERT h.

A P P E A L F'tt'.V

wm

Suzanne Ber-:-.
MCDONALD, V
Attorney fc4b5 Bast hi1':
Sal t Lakp'

:

:i

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
(McDonald v. McDonald, Case No, 920313)

Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Appendix, Exhibit S)
Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952) (Appendix, Exhibit N)
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Appendix, Exhibit T)
Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P.2d 970 (Utah 1966) (Appendix,
Exhibit 0)

COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
TAMERA A. MCDONALD,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ROBERT M. MCDONALD,

Case No. 920313
Priority Number 16

Defendant/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
THE HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL, PRESIDING

Suzanne Benson
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellent
455 East 500 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telphone: (801) 359-0999

James Watts
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
124 South 600 East, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-8505
Edwin Guyon, Pro Se
Non-Party Judgment Creditor
P.O. Box 17697
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 355-8811

LIST OF PARTIES

Tamera A. McDonald, the named Pin

il1 i n

Robert M. McDonald , 1 11*» limine 1 p< 'fen. ta \ i1

II

, I iu i.

i 111«. ri» • i i - in .

Jilthoi.-jii ,- t: .••:!'.
h e ~<~».JLW.
,•-,,
r. G u y o n h a s b e e n
designated as : -MKr.i-nt creditoi ii. this action.
The
r
designation of a n
as a judgment creditor is the issue
w h i c h is the subj*
<=>»- ^f this appeal

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL

5

POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF A NON-PARTY

10

POINT II: THE AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT WITHOUT NOTICE
OR HEARING DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF PROPERTY WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS OF LAW

13

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE JUDGMENT
AFTER THE TIME PERIODS SPECIFIED IN RULES 59 AND 60, UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

16

A.

RULE 59(e)

16

B.

RULE 60(b)

17

POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ENTERING THE SUBJECT ORDER ON THE BASIS OF MISTAKE

18

CONCLUSION

20

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED

Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen. 414 P.2d 970 (Utah 1966)

1, 12, 13

Gribble v. Gribble. 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978)

2, 15

Mitchell v. Mitchell. 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974)

1

Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983)

2, 15

Penrose v. Penrose. 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982)

1

Shaw v. Jeppson. 239 P.2d (Utah 1952)

1/11

Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984)

2, 15

STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

16, 17

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

2, 4, 17, 18

Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

1,10,11

Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

1, 13

Rule 4-504(1), Code of Judicial Administration

10

Treatises
47 AJQ. J U T . 2d, Judgments, §§ 999-1002

ii

12

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the
Third Judicial District Court on May 7, 1992, in a domestic
relations case.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the trial court err in granting judgment in

favor of Edwin F. Guyon who is not a party to the action?
Inasmuch as divorce actions are equitable proceedings, the
Appellant Court should review the law and the facts to fashion
its own remedy as a substitute for the judgment of the trial
court.

The trial court's action should be disturbed only to

prevent manifest injustice. Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017
(Utah 1982); Mitchell v. Mitchell. 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974).
The authorities submitted by Defendant on this issue are as
follows:

Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

Jeppson, 239 P.2d (Utah 1952);
Procedure;

Shaw v.

Rule 24 Utah Rules of Civil

Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P.2d 970 (Utah

1966).
2.
initially

Did the trial court err in amending a judgment
entered

in favor of Plaintiff and

1

subject to

offsetting

judgments against

Plaintiff

without

affording

procedural due process of lawr? The standard of review is the
same as stated in paragraph 1.

The authorities submitted by

Defendant on this issue are as follows:
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983);
(Utah 1978);

Nelson v. Jacobsen,

Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64

Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199

(Utah 1984).
3.

Did the trial court err in amending a judgment

originally entered on October 30, 1991, after the time period
specified in Rules 59(e) and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?

The standard of review is the same as stated in

paragraph 1.

The authorities submitted by Defendant on this

issue are as follows:

Rules 59(e) and 60(b), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure.
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering

the Subject Order on the basis of mistake?

The standard for

review is the same as stated in paragraph 1.

The authority

submitted by Defendant on this issue are as follows:

Rule

60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the conclusion of the trial on March 28, 1991, the
trial court granted judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
2

Defendant in the sum of $7,500 for attorney's fees.

This

judgment was formally entered in a Decree of Divorce on
October 30, 1991.1
Judgments

(Appendix, Exhibit E).

had previously

been

awarded

in

favor of

Defendant and against Plaintiff on February 16, 1991, for $250
(R. 533, Appendix, Exhibit C) and on August 7, 1991, for
$3,846 (R. 795, Appendix, Exhibit D). 2

Thus, Defendant had

offsetting judgments of $4,096, reducing his obligations
(exclusive of interest) from $7,500 to $3,404.3

On May 7,

1992, without prior notice to Defendant, and without providing
Defendant with notice and a right be heard, the trial court,
sua sponte, issued a Memorandum Decision and Order (R. 10681070)

(hereinafter

"subject

order") providing

that

the

1

After entry of the Decree on October 30, 1991, the parties
entered into a stipulation to amend the visitation provisions of
the Decree (R.955). Pursuant to the stipulation, an Amended Decree
was entered on December 12, 1991. The Amended Decree had no effect
on the judgment. The wording of both Decrees with respect to the
judgment are identical. (R. 920, para. 14; R. 989, para. 14).
2

In addition to the judgments already entered in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff, there is currently pending a
motion for an additional judgment (R. 1078) arising out of
Plaintiff's refusal to abide by paragraph 13 of the Decree (R. 988
- 989) with respect to the payment of indebtedness to Mountain
America Credit Union.
3

If Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment noted in fn. 2
is granted, the judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant would be fully off set.

3

judgment previously entered in favor of Plaintiff was amended
to provide judgment in favor of Edwin F. Guyon rather than the
Plaintiff, thereby removing the judgment from the offsetting
judgments in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

(A

copy of the Subject Order is attached as Appendix Exhibit A ) .
Thereafter, Edwin Guyon sought to enforce the amended
judgment

against

Defendant

without

any

allowance

for

offsetting judgments previously entered in favor of Defendant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court erred in granting judgment in favor

of Edwin Guyon who was not a party to the action.
2.

The judgment in favor of Plaintiff, naming Edwin

Guyon as the judgment creditor, was entered without notice to
Defendant and without providing Defendant with an opportunity
to be heard and deprived Defendant of the right to setoff in
violation of procedural due process.
3.

The amendment of the judgment in favor of Plaintiff,

by naming Edwin Guyon as the judgment creditor, was untimely
having been entered after the ten-day period prescribed in
Rule 59(c), and after the three-month period stated in Rule
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

4

4.

The trial court abused its discretion in entering a

judgment in favor of Edwin Guyon on the basis of mistake.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

On March 28, 1991, at the conclusion of trial of

this matter, the trial court orally announced its decision.
Included in the court's decision was the following:
With regard to attorney's fees, the Court
finds there is a need on the part of
Plaintiff for attorney's fees and awards
attorney's fees in the amount of $7,500.
(Tr. 9)
2.

On October 30, 1991, the Court entered a final

Decree of Divorce.

Paragraph 14 of the Decree provided as

follows:
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against
Defendant in the sum of Seven Thousand
Five
Hundred
Dollars
($7,500)
as
attorney's fees. (Emphasis added). (R.
920, Appendix, Exhibit E).
3.

Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, an

Amended Decree of Divorce was entered on December 12, 1991.
Paragraph

14 of the Amended Decree of Divorce awarding

Plaintiff judgment for attorney's fees incorporated the exact
wording of the original Decree as quoted in the preceding
paragraph.

The

specific wording

5

of

the Decree

naming

Plaintiff as the judgment creditor was expressly approved by
Plaintiff and her then attorney, James Watts.

(R. 989,

Appendix, Exhibit F ) .
4.

Prior to the entry of either of the Decrees of

Divorce, the

trial

court

entered

judgment

in

favor

of

Defendant and against Plaintiff on February 16, 1991, in the
sum of $250 as a sanction for contempt of court arising out of
Plaintiff's detention of the child in violation of a court
order (R. 533, Appendix, Exhibit C ) .
5.

Prior to the entry of either of the Decrees of

Divorce, the trial court entered second judgment in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff in the sum of $3,846 on August
7, 1991, as a sanction for contempt of court arising out of
Plaintiff's detention of the child in violation of a court
order (R. 795, Appendix, Exhibit D ) .
6.

Prior to the entry of either Decrees of Divorce,

Defendant filed a motion for an additional judgment in the sum
of $7,000 against Plaintiff by reason of Plaintiff's refusal
to pay indebtedness to Mountain America Credit Union (R. 107879). 4
4

On December 17, 1991, the Court found that "it appears
probable that said motion would be granted." (R. 1000, Appendix,

6

7.

In September or October, 1991, Plaintiff terminated

Edwin Guyon as her attorney (R. 1019, para. 7; R. 878).
However, Mr. Guyon refused to formally withdraw as attorney
for Plaintiff.
8.

In

November,

1991, after

being

terminated

as

Plaintiff's attorney, Edwin F. Guyon sought to execute on the
judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff. Mr. Guyon obtained a
Praecipe and Writ of Execution describing all property awarded
to Defendant in the divorce decree.

In response thereto, on

November 25, 1991, Defendant filed a Motion to Quash Praecipe
and Execution and Alternative Motion to Stay Enforcement of
Praecipe and Execution (R. 933-34). On December 17, 1991, the
trial court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining
the sale of Defendant's property pursuant to the praecipe and
execution (R. 999-1001).

The Temporary Restraining Order

stated:
1.
The sale of Defendant's property
purports to be based upon a judgment
entered in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant in the sum of $7,500.00, and
Defendant appears to have valid setoffs
against said judgment in the sum of
$4,096.00 by reason of judgments

Exhibit G). As of the date of the Notice of Appeal, no hearing has
been held on said Motion.

7

heretofore entered in favor of Defendant
and against Plaintiff,
2. It appears that Plaintiff has failed
and refused to comply with the prior
order of the Court that she pay and
discharge all indebtedness to Mountain
America Credit Union secured by the 1988
Ford van and that such failure gives rise
to a claim on the part of Defendant
against Plaintiff in a sum in excess of
$3,404,00, which would set-off and
discharge the judgment upon the proposed
sale is based,
3.
Defendant has filed a motion for
judgment against Plaintiff arising out of
Plaintiff's failure to pay indebtedness
to Mountain America Credit Union and it
appears probable that said Motion would
be granted. If such Motion were granted,
the judgment of $7,500,00, upon which the
proposed sale is based, would be fully
paid and discharged.
(R. 999-1000,
Appendix, Exhibit G ) .
9.

On January 16, 1992, the trial court issued a Minute

Entry announcing its decision to quash the Praecipe and
Execution.

In the Minute Entry, the court stated:

The court is of the opinion that this a
judgment granted in favor of the
Plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel must look
to Plaintiff for actual payment of his
attorney's fees. . . . In any event the
Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's
counsel must look to Plaintiff for
payment of his fees and accordingly
grants the Motion to Quash the Praecipe
and Execution. (R. 1013-1014, Appendix,
Exhibit H ) ,

8

10.

On

February

7, 1992, the trial

court entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Quashing the
Praecipe and Execution obtained by Edwin F. Guyon.

In this

regard, the Order entered by the trial court provided as
follows:
1. Defendant's Motion to Quash Praecipe
and Execution and to Stay Enforcement of
Praecipe and Execution obtained by
Plaintiff's former counsel, Mr. Edwin
Guyon, is hereby vaca4ec^.m^said Praecipe
and Execution are quashed and are of no
effect and enforcement of the same is
stayed.
2.
Plaintiff's former attorney, Edwin
Guyon, must look directly to his client,
Tamera A. McDonald, Plaintiff, for
payment of his attorney's fees.
(R.
1031-1032, Appendix, Exhibit I)
11.

On May 7, 1992, without prior notice or hearing, the

trial court suddenly reversed its position and entered the
Subject Order in a Memorandum Decision wherein the trial court
held as follows:
The court is going to set aside that
portion of the Decree that granted
Plaintiff judgment for attorney's fees
and is going to sua sponte order an
amendment to the Decree which grants a
judgment in favor of Plaintiff's counsel
at the time, Mr. Edwin Guyon, in the sum
of $7,500.
(R. 1068-1070, Appendix,
Exhibit A ) .

9

12.

The Memorandum Decision of May 7, 1992, provides

"This decision will serve as the order of the court"
(R.1070).

This is the Subject Order which is the focus of

this appeal.5
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF A NON-PARTY,
Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
"every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest."
In this action, Plaintiff engaged the services of Edwin
Guyon to represent her in the action and she thereby incurred
attorneyfs fees for his services. Accordingly, Plaintiff was

5

After Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on May 13, 1992
(R. 1093), specifying the subject order of May 7, 1992, as the
order being appealed, Mr. Guyon unilaterally prepared an "Amendment
to Judgment" (hereinafter "judgment") dated July 2, 1992 (R. 1207,
Appendix, Exhibit J). The judgment was executed by the trial court
on July 15, 1992. Inasmuch as the "judgment" is contrary to the
wording of the subject order of May 7, 1992 (which, among other
things, expressly states "this decision will serve as the order of
the Court") and inasmuch as the "judgment" was submitted in
violation of Rule 4-504(1), Code of Judicial Administration (which
requires judgments and orders to be submitted within 15 days of the
ruling) (Appendix, Exhibit W ) , Defendant has regarded the
"judgment" as invalid and superfluous. To the extent this Court
regards the "judgment" as valid or effective, Defendant extends his
appeal to include said "judgment."

10

directly liable to Edwin Guyon for such fees.

If Mr. Guyon

pursued claims for collection, his client, Plaintiff in this
action, and was the party directly liable for the fees.
In paragraph 10 of her Complaint (R. 3), Plaintiff sought
an order that Defendant "pay to Plaintiff" a reasonable sum
for attorney's fees.

At the conclusion of trial, the Court

granted Plaintiff's prayer in that regard.

There was no

suggestion in the pleadings that Plaintiff's attorney was
directly seeking judgment against Defendant for attorney's
fees.

Mr. Guyon never filed a complaint in intervention or

otherwise assert any basis for a claim of attorney's fees
directly against Defendant.
One of the purposes for the requirement of Rule 17, that
an action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest, is to permit the Defendant to assert all defenses
and counterclaims against the real owner of the cause.

Shaw

v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952). Defendant respectfully
submits that it is grossly unfair to allow a person not
subject to offsetting judgments to "stand in" for the real
party in interest who is so liable in order to circumvent the
offsetting judgments. Moreover, under the Shaw decision, such
a procedure violates the purpose of Rule 17.

11

As previously noted herein, at the time of the Subject
Order on May 7, 1991, which purported to change the identity
of the judgment creditor from Plaintiff to Edwin Guyon,
Defendant had judgments against Plaintiff in the sum of
$4,096, with a pending motion for an additional judgment of
$7,000 which the trial court found would likely be granted
thereby totally offsetting Plaintiff's judgment (R. 1000)6.
The subject order circumvented offsetting judgments and claims
which Defendant had against Plaintiff.
Apart

from the

inherent

injustice

in

circumventing

Defendant's offsetting judgments, the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P.2d 970
(Utah 1966), expressly prohibits Edwin Guyon from directly
enforcing

a

judgment

entered

in

favor

of

Plaintiff

or

obtaining a judgment in his own name in the absence of a
complaint in intervention.
A person not a party to an action who seeks relief or
believes his interests will be adversely affected by an
adjudication in an action must file a motion seeking leave to
file a complaint in intervention thereby allowing the adverse

6

The right to setoff judgments is well established - 47 Am.
Jur. 2d, Judgments, §§ 999-1002 (Appendix, Exhibit X ) .
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party notice of his claims and an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the claims.

Rule

24, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure; Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P. 2d 970 (Utah
1966).
At no time prior to the entry of the subject order did
Edwin Guyon seek leave to file a complaint in intervention nor
did he file any such complaint.

Accordingly, not being a

party to the action, Defendant had no notice of his claims, if
any claims he had, for direct judgment.

Moreover, Edwin

Guyon, not being a party or intervener in the action, was not
entitled to present his "claims" to the trial court or obtain
a judgment in his favor against Defendant.

On the basis of

the above argument and authorities, the Subject Order should
be reversed.

POINT II.
THE AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING
DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
At no time prior to the entry of the Subject Order was
Defendant given any notice or right to be heard on the issue
of whether the judgment should be amended or a new judgment
entered in favor of Edwin Guyon rather than Plaintiff. It is
readily apparent that Defendant had a vital interest in such
13

decision inasmuch as the amendment, or new judgment, deprived
him

of

his

right

of offset with

respect

to

judgments

previously entered in his favor and against Plaintiff•

The

trial court acknowledged in the text of the Subject Order that
such order was entered without prior notice as a sua sponte
order.
The only motion before the trial court at the time of the
entry of the Subject Order was the "Motion For Stay Of Entry
Of Order and To Set Aside Judgment re Attorney's Fees" filed
on January 28, 1992 (hereinafter "Motion To Set Aside") (A
copy of the Motion To Set Aside is attached as Appendix,
Exhibit B ) . The Subject Order recited that it was entered
pursuant to this Motion To Set Aside. However, the Motion to
Set Aside made no claim that the prior judgment in favor of
Plaintiff

should be amended to name Edwin Guyon as the

judgment creditor nor did the motion otherwise give notice of
any

relief

that would

circumvent

Defendant's

offsetting

judgments. On the contrary, in the text of the Motion, Edwin
Guyon expressly acknowledged that the judgment was properly
entered in favor of Plaintiff and that "Plaintiff is entitled
to enforce the judgment."

(R. 1018, Appendix, Exhibit B ) .

14

Thus, at no time prior to the entry of the Subject Order
did Defendant have notice or opportunity to be heard to argue
the unfairness of changing the identity of the judgment
creditor to a person not subject to offsetting judgments and
claims. To the extent of the offsetting judgments and claims.
Defendant was deprived of property without due process of law.
In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the
Utah Supreme Court held:
Timely
and
adequate
notice
and
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
way are the very heart of procedural
fairness . . . .
An elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. The notice must be of
such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information, and it must afford
a reasonable time for those interested to
make their appearance.
Many cases have held that where notice is
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party
of the nature of the proceedings against
him or not given sufficiently in advance
of the proceeding to permit preparation,
a party is deprived of due process.
Accord, Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64
(Utah 1978);
Wells v. Children's Aid
Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984).

15

The Subject Order should be reversed inasmuch as it was
entered without affording Defendant procedural due process of
law.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE JUDGMENT
AFTER THE TIME PERIODS SPECIFIED IN RULES 59
and 60, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
A.

RULE 59(e)

Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as
follows:
A motion to alter or amend the judgment
shall be served not later than ten days
after entry of judgment.
The Subject Order violates the terms and provisions of
Rule 59(e).

At no time prior to the entry of the Subject

Order was any motion or other notice given to Defendant that
such amendment was contemplated or considered,

Moreover, if

the subject order is not considered as a new judgment entered
without notice or right to be heard, it must be construed as
an amendment to the judgment originally entered on October 30,
1991.

In such case, the amendment was made 189 days after the

original judgment.

16

At some point, the litigating parties must be able to
rely on the certainty of a final judgment.
case, by

reason

of

prior

rulings of

the

In the instant
trial court,

Defendant's belief that the matters relating to judgments and
offsets had been finally determined had been affirmed and
reaffirmed.
Defendant respectfully submits that a procedure allowing
amendments to judgments 189 days after the judgment is entered
opens the door to chaos and confusion with respect to finality
of litigation and violates the provisions of Rule 59(e).
B. RULE 60(b)
The Subject Order recited that it was entered pursuant to
a "Motion For Stay Of Entry Of Order And To Set Aside Judgment
re attorney's fees"

(hereinafter

"Motion To Set Aside")

(Appendix, Exhibit B). The referenced Motion To Set Aside was
filed by Edwin Guyon on January 28, 1992. Although the Motion
To Set Aside was filed within the time limits specified in
Rule 60(b), said Motion did not even suggest that the judgment
should

be amended to name Edwin Guyon as the judgment

creditor. On the contrary, the Motion To Set Aside expressly
acknowledged that the judgment for attorney's fees should be
in favor of Plaintiff and "Plaintiff is entitled to enforce

17

the judgment" (Appendix, Exhibit B, p. 1018, para, 4 ) . Thus,
on the date of the Subject Order, no motion requesting the
relief granted in the Subject Order had been filed.

This

circumstance was apparently acknowledged by the trial court
when it noted that the Subject Order was entered sua sponte.
Thus, the amendment of the judgment naming Edwin Guyon as the
judgment creditor was not made within the three-month time
period stated in Rule 60(b).

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING
THE SUBJECT ORDER ON THE BASIS OF MISTAKE.
According to the terms of the Subject Order, the entry of
judgment in favor of Edwin Guyon was made to correct a mistake
in originally entering judgment in favor of Plaintiff rather
than Edwin Guyon.

The rationale of "mistake" is contrary to

all facts and circumstances surrounding the entry of the
original judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

First, after entry

of the judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the trial court
considered and reconsidered the precise issue of Edwin Guyon's
rights to enforce the judgment for his direct benefit.

On

these occasions the trial court reaffirmed that the judgment
was in favor of Plaintiff, not Edwin Guyon, and subject to
18

offsetting judgments and claims of Defendant.

(See Temporary

Restraining Order, R. 999-1000, Appendix, Exhibit G;
Entry R. 1013-1014, Appendix, Exhibit H;

Minute

Order Quashing

Praecipe and Execution, R. 1031-1032, Appendix, Exhibit I).
Second, if a mistake had been made in not entering judgment in
favor of Edwin Guyon, it is readily apparent that Edwin Guyon
would

promptly notified the court of the mistake.

No such

notice was ever given to the court. In this regard, on April
8, 1992, Defendant submitted a proposed Decree to the trial
court (R. 581-589).

Paragraph 14 of the proposed Decree (R.

587) provided as follows:
Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff for the
use and benefit of her attorney, the sum
of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($7,500).
Said obligation shall be
discharged by installment payments in
accordance with an agreement between
Defendant and Plaintiff's attorney and
execution shall be stayed so long as
payments are made in accordance with the
agreement or subseguent court order. In
the event Defendant and Plaintiff's
attorney are unable to agree, the court
shall, after hearing, establish an
installment payment schedule.
On August 20, 1991, Edwin Guyon filed objections to the
proposed

decree

submitted

Appendix, Exhibit K).

by

Defendant.

(R. 797-800,

Mr. Guyon's objections to paragraph 14

of the proposed decree made no reference to any mistake in

ordering that the payments be made "to Plaintiff."

On the

contrary, Edwin Guyon's objections expressly demanded that
judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff.

Edwin Guyon's

objections to paragraph 14 of the proposed Decree were as
follows:
Attorney fees are a matter of judgment,
not agreement, defendant's obligation is
a matter of judgment, not agreement and,
in the event no agreement is reached,
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
enforce
judgment. (Emphasis added).
Edwin Guyon's objections were accepted

resulting

in the

wording of paragraph 14 of the final Decree awarding judgment
to Plaintiff.
Inasmuch as there was no mistake in entering the judgment
in favor of Plaintiff rather than Edwin Guyon, the rationale
for the Subject Order is invalid.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Subject Order should
be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that an element of chaos
would

be

imposed

in the judicial

system

if courts are

permitted to grant judgments in favor of persons whom are not
parties to the action, in favor of persons who the judgment
20

creditor did not even realize was his adversary, and without
notice or opportunity to be heard in the matter.

Moreover,

the procedure followed in this action imposes substantial
uncertainty with respect to the finality of judgments.
The Subject Order should be reversed so that the original
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and subject to setoffs and
pending

claims, would

be

reinstated

as

the measure of

Defendant's liability.
DATED this J)

day of October, 1992.

^ ^ vA. CS^O—"
Suzanne Benson
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and .accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant this
<y'' day of October, 1992, to the following:
Edwin F. Guyon
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 17697
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
James I. Watts ?
124 South 600 East #10'<T)
Salt Lake City, UT 8410/
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMERA MCDONALD,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Civil No. 894901447 DA

vs.

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

ROBERT MCDONALD,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

:

The Court notes that there is now before it a "Motion for
Stay of Entry of Order and to Set Aside Judgment RE: Attorneys
Fees," filed by Mr. Edward F. Guyon, and defendant's "Motion to
Dismiss the Motion of Ed Guyon Dated the 25th day of January,
1992 to Set Aside Judgment and Stay Entry of Order and Motion to
Enter Order

Consistent with the Court's Minute Entry."

The

Court has reviewed the entire history regarding this "Attorney's
Fees" matter and now enters an Order disposing of these motions
and resolving

the issue of plaintiff's

attorneys fees.

The

Court previously entered a minute entry dated the 16th day of
January, 1992 indicating that Mr. Guyon should look to plaintiff
for payment of his attorneys fees.

That opinion was based on

the precise wording of the Decree of Divorce which stated:

MEMO DECISION
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"Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant in the sum
of $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) as attorneys
fees."
The Court is of the opinion that the precise wording of the
Decree required that result.

Mr. Guyon has now filed a Motion

to Set Aside that judgment relating to attorneys fees relying on
Rule

60 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

After

reviewing

this

entire matter, including portions of the Court transcript cited
by the parties, and the Court's notes together with the Court's
recollection of this matter, the Court is the opinion that Mr.
Guyon's Motion is W€>11 taken.
that

Mr.

Guyon

be

given

a

It was and is the Court's intent
judgment

for

attorneys

fees

for

services rendered up to the time of the Court's order awarding
attorneys fees.
this matter
addressed

The technical language that finally emerged in

(although the specific issue here presented was not

earlier) granted the judgment

in favor of plaintiff

rather than to Mr. Guyon.
The Court is going to set aside that portion of the Decree
that granted plaintiff judgment for attorneys fees and is going
to sua sponte order an amendment to the Decree which grants a
judgment in favor of plaintiff's Counsel at the time, Mr. Edwin
Guyon, in the amount of $7,500.00.
The

Court

arrangement
willing

to

for

urged

the

payment

accept monthly

parties
of

to

attorneys

payments

as

try

to

fees.
the

work
Mr.

Court

out

Guyon

an
was

specifically

MCDONALD V. MCDONALD
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recalls during a colloquy between defense Counsel and Mr. Guyon
during hearings before the Court, and the Court continues to
encourage the parties to work out a payment arrangement but if
that is not possible then it appears to the Court that Mr. Guyon
would be entitled to collect on his judgment for attorneys fees
as provided by law.
This decision will serve as the order of the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

(

day of May, 1992.

PAGE 4

MCDONALD V. MCDONALD
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this ~"7

day of May, 1992:

Edwin F. Guyon
Attorney for Plaintiff
433 South 400 East

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Glen M. Richman
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAHT/CLERK
TAMERA A. McDONALD
plaintiff
vs

MOTION FOR STAY OF ENTRY
OF ORDER and TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT re ATTORNEY FEES

-

i|

ROBERT M. McDONALD

case no,
8949014^7 - DA
Judge Frank G. Noel

defendant
Plaintiff moves the court for an order staying the entry
of the proposed order and findings of fact forwarded to the court
by counsel for defendant on the 22nd day of January, 1992; and,
further, moves the court for an order, pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, setting aside the
Judgement herein entered as It relates to attorney fees and in
support thereof would show the court the following:
1.

On March

28, 1991 the court,

in making

oral

findings, conclusions and orders regarding attorney fees stated:
With regard to attorney's fees, the Court finds
that there is a need on the part of the plaintiff for
attorney / s fees and awards attorney's fees in the amount
of seventy-five hundred dollars, . . . March 28, 1991
transcript, page 9, lines 12 to 15,
2,

At the March 28, 1991 hearing above referenced the

following conversation occurred as a result of defendant's counsel
indicating that Mr. McDonald had some tax problems which prevented
him from borrowing money, to take care of this obligation, [trans.,
p. 14, lines 21 and 223:
Mr. Guyon:
I agree with that, Your Honor.
If it
places a cash flow burden on Mr. McDonald to pay

001016

those, I think we need to work some program out.
The Court:
Work out some payment. How much can he
pay a month on the attorney's fees? Let me ask you
this first. How long will it take to come up with
the $2,000 In Cash settlement?
Mr. Richman:
That is something that can be arranged
within thirty days. . . .
The Courtt

How much per month on the attorney's fees?

Mr. Richman:
Could we get with Mr. Guyon on that in the
next few days?
Mr. Guyon:

Yeah.

The Court:

Try and work that out.

Mr. Guyon Have no gripes about working with him on that
Issue, trans., p. 14, line 23 to p. 15, line 20.
[emphasis added]
3.

On April

8,

1991, and based upon

the findings,

conclusions and orders rendered during the proceedings concluded
March 28, 1991, counsel

for defendant forwarded to counsel for

Plaintiff proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and
proposed decree of divorce which contain the following references
to the payment of attorney fees:
Plaintiff requested alimony from Defendant and
payment of her attorney's fees. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 6, page 2. • • •
Defendant should be required to pay to
Plaintiff, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff's
attorney, the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($7,500.00).
By reason of the financial condition of
Defendant, said sum should not be immediately due and
payable. Said sum should be paid In accordance with an
agreement with Defendant and Plaintiff's attorney. In
the event Defendant and Plaintiff's attorney are unable
to agree as to a payment schedule, said matter should be
submitted to the Court for further determination.
Execution should be stayed so long as payments are made
In accordance with the aforesaid agreement or subsequent
order of the Court. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, paragraph 19, pages 14 and 15. [emphasis added]
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Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff for the use
and benefit of her attorney, the sum of Seven Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00). Said obligation shall
be discharged by Installment payments in accordance with
an agreement between Defendant and Plaintiffs attorney
and execution shall be stayed so long as payments are
made In accordance with the agreement or subsequent court
order. In the event Defendant and Plaintiffs attorney
are unable to agree, the Court shall, after hearing,
establish an installment payment schedule.
Decree of
Divorce, paragraph 14, page 7. [emphasis added]
4.

On August 16, 1991 plaintiff filed her objections to

the proposed findings and Judgment above referenced, in relevant
part as follows:
Objection to conclusions? page 14, paragraph
19; lines Iff - Statements regarding payment of attorney
fees are wholly without regard to representations by
plaintiffs counsel (see transcript, page 14, lines 23 to
25 and page 15, lines 1 to 20).
The purpose of
plaintiffs agreement regarding fees was made as a
courtesy, convenience and benefit to defendant, not to
change the terms and conditions of the Judgment nor to
permit defendant to unilaterally determine what he wasted
as payment schedules. . . .
Objections to decree: 6.
page 7, paragraph
14, lines Iff - Attorney fees are a matter of Judgment,
not agreement, defendant's obligation is a matter of
Judgment, not agreement and, in the event no agreement Is
reached, plaintiff is entitled to enforce Judgment,
5.
1991,

ruled

The court, in a memorandum decision dated October 9,
upon

the

above

referenced

objections

to proposed

findings and Judgment as follows*
Objections to conclusions of laws Plaintiff's
objection to paragraph 14; 19; 1 et. seq. is sustained.
Objections to decree: 6.
sustains plaintiffs objections.
6.

The

Court

The Court, also in its memorandum decision dated

October 9, 1991, Included the following Instruction:
Counsel for defendant
is to prepare new
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree
consistent with this decision, submit them to opposing

VOiOlS

counsel for approval as to form and then to the Court for
signature*
7.

At some time subsequent to October 9, 1991 Edwin F.

Guyon was Informed by plaintiff that she was in the process of
seeking other counsel and that she anticipated that it would be
J.I. Watts of Salt Lake City.
8.

On October 21, 1991 Edwin F. Guyon, as counsel for

plaintiff, forwarded to counsel for defendant a letter indicating
that he had received no information regarding the new findings of
fact, conclusions of law and Judgment as directed by the court on
October 9, 1991. A copy of said letter is attached hereto and made
a part hereof for all purposes labeled exhibit A.
9.
above

On October 25, 1991 Mr. Rlchman in response to the

letter (exhibit A) forwarded to Edwin F. Guyon a letter

Indicating that Mr. Watts had filed an appearance in the case and
that he was dealing with him (Mr. Watts). A copy of said letter Is
attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes labeled
exhibit B.
10.

On October 26, 1991, in response to the above letter

(exhibit B) Edwin F. Guyon forwarded a letter to Mr. Rlchman.

A

copy of said letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof for
all purposes labeled exhibit C.
11.

On or about November 15, 1991 Edwin F. Guyon, in

response to a call to the clerk of the court regarding the docket
sheet in the Instant matter, was advised that findings, conclusions
and Judgment had been entered on October 9, 1991.
12.

At

no

time

prior

to

entry

of

said

findings,

conclusions and decree above referenced did Glen M. Rlchman comply

001019

with the memorandum decision of the court dated October 9, 1991,
which states:
Counsel for defendant is to prepare new
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree
consistent with this decision, submit them to opposing
counsel for approval as to form and then to the Court for
signature,
13,

By Minute entry of the court dated January 16, 1992

Edwin F, Guyon, as counsel for plaintiff, was first Informed that
the precise

wording

of

the

Decree

of

Divorce

pertaining

to

attorneys fees had been altered from the form Indicated in the
earlier proposed orders to read as follows:
Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against defendant in the
sum of $7,500.00 (Seven thousand five hundred dollars) as
attorneys fees,
14,

At

no time

prior

to the

receipt

of

the

above

referenced minute entry dated January 16, 1992 was Edwin F, Guyon,
counsel for plaintiff, Informed of the alteration of the provision
in the decree related to attorney fees, nor did Glen M, Rlchman
notify, either orally or In writing of the alternation of the terms
of said decree provision.
Wherefore defendant moves the court for an order setting
aside the portions of the October 99, 1991 Judgment as It relates
to attorney

fees and staying the entry

of any order

thereto

relating until a hearing on the Instant motion is had.
Dated the ^ d E _ Z _ day of ,

Edwin F. 'Gutfon, counsel fp^ plaint if f

noi02n

I certify that on the above date a copy of the foregoing
was mailed, first class, postage prepaid to Glen M. Rlchman, Esq.,
60 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 and James I.
Watts, Esq., 124 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102.

3&c£&cfi' ^s.
Jotwmdt/fau

. 3 ^Up&fts

#JJ S/Lie #005£*a

4t£ JJLAM*

<r0//jss-<fcr//
&L> 00//SSA0JSS
October 21, 1991
Glen M. Rlchman, Esq.
60 south 600 East, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102

RE:

McDonald v. McDonald

Inasmuch as I have not heard from you regarding the preparation of
new findings of fact, conclusions of law and Judgment as directed
by Judge Noel in his memorandum decision of October 9, 1991, I wish
to notify you that, unless payment in full of the amounts awarded
as attorney fees are made prior to November 1, 1991, I wi 11 cause
execution to issue to obtain such funds from your client.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Kindest regards*

Edwin F. Gy
EG/me
cc

J,I. Watts, Esq.
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RICHMAN & RICHMAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Glen M. Richman

60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Barbara W. Richman
(of counsel)

(801) 532-8844
FAX (801) 596-8285

October 25, 1991

Edwin F. Guyon, Esq.
43 3 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, 84111
Re:

McDonald v. McDonald

Dear Mr. Guyon:
I received your letter dated October 21, 1991, on October 22,
1991 regarding the McDonald matter and your intention to execute
against my client's assets to collect your attorney's fees for your
representation of Tamera McDonald.
I have passed the content of your letter onto Mr. McDonald.
I will be in touch with you regarding his reply.
I have been dealing with Mr. Watts on this matter since he
entered an appearance in the case. He related to me that you have
refused to file a withdrawal. If you feel I should be dealing with
you on the case, please advise and let me see something from one of
you signed by Tamera McDonald stating which of you represents her.
Sincerely yours,
RICHMAN & RICHMAN

l^llf\{H^l^^

V
GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorney at Law
GMR:11
cc:

Robert M. McDonald
James Watts

OQ109?

M33 9ocUk 400 iaU
S01/355.S&H
fFax S01/SU235S

October 26, 1991
Glen M. Rlchman, Esq.
60 South 600 East, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
RE:

McDonald v. McDonald

I read with great surprise your letter of October 25, 1991. Please
be advised that I am counsel of record and, unless and until you
are advised otherwise by me, will remain so.
I believe the rules specify that, in the event a party is
represented by more than one attorney, you are obligated to provide
notice of your activities to both.
To the extent that you have communicated with other counsel without
notifying me, please forward to me any and all documents involved
in such communication and inform me Cin writing) of the time, date
and content of any oral communications with Mr. Watts to which I
was not a party.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Kindest regards.

cc

J . I . W a t t s , Esq.

nn-jnoM

Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844

ERK

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

TAMERA A. McDONALD,
Plaintiff,

vs.

MOTION TO DISMISS THE
MOTION OF ED GUYON DATED
THE 25TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1992
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND STAY
ENTRY OF ORDER AND MOTION TO
ENTER ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THE
COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY
Civil No.

ROBERT M. MCDONALD,

89-4901447 DA

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.

Defendant, through counsel, moves the Court to dismiss the
motion of Mr. Ed Guyon as above referred to for the following
reasons:
1.

Mr. Ed Guyon has no standing before the Court on the

issue of attorney's fees av/arded to Plaintiff
2.

Mr. Guyon cannot act on behalf of Plaintiff because he

does not represent her.
3.

Said motion as it purports to be brought under Rule 60 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is premature and inappropriate as
it may relate to an order that is not entered.

H01Q25

4.

If Mr. Guyon's motion under Rule 60 (b) relates to the

Decree itself, it is without merit and pertains to a matter upon
which the Court has ruled and has sustained its ruling as shown by
the Court7s Minute Entry dated the 16th day of January, 1992. The
Decree that has carried the language upon which the Court has ruled
was reviewed by Mr. Guyon over a considerable period of time; it
was a decree to which he made numerous objections, but at no time
did he make objections to the language with which he now disagrees.
5.

Defendant requests the Court to enter the Findings and

Order submitted herewith.
6.

This Motion to Dismiss will be supported by a Memorandum

of Points and Authorities.
DATED this

y

day of February, 1992.
RICHMAN & RICHMAN

GLEN M. RICHMAN/
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH
)ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Leora Loy, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
follows:
She is a secretary in the law firm of RICHMAN & RICHMAN,
attorneys for Defendant herein.,
That she served the attached Motion to Dismiss the Motion of
Ed Guyon dated January 25, 1992, upon Plaintiff by placing a copy
in an envelope addressed tc:
James I. Watts, Esq.
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
and
Edwin F. Guyon, Esq.
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and depositing the same, sealed with first class postage prepaid
thereofin the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
^"^Tday of February, 1992 and also hand delivering the same.
cSC-Q^&>i^
Leora Loy
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of February,

1992.
NOTARY PUBUC

GLENM RICHMAN
60 So 600 East #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
MyComm Expires 8-10-93
Stats of Utah

t/yw^L*^
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah

My Commission Expires:
8-10-93
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Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844

By.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMERA A. MCDONALD,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

a-av-si-^sio^.

ROBERT M. MCDONALD,

Civil No,

Defendant.

89-4901447 DA

Judge Frank G. Noel

The above matter came on for hearing before the Court, the
Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel in his courtroom on the 17th day of
January, 1991 pursuant to the defendant's Motion for Contempt,
Sanctions and Fees and defendant's Motion for an independent mental
and psychological Examination under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure,
The plaintiff moved the Court to continue the hearing on
contempt on the basis that the plaintiff who resides in Denver,
Colorado, planned to arrive in Salt Lake on the 18th of January; is
employed in Denver and unable to reschedule her travel arrangements
or rearrange her work schedule to participate in the hearing
without substantial expense.

The plaintiff, through her attorney, objected to the motion
under Rule 35 as not conforming to said Rule.
The Court heard arguments of counsel and denied plaintiff's
motion to continue the hearing on contempt; d€*nied plaintiff's
objection to the defendant's motion under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure; granted defendant's motion for an independent
mental and psychological examination of the plaintiff by Dr. Ralph
Gant at the expense of the defendant.
The Court further ordered that defendant's counsel communicate
with Dr. Ralph Gant as to the scope, time, place, manner and
conditions of the examination to be done and report to the Court so
that those items may be included in the Court's Order.
The Court found that there was good cause shown for the
independent examination.
The Court then heard testimony concerning the matters of
contempt, fees and sanctions and heard argument of counsel; found
the plaintiff

in contempt

of the Court's

order

and

imposed

sanctions.
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff's motion to continue the hearing on contempt is

denied.

2
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2.

Plaintiff's objection to the motion of defendant for an

independent mental and psychological examination under Rule 35 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is denied.
3.

Defendant's

motion

for

an

independent

mental

and

psychological examination of the plaintiff by Dr. Ralph Gant is
granted. Defendant, through his counsel, is to report to the Court
the time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the examination to
be done after communicating with Dr. Ralph Gant, and a report
thereof to be filed with the Court and counsel for the plaintiff.
4.

The Court finds plaintiff in contempt of the Court's

order regarding visitation by not bringing the child home at the
scheduled time on the 23rd of December, 1990; by picking the child
up earlier than scheduled on January 3, 1991; by bringing the child
back two days later than scheduled on January 9, 1991; by failing
to let the defendant know the flight the child was to be on and the
time the flight would arrive, and not delivering the child to the
defendant as soon as possible after arrival on her flight on the
23rd of December, 1990.
5.

The Court imposes as a sanction, a sentence upon the

plaintiff to serve five (5) days in the Salt Lake County jail;
withholds execution of the sentence and allows the plaintiff to
purge herself of the contempt by abiding strictly to the Court
orders, requires a report to be made by the end of January, 1991 of
3
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the visitation scheduled for the weekend of the 18th of January,
1991; requires further that the next visitation period on the first
weekend of February shall also be reported to the Court.

Said

reports of visitation shall be prepared by counsel for defendant
and forwarded to the Court.
6.

The Court further awards judgment against the plaintiff

in favor of defendant for the use and benefit of his attorney; fees
in the sum of $250.00.
7.

The Court has previously ordered that an evaluation be

made concerning the use of alcohol or drugs of each of the parties
to determine if treatment is needed, and if so to recommend a
program for the appropriate party or for one or each of the parties
if required; withholding a determination as to payment of the
expenses thereof for further hearing until after the evaluation and
recommendation is made; ordered the parties to submit names of
those who could be chosen to do the evaluation.

Each of the

parties through counsel have submitted three names.

The Court

restates that order and will make a determination as to an
evaluator and will inform the parties through counsel, whereupon
each of the parties is ordered forthwith, within a reasonable time,
to make an appointment and to complete the evaluation.
8.

This matter is set for a first place setting for final

trial of the remaining issues on the 25th day of March, 1991,
4
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beginning at 10:00 a.m.

Anticipated trial time is three days,

March 25, 26 and 27, 1991.
9.

The mental and psychological examination of plaintiff

shall be completed in accordance with the following:
a.

Time: The examination is to be on either the 15th or the

18th of February, beginning at the hour of 1:00 p.m., and will last
approximately seven (7) hours, or until completed.

The choice of

those dates should be made known to Dr. Gant's office as soon as
possible, and no later than the next five (5) days.
b.
form

of

Manner:
clinical

psychological

The manner of the examination will be in the
interviews

testing,

and

including

objective
the

and

Minnesota

subjective
Multi-Phasic

Personality Inventory.
c.

The conditions

and

place of the examination.

The

examination will occur in the office of Dr. Ralph Gant at 716 East
4500 South, Suite N 150, Salt Lake City, Utah

84107; telephone

number 263-1103.
d.
assessment

Scope:
of

The

scope of the examination

intellectual

functioning;

an

shall be an

assessment

of

personality functioning as/and evidenced by history and examination
of dissociative process.
e.

A written report will be prepared.

Person conducting the examination: The examination will

be conducted by Dr. Ralph Gant, a licensed psychologist.

5
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DATED this

%

day of February, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

EDWIN F. GUYON
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
Glen M. Richman certifies that he served the attached Order
and Judgment upon plaintiff by placing a copy in an envelope
addressed to:
Edwin F. Guyon, Esq.
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and hand delivering the same this

I ff day of January, 1991.
RICHMAN & RICHMAN

r
GLEN M. RICHMAN *
Attorney for Defendant
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Glen M. Richman ( 2 7 5 2 )
A t t o r n e y for Defendant
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S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84102
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Telephone: (801) 532-8844

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AMD FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TAMERA A. McDONALD,

:

Plaintiff,

£* * ^

J^

>, ^r-.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.

Civil No. 89-4901447

ROBERT M. MCDONALD,

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
Hearing on the Order to Show Cause heretofore entered by the
Court on Monday, July 15, 1991, was held before the Honorable Frank
Noel, District Judge, on Monday, July 29, 1991.
hearing

were

Plaintiff and

her attorney

Edwin

Present at said
F. Guyon and

Defendant and his attorney Glen M. Richman. The Court having heard
the evidence presented by the parties and being fully advised in
the premises, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The second segment of summer visitation as specified in

the decision announced by the Court at conclusion of trial is
hereby forfeited and canceled and Plaintiff shall have no right to
visit the child for all or any portion of the second three-week
segment of summer visitation.

00Q794

2.

Plaintiff shall retain all other visitation rights as

provided by the decision of the Court at the conclusion of the
trial of this matter and which shall be more particularly stated in
the Decree of Divorce.

Provided, however, that such visitation

shall be subject to strict supervision for a period of three (3)
months.

The

recommendations

identity

supervisor

of Dr. Mercedes

shall

be

based

upon

Riesinger, the child

the

custody

evaluator appointed by the Court in this action. The requirements
with respect to the supervised visitation shall be stated in a
separate order.
3.

As a sanction for contempt of Court, judgment is hereby

entered for and on behalf of Defendant, Robert M. McDonald, and
against Plaintiff, Tamera A. McDonald, in a sum of $3,846.00. Said
judgment shall hereafter bear interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum.
DATED this

y

day of *t&y, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

>-N

HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL \^
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 1991, I

served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment

2

00O7or

upon the following named persons by depositing said document in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Edwin F. Guy on
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 17697
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
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Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844
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—

—
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMERA A. McDONALD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT M. MCDONALD,
Defendant,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

DECREE OF DIVORCE
(Integration of Prior Orders)

Civil No.

89-4901447 DA

Judge Frank G. Noel

The trial of this matter was held before the Honorable Frank
G. Noel, District Judge, commencing on Monday, March 25, and
concluding March 28, 1991. Prior to trial, the Court made various
orders relating to the issues raised by the pleadings that are
incorporated herein. Present at the trial and prior hearings were
Plaintiff and her attorney, Edwin F. Guyon, and Defendant and his
attorney, Glen M. Richman.

The Court having considered the

evidence presented by the parties, and being fully advised in the
premises, and good cause appearing therefore, and having heretofore
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby

ORDERED# ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

On the basis of evidence presented to the Court on

December 19, 1990, and the Findings and Conclusions of the Court
with respect thereto, Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded a Decree
of Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences which was
entered on the 7th day of January, 1991.
2.

Defendant is awarded 'the care, custody and control of the

minor child born of the marriage, Robert Andrew McDonald, born
September 11, 1987, subject to reasonable and liberal rights of
visitation on the part of Plaintiff as specifically described
hereunder or as the parties may agree.
3.

Plaintiff shall have the right to visit the child born of

the marriage as follows: alternate weekends to commence on Friday
at 9:00 p.m. and to end on Sunday at 8:00 p.m.; holiday visitation
on alternate red-letter holidays, (New Years, President's Day,
Easter, Mother's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day,
one day during the week of the child's birthday, Thanksgiving,
Christmas); and six (6) weeks during the summer months of June,
July and August, provided, however, that summer visitation shall be
exercised in no les«/than two (2) segments not to exceed three (3)
weeks each.

The extended visitation during the summer months is

under review by the Court as if on a motion to conform to standard
summer visitation as applied in the Third District Court of four
2

(4) weeks, but in two (2) equal segments.

The Court shall review

the matter without prejudice to either party, and without the need
to show a change of circumstances.

The matter may be briefed by

each party in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration.

Defendant shall file a memorandum of

points and authorities and Plaintiff may respond thereto.

Either

party shall file a notice to submit for ruling after Plaintiff's
memorandum

and

the matter

shall

be

determined

without

oral

argument, A Plaintiff is required to give notice of intent to
exercise weekend visitation at least ten (10) days prior to the
commencement of the weekend visitation period and shall give notice
of intent and desired date to exercise summer visitation prior to
May 1 of each calendar year.
accumulate.

Unexercised visitation shall not

Other visitation-shall be as the parties may agree.

However, their agreement must be in writing.
4.

Each of the parties is ordered to fully cooperate in

visitation and custody matters and shall adhere strictly to the
provisions of the Decree. Defendant shall have the child available
and ready for visitation at the appointed times.

Plaintiff shall

promptly return the minor child to Defendant timely and without
incident, at the conclusion of each visitation period. Failure to
return the child to Defendant at the conclusion of the agreed
visitation period may be punishable by contempt of court by ex3

parte order obtained upon Defendant's appropriate affidavit.
5.

Defendant

is ordered

to pay to Plaintiff, for her

continued maintenance and support, the sum of Three Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($350.00) per month as alimony, payable 1/2 on the 5th and
1/2 of the 20th of applicable* months, beginning in April, 1991.
Said obligation shall absolutely cease and terminette at the end of
March, 1996 or such earlier time of Plaintiff's death, remarriage,
or cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex.

Defendant may

pay to Plaintiff a sum of money equal to the difference between the
alimony award stated herein and Plaintiff's obligation to Defendant
for child support during" the time alimony is applicable.

In the

event Defendant elects to exercise this method of payment, the
difference between alimony and child support shall be regarded as
full payment of Defendant's alimony obligation.
6.

Child support shall bie as established by the Utah Uniform

Child Support Guidelines as found in §78-45-7.2 - §78-45-7.14 Utah
Code Annotated.

Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant, for the use and

benefit of the child born of the marriage, the sum of Three Hundred
Two Dollars Fifty Cents ($302.5>u) per month as child support. Said
payment

obligation

shall commence

in April, 1991, and shall

continue until such time as the child attains the age of eighteen
(18) years or graduates

from high school with his expected

graduating class, whichever last occurs.
4

In the event Defendant

exercises the method of payment of alimony stated in the preceding
paragraph, Plaintiff's child support obligation shall be discharged
by an off-set against Defendant's alimony obligation to Plaintiff
during the applicable period.

Fifty percent (50%) of the child

support shall abate for periods of visitation with Plaintiff for
twenty five (25) or more consecutive days of any thirty (30) day
period in accordance with §75-45-7.11 Utah Code Annotated.
7.

In

accordance

with

§78-45-7, Utah

Code

Annotated,

Defendant is ordered to maintain hospital and medical insurance in
effect for the minor child during his minority to age 18 years so
long as it is reasonably available to him at a reasonable cost
through his employment.

Plaintiff is also ordered to maintain

hospital and medical insurance for the benefit of the minor child
during minority to age 18, provided it is reasonably available to
her through her employment at a reasonable cost.

Each of the

parties shall be responsible to pay one-half of any hospital,
medical and dental expenses incurred for the minor child, including
orthodontics, not otherwise covered by insurance.
8.

Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and

to the real property situated 1167 Brickyard Road, #802, Salt Lake
City, Utah, more particularly described as:
Unit No. 802 in Building 8 of Brickyard Condominiums,
Phase I, together with the undivided ownership interest
in the common areas and facilities which is actually
appurtenant to said .unit,' and subject to the project's
5

declaration, which provides for alteration both in the
magnitude of said undivided ownership interest in the
composition of the common areas and facilities to which
said interest relates, all of which is set forth,
established and identified on the record of survey map of
the Brickyard, Phase I, filed for record in the office of
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, on the
18th day of August, 1978, in Book 78-8, Page 231 of
Plats, as Entry No. 3155499 and as set forth in the
declaration for the said Brickyard Condominiums, Phase I,
dated the 5th day of June, 1978 and recorded cis Entry No.
3155498 in Book 4725 at Page 830 of official records,
subject to and together with all easements and rights of
way as shown and described in said Record of Survey Map
and as set forth in said declaration of said Brickyard
Condominium, Phase I, including, but not limited to
Brickyard Declaration dated the 18th day of August, 1978
and recorded on the 18th day of August, 1978 as Entry No.
3155497 in Book 4725 at Page 814 of official records, and
all amendments thereto
free and clear of all claims of Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall execute
and deliver to Defendant any and all deeds or other documents
necessary to clear record title to said property in Defendant's
sole name.
9.

Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and

to the personal property described on Exhibits "A", "D" and "E"
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Plaintiff

shall execute and deliver to Defendant any and all certificates of
title or other documents necessary to establish record title in
said property in Defendant's sole name.
10.

Plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest in and

to the personal property described on Exhibits "B" and "F" attached
hereto and incorporated.• herein by reference.
6

Defendant shall

execute and deliver to Plaintiff any and all certificates of title
or other documents necessary to establish record title to said
property in Plaintiff's sole name.
11.

In order to equalize the division of personal property

values, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of Two Thousand
Forty Two Dollars Fifty Cents ($2,042.50) within thirty (30) days
after the entry of this Decree.
12.

Defendant shall pay and discharge all obligations to the

following creditors:
CREDITOR

APPROXIMATE
BALANCE

MONTHLY
PAYMENT

Valley Mortgage Co.
Ford Motor Credit
Mt. America C.U.(Lincoln)
Internal Revenue Service
Utah State Tax Comm.
Pension Plan
Centurion Bank

$55,000.00
20,000.00
7,000.00
30,000.00
8,000.00
20,000.00
9,000.00

$635.59
657.00
469.70
500.00
300.00
385.00

Brickyard Homeowners Assoc.

99.00

Defendant shall indemnify Plaintiff and save her harmless from
liability with respect to the claims of said creditors arising out
of the indebtedness above described in this paragraph.
13.
following

Plaintiff shall pay and discharge all obligations to the
creditor:

Mountain

America

Credit

Union

in

the

approximate amount of S17.44S.00 secured by the 1988 Ford van.
Plaintiff shall indemnify Defendant and save him harmless from
liability from the claims of the creditor described
7

in this

paragraph.
14.
sum

of

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the
Seven

Thousand

Five

Hundred

Dollars

($7,500.00)

as

attorney's fees.
15.

The parties are enjoined from making

any derogatory

statements concerning the other party in the presence of the minor
child.
16.

In the event Plaintiff enters Defendant's home over the

objection of Defendant, an ex parte injunction shall be entered by
the Court enjoining such entry upon filing by Defendant of an
appropriate affidavit noting such unauthorized entry.
17.

The parties are each required to execute any and all

documents necessary to implement the provisions of this Decree.
DATED this o>ff *" day of October, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

<u^

HONORABLE FRANK G. WOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TPtiP r^v r~ *»•
0RIGW4L DOf L r r T ' J
^ •= - A'\
DISTRICT r V_- ' '•
- 1 .-. •• •'•?

JAMES I. WATTS
Attorney for Plaintiff
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FU.EDW3TMCT COURT
Third Judicial District

Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844

DEC 1 2 1991
utyCtarfc

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMKRA A . MCDONALD,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE
(Integration of Prior Orders)

vs.

Civil No.

89-4901447 DA

ROBERT M. MCDONALD,
Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendant.

The trial of this matter was held before the Honorable Frank
G. Noel, District Judge, commencing on Monday, March 25, and
concluding March 28, 1991. Prior to trial, the Court made various
orders relating to the issues raised by the pleadings that are
incorporated herein. Present at the trial and prior hearings were
Plaintiff and her attorney, Edwin F. Guyon, and Defendant and his
attorney, Glen M. Richman.

The Court having considered the

evidence presented by the parties, and being fully advised in the
premises, and good cause appearing therefore, and having heretofore
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby

ORDERED# ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

On the basis of evidence presented to the Court on

December 19, 1990, and the Findings and Conclusions of the Court
with respect thereto, Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded a Decree
of Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences which was
entered on the 7th day of January, 1991.
2.

Defendant is awarded the care, custody and control of the

minor child born of the marriage, Robert Andrew McDonald, born
September 11, 1987, subject to reasonable and liberal rights of
visitation on the part of Plaintiff as specifically described
hereunder or as the parties mav agree.

In the event the parties

agree to visitation in excess of the visitation specified in the
following paragraph, the parties shall acknowledge the terms and
provisions of such agreement for additional visitation in writing
prior to exercise of the visitation including, but not limited to,
the date, time and place when the child shall be returned.
Plaintiff is hereby ordered to strictly abide by the conditions
stated in the writing and failure to do so shall be a violation of
the provisions of this Decree and the Court may impose sanctions or
punishment as it deems appropriate.
3.

Plaintiff shall have the right to visit the child born of

the marriage as follows: alternate weekends to commence on Friday
at 9:00 p.m. and to end on Sunday following at 8:00 p.m.; holiday
2

visitation on alternate red-letter holidays specified herein:

in

odd numbered calendar years New Year's vistation from December 29
of the preceding year to January 2 of the odd numbered year, Martin
Luther King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, Labor Day and
Christmas vacation from December

23 to December

28; in even

numbered calendar years, Easter, Independence Day, and Thcinksgiving
Day; Mother's Day of every calendar year and Plaintiff's birthday
in every calendar year.

Plaintiff shall have the right to visit

the child on the child's birthday in even nunmbered calendar years
and, in odd numbered calendar years, the right to visit the child
on a date in close proximity (within 10 days) of the child's
birthday.

Defendant shall have the right in all calendar years to

spend the following days with the child: Father's Day, Defendant's
birthday and all holidays not designated for visitation with
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff shall also have summer visitation for six

weeks during the months of June, July and August, provided,
however, the visit shall be exercised in no less than two (2)
segments not to exceed three (3) weeks.

The extended visitation

during the summer months is under review by the Court.

The Court

shall review the matter without prejudice to either party, and
without the need to show a change of circumstances. The matter may
be briefed by each party in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Rules

of

Judicial

Administration.
3

Defendant

shall

file

a

memorandum of points and authorities and Plaintiff may respond
thereto.

Either party shall file a notice to submit for ruling

after Plaintiff's memorandum and the matter shall be determined
without oral argument.
visitation schedule.

Holidays take precedence over the weekend

No changes shall be made to the established

rotation of alternate weekends.

It is understood this may result

in Plaintiff losing a regular visitaiton (a weekend falling on a
holiday reserved to Defendant) or may result in Plaintiff having
consecutive weekends (when the first of said weekends is a regular
weekend visitation).. Plaintiff is required to give notice of
intent to exercise weekend visitation at least ten (10) days prior
to the commencement of the weekend visitation period and shall give
notice of intent and desired date to exercise summer visitation
prior to May 1 of each calendar year. Unexercised visitation shall
not accumulate. Other visitation shall be as the parties may agree
in writing.
4.

Each of the parties is ordered to fully cooperate in

visitation and custody matters and shall adhere strictly to the
provisions of the Decree. Defendant shall have the child available
and ready for visitation at the appointed times.

Plaintiff shall

promptly return the minor child to Defendant timely and without
incident, at the conclusion of each visitation period. Failure to
return the child to Defendant at the conclusion of the agreed
4

visitation period may be punishable by contempt of court by exparte order obtained upon Defendant's appropriate affidavit.
5.

Defendant

is ordered

to pay to Plaintiff, for her

continued maintenance and support, the sum of Three Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($350.00) per month as alimony, payable 1/2 on the 5th and
1/2 of the 20th of applicable months, beginning in April, 1991.
Said obligation shall absolutely cease and terminate at the end of
March, 1996 or such earlier time of Plaintiff's death, remarriage,
or cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex.

Defendant may

pay to Plaintiff a sum of money equal to the difference between the
alimony award stated herein and, Plaintiff s obligation to Defendant
for child support during the time alimony is applicable.

In the

event Defendant elects to exercise this method of payment, the
difference between alimony and child support shall be regarded as
full payment of Defendant's alimony obligation.
6.

Child support shall be as established by the Utah Uniform

Child Support Guidelines as found in §78-45-7.2 - §78-45-7.14 Utah
Code Annotated.

Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant, for the use and

benefit of the child born of the marriage, the sum of Three Hundred
Two Dollars Fifty Cents ($302.50) per month as child support. Said
payment

obligation

shall commence

in April, 1991, and shall

continue until such time as the child attains the age of eighteen
(18) years or graduates from high school with his expected
5

graduating class, whichever last occurs•

In the event Defendant

exercises the method of payment of alimony stated in the preceding
paragraph, Plaintiff's child support obligation shall be discharged
by an off-set against Defendant's alimony obligation to Plaintiff
during the applicable period.

Fifty percent (50%) of the child

support shall abate for periods of visitation with Plaintiff for
twenty five (25) or more consecutive days of any thirty (30) day
period in accordance with §75-45-7.11 Utah Code Annotated.
7.

In

accordance

with

§78-45-7, Utah

Code

Annotated,

Defendant is ordered to maintain hospital and medical insurance in
effect for the minor child during his minority to age 18 years so
long as it is reasonably available to him at a reasonable cost
through his employment.

Plaintiff is also ordered to maintain

hospital and medical insurance for the benefit of the minor child
during minority to age 18, provided it is reasonably available to
her through her employment at a reasonable cost.

Each of the

parties shall be responsible to pay one-half of any hospital,
medical and dental expenses incurred for the minor child, including
orthodontics, not otherwise covered by insurance.
8.

Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and

to the real property situated 1167 Brickyard Road, #802, Salt Lake
City, Utah, more particularly described as:
Unit No. 802 in Building 8 of Brickyard Condominiums,
Phase I, together with the undivided ownership interest
6

in the common areas and facilities which is actually
appurtenant to said unit, and subject to the project's
declaration, which provides for alteration both in the
magnitude of said undivided ownership interest in the
composition of the common areas and facilities to which
said interest relates, all of which is set forth,
established and identified on the record of survey map of
the Brickyard, Phase I, filed for record in the office of
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, on the
18th day of August, 1978, in Book 78-8, Page 231 of
Plats, as Entry No. 3155499 and as set forth in the
declaration for the said Brickyard Condominiums, Phase I,
dated the 5th day of June, 1978 and recorded as Entry No.
3155498 in Book 4725 at Page 830 of official records,
subject to and together with all easements and rights of
way as shown and described in said Record of Survey Map
and as set forth in said declaration of said Brickyard
Condominium, Phase I, including, but not limited to
Brickyard Declaration dated the 18th day of August, 1978
and recorded on the 18th day of August, 1978 as Entry No.
3155497 in Book 4725 at Page 814 of official records, and
all amendments thereto
free and clear of all claims of Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall execute
and deliver to Defendant any and all deeds or other documents
necessary to clear record title to said property in Defendant's
sole name.
9.

Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and

to the personal property described on Exhibits "A", nDff and nE,f
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Plaintiff

shall execute and deliver to Defendant any and all certificates of
title or other documents necessary to establish record title in
said property in Defendant's sole name.
10.

Plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest in and

to the personal property described on Exhibits "B" and "F" attached
7

hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Defendant shall

execute and deliver to Plaintiff any and all certificates of title
or other documents necessary to establish record title to said
property in Plaintiff's sole name.
11.

In order to equalize the division of personal property

values, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of Two Thousand
Forty Two Dollars Fifty Cents ($2,042.50) within thirty (30) days
after the entry of this Decree.
12.

Defendant shall pay and discharge all obligations to the

following creditors:
APPROXIMATE
BALANCE
$55,000.00
20,000.00
7,000.00
30,000.00
8,000.00
20,000.00
9,000.00

CREDITOR
Valley Mortgage Co.
Ford Motor Credit
Mt. America C.U.(Lincoln)
Internal Revenue Service
Utah State Tax Comm.
Pension Plan
Centurion Bank

MONTHLY
PAYMENT
$635.59
657.00
469.70
500.00
300.00
385.00

Brickyard Homeowners Assoc.

99.00

Defendant shall indemnify Plaintiff and save her harmless from
liability with respect to the claims of said creditors arising out
of the indebtedness above described in this paragraph.
13.
following

Plaintiff shall pay &nd discharge all obligations to the
creditor:

Mountain

America

Credit

Union

in

the

approximate amount of $17,443.00 secured by the 1988 Ford van.
Plaintiff shall indemnify Defendant and save him harmless from
8

liability

from

the

claims

of

the

creditor

described

in

this

paragraph.
14.
sum

of

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the
Seven

Thousand

Five

Hundred

Dollars

($7,500.00)

as

attorney's fees.
15.

The

parties

are

enjoined

from

making

any

derogatory

statements concerning the other party in the presence of the minor
child.
16.

In the event Plaintiff enters Defendant's home over the

objection of Defendant, an ex parte injunction shall be entered by
the

Court

enjoining

such entry

upon

filing by

Defendant

of

appropriate affidavit noting such unauthorized entry.
17.

The parties are each required to execute any and all

documents necessary to implement the provisions of this Decree.
DATED this

( £

day of December, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE FRANK G. J\0EL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FORM AND CONTENT:
DATE:
WATTS

brney for Plaintiff
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Glen M. Richraan (275 2)
A t t o r n e y for Defendant
60 South 600 E a s t , S u i t e 100
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMERA A. MCDONALD,
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Plaintiff,

vs

Civil No. 89-4901447

ROBERT M. MCDONALD,
Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendant.

Based

upon the

affidavits

of Defendant

dated

November

25,

1991, and December 16, 1991, and good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff, Edwin Guyon and
any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of Plaintiff or
Edwin Guyon, including Constable John Sindt, are hereby restrained
from
1991,

conducting
or

at

a sale of Defendant's

any

other

time,

or

in

property

any

other

on December
manner

19,

selling,

transferring or assigning or purporting to sell, transfer or assign
any of Defendant's property.
This Order is based upon the following findings by the Court:
1.

The sale of Defendant's property

purports to be based

upon a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant
in the sum of $7,500.00, and Defendant appears to have valid set-

BATE

/fd?

CP/R
UPON
SINDT

000999

offs against said judgment in the sum of $4,096.00 by reason of
judgments heretofore entered in favor of Defendant and against
Plaintiff.
2.

It appears that Plaintiff has failed and refused to

comply with the prior order of the Court that she pay and discharge
all indebtedness to Mountain America Credit Union secured by the
1988 Ford van and that such failure gives rise to a claim on the
part of Defendant

against

Plaintiff

is a sum

in excess of

$3,404.00, which would totally set-off and discharge the judgment
upon the proposed sale is based.
3.

Defendant

has

filed

a motion

for

judgment

against

Plaintiff arising out of Plaintiff's failure to pay indebtedness to
Mountain America Credit Union and it appears probable that said
motion would be granted. If such motion were granted, the judgment
of $7/500.00/ upon which the proposed sale is based/ would be fully
paid and discharged.
4.

Defendant may be irreparably harmed if the sale scheduled

for December 19, 199lf is not restrained.
This Temporary Restraining Order is entered after the Court
has made telephone contact with Edwin Guyon and given Edwin Guyon
full opportunity to address the merits of Defendant's motion for
temporary restraining order.
This Temporary Restraining Order is granted this
December, 1991/ at the hour of

// % LsJ

expire by its terms on December ^D j

f '

day of

Q\ .m. and shall
,

1991/ at the hour of

ooiopo

/

//y^*b
shown .

^A^y^A

/f^- »m. u n l e s s extended by t h e Court for good cause

Usfrrr^ CJL ^v^v

'&%? ~ V ^ ^ A - ,

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUD'
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMERA A. McDONALD,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

Civil No. 894901447 DA

vs.

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

ROBERT M. MCDONALD,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Now

before

:

the

Court

is defendant's

Motion

to

Quash

Praecipe and Execution and Alternative Motion to Stay Enforcment
of Praecipe and Execution.

The Court has reviewed the memos and

affidavits filed in connection with said Motion and now rules as
follows:
The precise wording of the Decree of Divorce pertaining
to attorneys fees is as follows:
"Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant in the
sum of $7,500.00 (Seven thousand five hundred dollars)
as attorneys fees."
The Court is of the opinion that this is a judgment
granted in favor of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff's Counsel must

look to plaintiff for the actual payment of his attorneys fees.
The record

does not reflect the current balance

claimed by

either plaintiff or plaintiff's Counsel, to be owed for attorneys

MCDONALD V. MCDONALD

fees.

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

In any event the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff's

Counsel must look to plaintiff

for payment of his fees and

accordingly

to

grants

the

Motion

Quash

the

Praecipe

and

Execution.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order consistent
with this ruling.
DATED this

/
/(y

day of January, 1992.

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUD'

001014
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MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

li/D

day of January, 1992:

Edwin F. Guyon
Attorney for Plaintiff
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Glen M. Richman
Attorney for Defendant
-60 South 60a East,—Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102

jJjPsri

s?i/S
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1 -si-ci Judicsal District

FEB 0 7 1992

Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMERA A. MCDONALD,
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:
r:
:

ROBERT M. MCDONALD,
Defendant.

Defendant's

Motion

to

Quash

ORDER

Civil No.

89-4901447 DA

Judge Frank 6. Noel

Praecipe

and Execution

and

Alternative Motion to Stay Enforcement of Praecipe and Execution
came before the Court on Defendant's motion in writing, supported
by affidavit and memorandum.

The Court also received responsive

memorandum of Plaintiff. The matter was submitted for decision by
Plaintiff through her counsel dated the 27th day of November, 1991,
and the Court having reviewed the matter and being fully advised in
the premises, grants Defendant's Motion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Quash Praecipe and Execution and to

Stay Enforcement of Praecipe and Execution obtained by Plaintiff's

ooi

former counsel, Mr. Edwin Guyon, is hereby granted.

Said Praecipe

and Execution are quashed and are of no effect and enforcement of
the same is stayed.
2.

Plaintiff's former attorney, Edwin Guyon, must look

directly to his client, Tamera A. McDonald, Plaintiff, for payment
of his attorney's fees.
DATED this

n

<~> K

day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

FRANK G. NOELDISTRICT COURT

001032

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
)ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Leora Loy, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
follows:
She is a secretary in the law firm of RICHMAN & RICHMAN,
attorneys for Defendant herein.
That she served the attached Order upon Plaintiff by placing
a copy in an envelope addressed to:
Edwin F. Guyon, Esq.
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

— and
James I Watts, Esq.
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
and depositing the same, sealed with first class postage prepaid
thereon in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
£fi Vh: day of January, 1992.

A*A
Leora Loy
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

^ ^ " d a y of January,

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
8-10-93

001033
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Edwin F. Guycn
205 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
801/355-8811

JUL 1 5 1992
84111
Oy.

.

' fit ffihflU

LtojwfcyCte.k

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUMTY, UTAH
TAMERA A. McDONALD
plaintiff
vs.

AMENDMENT TO JUDGMENT

ROBERT K. McDONALD

A )(/} L] tfo

defendant
* * * * * * *

EDWIN F. GUYON
vs.

case no. 8904901447 - DA
Judce Frank 0. Noel

ROBERT M. McDONALD
On the 25th to 28th of March, 1991 came on to be heard
the instant action; thereafter, on December 12, 1991 the court
entered its amended decree of divorce; and the court upon motion
and hearing and for the reasons stated in its memorandum decision
entered the 7th day of May, 1992 it is hereby ordered that said
December 12, 1991 decree be and hereby is amended to provide, in
lieu of payment of attorney fees directly to plaintiff, as follows:
Defendant shall pay directly to Edwin F. Guycn as counsel
for plaintiff, as attorney fees, the sum pi
Dated the

/^

day of

$7,500.00.

,J i^UUy\

£_, 1992

Judge Frank G.c$|
On the 2na day of July, 1992 copies of th$\%8tp^ing

were

001On^

mailed to Glen M. Richman, Esq., 60 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84102; James I. Watts, Esq. 124 South 600 East, #100,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 and Tamera A. McDonald. 16211 East
Flora Place, Aurora, Colorado, 80013.
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Edwin F. Guyon - 1284
counsel for plaintiff
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
801/355-8811

K. J

3

55ft'3/

^v
84111
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
TAMERA A. McDONALD
plaintiff

OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS and JUDGMENT

vs.
ROBERT M. McDONALD

case no.
894901477 - DA
Judge Frank G. Noel

defendant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March

28, 1991 subsequent

to hearing

in the

instant action regarding property distribution, custody, support
and visitation matters the court orally stated
opinion.

its rulings and

A copy of the transcript of said findings and opinion is

attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes labeled
exhibit A.
2.
documents

Defendant

labeled

subsequently

"findings

of

fact

filed
and

with

the

conclusions

court
of

law

(integration of prior findings and conclusions)" and "decree of
divorce (integration of prior orders)". Copies of said documents
have been filed with the court and are made a part hereof for all
purposes as fully and completely as if attached hereto and made a
part hereof.
3.

Plaintiff advised the court that said documents did

not conform to the rulings of the court, objected to them generally
and thereafter filed with the court documents labeled "findings of

A0079?

fact and conclusions of law" and "judgment" which in the opinion of
plaintiff

more

closely

comply

with

the

rulings of

the

court.

Copies of said documents have been filed with the court and are
made a part hereof for all purposes as fully and completely as if
attached hereto and made a part hereof,
4.

On August

12,

1991 and subsequent

to notice the

court heard argument of counsel as to the position of the parties
thereto (including related motions) and directed
file

written

objections

to

defendants

that plaintiff

proposed

findings

and

decree.
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS
Plaintiff objects to defendants proposed "findings of
fact" as follows: (references are to page, paragraph and line)
1.

2;4;1 - The statement regarding the appointment of

Dr. Reisinger is not an ultimate fact.
2.

2;5;1 - The statements regarding insurance are not

relevant to the Judgment.
3.

2;6;1

- The statement

regarding

alimony/attorney

fees is not relevant and is redundant.
4.
redundant,

2;7;1

-

The

statements

regarding

a divorce having been granted prior

divorce

to the

are

instant

action, are not ultimate facts, are subordinate material facts.
5.

Defendant wholly failed to include as a finding of

fact that: " . . .

defendant has that (substance abuse) somewhat

under control; and in the future if it should appear that he no
longer has that under

control, that may very well

indeed be a

change of circumstances that the court would have to consider with

000798

regard to custody of this boy, because I believe that's Ca] very
important

factor

that

has

to

be

considered

by

the

Court."

(transcript, page 7, lines 10 to 16)
OBJECTIONS TO MIXED FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiff objects to defendant's proposed "mixed findings
of fact and conclusions of

law" as follows: (references are to

page, paragraph and line)
1.

5;14;1

to end

- Plaintiff

is not

aware

of

the

existence of any statutory authority "mixing" findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Plaintiff is not aware of any binding judicial
decision

permitting

conclusions

of

law.

the

"mixing"

of

findings

of

fact

and

Defendant's statements are generally not

ultimate facts, not subordinate

material facts, nor relevant to

any issue before the court and are, at best, conclusory.

The very

purpose of separating findings of fact from conclusions of law is
to permit review of facts and law separately. Further, defendant's
statements do not conform with the actual findings of the Court.
OBJECTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiff objects of defendant's proposed "conclusions of
law" as follows: (references are to page, paragraph and line)
9;2;4 - The date the decree of divorce in the instant
action was entered is January 7, 1991.
9;3;1 - This paragraph recites a finding of fact and, in
the event

it

supports a judgment, should be included

in the

findings of fact.
12;8;9 to 11 - The conclusion granting to defendant the
election as to how payment of funds between parties is to occur is

000799

does not conform to the oral findings.
14; 19; Iff - Statements regarding payment of attorney fees
are

wholly

without

regard

to

representations

by

plaintiffs

counsel (see transcript, page 14, lines 23 to 25 and page 15, lines
1 to 20), The purpose of plaintiffs agreement regarding fees was
made as a courtesy, convenience and benefit to defendant, not to
change the terms and conditions of the judgment
defendant

to unilaterally

determine what

nor

to permit

he wanted

as payment

to defendant's proposed

"decree of

schedules,
OBJECTIONS TO DECREE
Plaintiff
divorce" as
1.

objects

follows: (references are to page, paragraph and line)
2;1;1 - The date of entry of the decree of divorce

in the instant action is January 7, 1991 not December 29, 1990,
2.

2;2;1

-

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

reasonable

visitation not as "specifically described hereunder" but at least
a minimum of the described visitation.
3.

2;3;2 to 5 - Plaintiff is entitled to visitation on

all odd numbered weekends, no limitation should exist as to the 5th
weekend of each month.
4.
to

defendant

3;5;7 to 10 - The court's oral findings do not grant
the

option

regarding

the

circumstances

by

which

payments are made.
5*
to defendant

4;6;9 to 12 - The court's oral findings do not grant
the

option

regarding

the

circumstances

by

which

payments are made.
6.

7;14;Iff - Attorney fees are a matter of judgment,

n

00r>n

not agreement, defendants obligation is a matter of Judgment, not
agreement and, in the event no agreement is reached, plaintiff is
entitled to enforce Judgment.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
1.

Rule 52<a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

in relevant part that:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a Jury . . .
the court shall find the facts specially and state
separately it conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; . . .
2.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further

provides that:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.
3.

Rule

52(a),

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

specifically provides that:
It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open
court following the close of the evidence or appear in an
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court.
4.

Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

in relevant part that:
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the
court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be
raised whether or not the party raising the question has
made in the district court an objection to such findings
or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for
judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
5.

Rule 52(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

in relevant part that:
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and
conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an

000801

issue of fact: „ . .
6.

Rule

52

does

not

mandate

the

entry

of

signed,

written findings and conclusions but specifically permits the trial
court

the opportunity to state its findings

orally if it chooses,

Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514 (Utah App 1989).
7.
ultimate

Findings by

facts

and

if

the court
they

should

ascertain

be

limited

ultimate

to the

facts,

and

sufficiently conform to the pleadings and the evidence to support
the judgment, are sufficient, Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080
(Utah 1977).
8.

In entering an order awarding or modifying child

custody the trial court must enter specific findings on the factors
relied

upon

in awarding/modifying

such

custody.

Hutchison

v.

Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1983); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 312
(Utah 1986).
9«

In actions involving custody, oral findings made by

the trial judge at the close of the evidence are sufficient to
support a custody award if they demonstrate that the determination
was based on factors relevant to the best interests of the child,
Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App) cert denied 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1987).
10.

Rulings in custody actions must be firmly anchored

in findings of fact, whether written or oral, that are sufficiently
detailed, include sufficient facts to disclose the process through
which the ultimate conclusion is reached, indicate the process is
logical

and properly

supported, and are not clearly erroneous,

Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App 1987).

000802

11.

Credlbi 1 ity of a witness is not a factual issue that

is appropriately the subject of the trial court / s findings as the
ultimate

findings

themselves

reflect

the

consideration

of

a

witnesses'" credibility, McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 1286
(Utah 1981).
12.

The trial court should make findings on al 1 material

subordinate and ultimate factual issues with the limitation that it
is

not

necessary

to

resolve

other

lesser

or

non-relevant

evidentiary issues, Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 762 (Utah 1980).
13.

While failure to find

upon all

material

issues

raised in the pleadings is reversible error, LeGrand Johnson Crop.
v. Peterson. 420 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966) the court has a duty to find
facts upon

all material issues submitted for decision unless such

findings are waived, Bover v. Lignel1. 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977) or
where the evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and only capable of
supporting a finding in favor of the judgment,

Kinkellav. Baugh.

660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983).
Wherefore plaintiff requests that

the court adopt the

findings, conclusions and judgment submitted by plaintiff as the
findings, conclusions and judgment

of the court

in the instant

matter.
Dated the

A

/>

day of

, 1991.

counsel f or pLaifit i f f

°ooeo3

I certify that on the above date a copy of the foregoing
was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to Glen M. Richman, Esq.,
60 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City, Utah,
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all support the finding that these were separate entities. So does the conduct of the
parties, including the monthly lease payments from Fairfield Services to Fairfield
Enterprises, and the filing of separate tax
returns for each organization. In the lease
agreement, the manager expressly agreed
to "pay all bills related to the operation of
the business." We therefore reject the
manager's attack upon this key finding, and
sustain the district court's conclusion that
the manager was responsible for the unpaid
debts of the service station.
2. The manager also argues that the
financing partner had a duty to disclose the
value of the manager's limited partnership
interest before acquiring it from him in the
settlement. This failure to disclose is characterized as "constructive fraud."

ship interest managed and kept the financial records of the primary partnership asset, the service station. He also admitted
to having ready access to the records of the
partnership, Fairfield Enterprises, as was
his right under the limited partnership
agreement and by law. U.C.A., 1953,
§ 48-1-16. Whatever duty of affirmative
disclosure might exist in a circumstance
where the partners have decidedly unequal
access to information about the nature or
value of the partnership assets, that duty
does not exist or was not violated on the
facts of this case.1 Cf. Craft v. Bates,
Okla., 372 P.2d 10, 13 (1962); Geddes's Appeal, 80 Pa. 442, 462 (1876).
The manager makes several other arguments in his brief. However, inasmuch as
each of these is based on the allegation of
constructive fraud, none need be considered
here.
The judgment is affirmed. No costs
awarded.

[2, 3] Partners obviously occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each
other in the utmost good faith. U.C.A.,
1953, § 48-1-18; Nelson v. Matsch, 38 Utah
122, 128, 110 P. 865, 868 (1910). This duty
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
applies when one partner (especially a manDURHAM,
JJ., concur.
aging partner) seeks to purchase the interest of another partner. W.A. McMichael
Construction Co, v.D&W Properties, Inc.,
La.App., 356 So.2d 1115, 1120-22 (1978);
O I KEYNUM8ERSYSTCM
Annot, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122, 1129-45 (1981).
In such a case, a breach of duty occurs if
the acquiring partner falsely represents or
conceals matters with respect to the value
of the interest of the selling partn^—NelRuth Jeppson Peterson PENROSE,
son v. Matsch, supra, 38 Utah at 128-29,110
Plaintiff and Respondent,
P. at 868; WA. McMichael Construction
Co. v. D & W Properties, Inc., supra, at
v.
1122; U.C.A., 1953, § 48-1-17,.
' Wallace Herbert PENROSE,
Defendant and Appellants
[4] In this case, however, no false representation or concealment has been alleged.
No. 17576.
Rather, the manager's only claim is that the
Supreme Court of Utah.
financing partner did not voluntarily disclose to him the value of his partnership
Dec. 16, 1982.
interest. Such a failure is not a breach of
fiduciary duty where the manager has ample access to information about the value of
Husband appealed from judgment of
his partnership interest. Here the party the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
who was relinquishing the limited partner- Salt Lake County, Christine M. Durham, J.,
1. This is not a case where a managing general
partner acquires the interest of a limited part-

ner who has no independent access to information about the nature and value of the business.
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resulting in judgment in wife's favor in
sum of $30,000 as lump-sum alimony and
monthly alimony of $200 per month; provided that upon payment of $30,000 lump
sum, monthly obligation would cease. The
Supreme Court, Dee, District Judge, held
that: (1) record supported trial court conclusion that wife was in need of and entitled to $200 per month, and (2) $30,000
lump-sum award would have to be conditioned so as to allow corpus to revert back
to husband or his estate upon termination
of husband's obligation to support wife.
Remanded with directions.
1. Divorce *=»239
Record in divorce action supported trial
court's conclusion that wife was in need of
and entitled to $200 per month alimony.
2. Appeal and Error <$=> 847(1), 1153
It is duty and prerogative of Supreme
Court in equity matters, where occasion
warrants, and after review of both facts
and law, to fashion its own remedy as substitute for judgment of trial court, but that
court's action should only be disturbed to
prevent manifest injustice.
3. Divorce <s=>241
Where $30,000 lump-sum alimony
award violated antenuptial agreement
which only required husband to provide for
support needs of wife, and those needs were
$200 per month, $30,000 lump-sum award
would have to be conditioned so as to allow
corpus to revert back to husband or his
estate upon termination of husband's obligation to support wife.
Macoy A. McMurray, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Fred L. Finlinson, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
DEE, District Judge:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, awarding a
lump sum and monthly alimony in a Decree

of Divorce to Mrs. Penrose, the plaintifj
and respondent. The defendant and appellant appeals from the lower court decision
which resulted in a judgment in plaintiff's
favor for the sum of thirty thousand dollars
($30,000.00) as "lump sum alimony," and
monthly alimony of two hundred dollars
($200.00) per month; provided however,
that upon payment of the $30,000.00 lump
sum, the monthly obligation would cease.
The relevant facts on appeal are as follows:
Mr. and Mrs. Penrose, hereinafter the defendant and plaintiff respectively, were
married on August 13, 1959, a late-in-life
second marriage for both. The defendant
was sixty (60) years of age, the plaintiff
fifty-four (54) years of age, at the time of
the marriage. Each party owned substantial assets which each had accrued separately prior to the marriage. Pursuant to the
circumstances, the parties entered into an
antenuptial agreement which, among other
things, provided:
-' .
It is mutually desired and agreed by the
parties that the estate of each of the
parties shall remain separate, and be sub-<
ject to the sole control and use of its
owner, its well after marriage as previous
thereto . . .
*
*
*
*
*
*
It is further agreed by the party of the
first part (defendant herein) that he does
and will from his own personal estate
assume the necessary expenses of the
support and maintenance of the party of
the second part (plaintiff herein).
The parties generally conducted their business affaire in accordance with the provisions of the agreement throughout their
twenty (20) years of marriage. In the middle* part of 1977 the marriage began to
deteriorate, followed by a divorce action in
the latter part of 1977. The lower court,
after trial, determined that the plaintiff
should be awarded a divorce, and proceeded
to make the above referred to judgment.
The defendant and appellant argues two
issues on appeal. First, whether the award
of any alimony was proper, and second, if
the plaintiff is entitled to alimony, whether

PENROSE v. PENROSE
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the type of award fashioned by the lower
court is proper.
[1] As to the first issue, whether any
award of alimony was proper, both parties
argued their respective positions on the issue, and the lower court determined that
the plaintiff was in need of support of two
hundred dollars ($200.00) per month and
that the defendant had "unilaterally, and
deliberately put himself in a position where
he was unable to respond to the support
need" of the plaintiff. Pursuant thereto
the lower court awarded plaintiff monthly
alimony of $200.00 per month and lump sum
alimony of $30,000.00, the $200.00 monthly
alimony to terminate upon payment of the
$30,000.00 lump sum. A review of the record supports the lower court's conclusion
that the plaintiff was in need of and entitled to $200.00 per month alimony. Therefore, since the plaintiff was entitled to
$200.00 per month alimony, the only issue
left for the Court to decide on appeal is
whether the $30,000.00 lump sum award
was proper.
The defendant contends that the lower
.court has made a property distribution in
contravention of the antenuptial agreement
by giving the plaintiff a $30,000.00 award
after the lower court found that plaintiff
was only entitled to $200.00 a month support. The lower court, on the other hand,
called the award a "lump sum alimony"
which did not result in a property distribution, but was only in payment of the support obligation.

$200.00 per month.1 Pursuant to that intent the lower court ordered the defendant
to pay $200.00 per month, and when the
$30,000.00 was paid to secure the monthly
amount, the $200.00 per month obligation
would cease. Otherwise, the $200.00 per
month obligation would be paid until terminated at death or remarriage of plaintiff.
The problem with the $30,000.00 lump
sum award as security for the $200.00
monthly support obligation is there was no
condition placed on that amount that would
require the corpus to revert to the defendant or his estate when the support obligation ceased. In effect, once the lump sum
was paid to the plaintiff to secure the
$200.00 per month established need for support, it was lost forever to the defendant or
his estate in that nothing required the corpus to be returned for any reason.
[2] It is the duty and prerogative of this
Court in equity matters, where the occasion
warrants,2 and after a review of both the
facts and the law, to fashion its own remedy as a substitute for the judgment of the
trial court,3 but that court's actions should
only be disturbed to prevent manifest injustice.4
[3] Viewed in that light, it is clear that
the $30,000.00 lump sum award violates the
antenuptial agreement which only required
the defendant to provide for the support
needs of the plaintiff, i.e., $200.00 per
month. Accordingly, it is the opinion of
this Court that the $30,000.00 lump sum
award must be conditioned so as to allow
the corpus to revert back to the defendant
or his estate upon the termination of the
defendant's obligation to support the plaintiff.

It is evident from the record, and more
particularly the court's Memorandum Decision, that in using the lump sum award the
court was essentially attempting to provide
a monthly income of $200.00 to the plaintiff. The lower court made the award on
the assumption that income from the $30,000.00 would provide the plaintiff with

The Court does not suggest that a lump
sum award to secure alimony is improper,
only that such an award must revert to the

1. $30,000.00 X 8 (interest on judgment) =
$2,400/year. This is equivalent to $200.00 per
month.

3. Article 8, § 9, Constitution of the State of
Utah. Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Jackson v. Jackson, Utah, 617 P.2d 338
(1980).

4. Reed v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980);
Provo City v. Lambert, Utah, 574 P.2d 727
(1978); Mitchell v. Mitchell, Utah, 527 P.2d
1359 (1974).
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obligor at the termination of the alimony
obligation.
The case is remanded to allow the lower
court to rewrite its judgment in accordance
with the views of this opinion. No costs
awarded.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS, and
HOWE, JJ., concur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein; DEE, District Judge, sat.
Av
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William A. LANGLEY, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.

N.D. "Pete" HAYWARD, Sheriff, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 18456.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec 16, 1982.
Petitioner, who was arrested on an extradition warrant for a robbery committed
in Idaho, appealed from a judgment of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Kenneth Rigtrup, J., denying his habeas
corpus petition. The Supreme Court, Oaks,
J., held that: (1) district court could not
redetermine probable cause for issuance of
the underlying arrest warrant; (2) substantial evidence supported district court's finding that petitioner was the person named in
the underlying arrest warrant and extradition papers; and (3) record supported district courts findings that petitioner failed
to show by clear and convincing evidence
that he was not in Idaho when the crime
was committed and that documents on file
were legally sufficient for the extradition
of petitioner to Idaho for trial on the
charges named.
Judgment affirmed.

1. Habeas Corpus <3=>92(2)
In evidentiary hearing on habeas petition filed by petitioner, who was. arrested
on extradition warrant, district court could
not redetermine probable cause for issuance
of the underlying arrest warrant U.C.A.
1953, 77-56>-l et seq.
2. Extradition and Detainers <^»36
Verified complaint sworn before magistrate who made finding of probable cause
satisfied statutory requirement that extradition warrant be issued on the basis of an affidavit made before a magistrate. U.C.A.
1953, 77-30-3.
3. Habeas Corpus <*=>92(2)
Claim of mistaken identity was a question that could be raised by habeas corpus
in the asylum state.
4. Extradition and Detainers <s=>39
State has a burden of proving that the
person arrested is the person named in the
extradition papers.
5. Extradition and Detainers *=»34
State makes a prima facie case that the
person arrested is person named in the extradition papers by showing that the arrested person has, or is known by, the same
name as that appearing on the extradition
papers.
6. Habeas Corpus <&=>85.2(4)
When state has made its prima facie
case that the person arrested is the person
named in the extradition papers, petitioner
has the burden of going forward with affirmative evidence that he is not the person
named in the extradition papers.
1. Habeas Corpus *=>S5.&U)
Where the petitioner, by sworn testimony or by a verified pleading, produces
evidence that he is not the person named in
the extradition papers and where the state
provides no evidence in addition to its bare
prima facie case, petitioner is entitled to
release.
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ing the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency
proceeding, 'the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.
Since this case must be reversed and remanded to the juvenile court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of
law, it would be more appropriate that the
fact finder assess the evidence in light of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
The judgment of the juvenile court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
HENRIOD, ELLETT, CROCKETT
and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

3>

1. Divorce <§=>I64, 245(1), 309
Proceeding to modify divorce decree is
equitable, and same authority is conferred
upon trial court to make subsequent
changes as to support and maintenance as
it could have dealt with them originally.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
2. Appeal and Error <§=*847(l), 1122(2)

It is both duty and prerogative of Supreme Court in an equitable action to review the law and the facts to make its own
findings and substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court. Const, art. 8, § 9.
3. Divorce <8=252, 286(2)

In a divorce action, trial court has
considerable latitude of discretion in^ adjusting financial property interests, and its
actions are indulged with a presumption of
validity. U.CA. 1953, 30-3-5; Const, art. 8,
§9.

KIT NUHIER JT5TIM

Delores Blood M I T C H E L L , Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
William Keith M I T C H E L L , Defendant
and Appellant.

No. 13565.
Supremo Court of Utah.
Nov. 7, 1074.
Petition to modify alimony and child
support payments awarded to "wife in decree of divorce. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., increased amounts of alimony and child support, and husband appealed. The Supreme
Court, Callister, C. J., held that where husband-appellant did not include in record on
appeal transcript of hearing on petition for
modification, presumptions of validity of
trial court's determination that there was a
substantial change of circumstances justifying increase of support and maintenance
payments applied to require affirmance of
trial court's order.
Affirmed.

4. Divorce e=>!84(4, 12)
On appeal in a divorce action, burden
is on appellant to prove that evidence
clearly preponderates against findings as
made, that there was a misunderstanding
or misapplication of law resulting in substantial prejudicial error, or that serious
inequity has resulted so as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion. U.C.A.1953, 303-5.
5. Divorce C=286(2), 312.6(3)
On appeal in divorce action, where appellant did not include in the record on appeal a transcript of the hearing on petition
for modification of alimony and child support payments, presumption of validity of
trial court's determination that there was a
substantial change of circumstances justifying increase of support and maintenance
payments applied to require affirmance of
trial court's order. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.

"Jackson Howard of Howard, Lewis &
Petersen, Provo, for defendant and appellant.
Kay M. Lewis of Jensen & Lewis, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
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CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff filed a petition to modify the
alimony and child support payments awarded to her in a decree of divorce entered in
February, 1970. The original decree
awarded plaintiff $1 per year alimony and
$90 per month for each of five minor children. Upon hearing of the petition, the
trial court increased plaintiffs alimony to
$100 per month and child support to $150
per child for the four minor children residing with her.
The trial court found that since the time
of entry of the original decree, defendant's
earnings had increased from a base salary
of $13,196 per year plus bonus to a base
salary of $19,355 per year; that the cost of
living had increased considerably; and
that plaintiffs living expenses for herself
and minor children had increased to an
amount in excess of $800 per month. The
trial court concluded that there had been a
substantial change of circumstances with a
substantial increase in the cost of living,
which justified an increment in the award.
Defendant appeals from the order decreeing'the aforementioned modification.
He contends that the amount of alimony to
which plaintiff is entitled should be based
upon her station in life at the time the decree of divorce was entered and should not
be measured by defendant's present wealth
and earning capacity. Defendant claims
that the sole ground for modification of alimony was the increase in his income, and
such a factor is relevant only insofar as
ability to pay is concerned; and that there
must be a change of circumstances to justify an increase in alimony. Defendant further urges that there must be a material
change of circumstances to modify an
award of child support, and such burden
was not sustained by plaintiff. Defendant
finally contends that in the original decree
plaintiff was awarded the family home in
lieu of substantial alimony payments, and
such a property settlement should be
I. Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2<I 430, 491
P.2d 231 (1971).

deemed res judicata and held to preclude
any subsequent modification of alimony.
Section 30-3--5, U.C.A.1953, as amended
1969, provides:
When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation
to the children, property and parties, and
the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court
shall have continuing jurisdiction to
make such subsequent changes or new
orders with respect to the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody
of the children and their support and
maintenance, or the distribution of the
property as shall be reasonable and necessary.
[1-4] In accordance with this statute,
this court has held that a proceeding to
modify a divorce decree is equitable and
the same authority is conferred upon the
trial court to make subsequent changes as
respect to support and maintenance as it
could have dealt with them originally.1
Under Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution
of Utah, it is both the duty and prerogative of this court in an equitable action to
review the law and the facts and make its
own findings and substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court. However, in a
divorce action, the trial court has considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are indulged with a presumption of
validity. The burden is upon appellant to
prove that the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings as made; or
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error; or a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse
of discretion.2
[5] In the instant action, defendant has
not included in the record on appeal a
transcript of the hearing for the petition
for modification. Defendant's points on
2. Harding v. Harding 26 Utah 2d 277, *&
P.2d 308 (1971); Searle v. Searle, 522 V^d
697 (Utah 1974).
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appeal involve a factual determination,
which this court obviously cannot undertake without a transcript of the hearing.
The determination of the trial court that
there had been a substantial change of circumstances, which justified the increase of
support and maintenance, is presumed valid. This court must assume that the trial
court, in evaluating the petition for modification for support, considered the parties'

respective economic resources and determined what constituted the equitable share
each should contribute to the household to
maintain the family according to their station in life.3
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs are awarded to plaintiff.
HENRIOD, ELLETT, CROCKETT,
and TUCKETT, JJ, concur.

3. Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155 (1973).
527 P.2d—«6

TabN

EXHIBIT

N

SHAW v. JEPPSON.

Utah
745
S H A W r. J E P P B O N
Clio « • 2.11 r fit 71s
prietor as its alter ego or agent and that
it w a s consequently real parly in interest.

No. 7711.
Buprenic Court of Utah.
Jon. 12, 1!»"»2.
Action by IMrnn Slniw, doing business ns
Arthur Murray l»nmv Slnillo, against A m
II I'irix.ml .lc|'|.-..ii for liijinictluii reslrnlnInf. dvfeiimmt from leiiclilng ilniu liiK In eoin|.tltl«»n wiih plaintiff. The Tlilnl .Imllclnl
tourt, Salt 1/iiUf County, Josrpli (I. .lrppaon,
J, inltrnl Juditmetit for pliiiiitifT. mid ilofcndant appealed.
The Supreme Court,
t'Mrkett, J . held tlmt where plainllfT w a s
frvc to Independently manage her own business, fnef Unit she liml Iheitslug agreement
• Ith foreljrn corporation for UFO of lis nitiiie
ind methods In teaching of dancing upon
r.»tnpll;iiH*» with certain requirements and
»*Hr.Htl.»ll«!, (11(1 llOt P'Md t<» Conclusion

tlmt

3. Contracts C=>330(2)
W h e r e proprietor of dancing studio
had licensing agreement with foreign corporation by which proprietor w a s permitted to use name, dances, instruction books
and methods of licensor, with certain obligations and limitations as condition of con*
tinuance o f rights given by licensing agreement, but proprietor w a s sole o w n e r of
business and w a s free to independently
manage same, fact that licensor might indirectly benefit from proprietor's enforcement of contract by which employee of
proprietor w a s precluded, upon termination
of employment, from leaching dancing
within given area for period of t w o years,
did not preclude maintenance by propric- «•
tor of suit to enforce agreement on her
o w n behalf.

•oh rorpnriilluti was doing husliii'ss In S t a l e
hj plaintiff as It* agent, hut plalntltT was
rtnl pnrty In Interest niut entitled to tuMu4. Contracts <S=»330(2)
uln gult to enjoin defendant In accordance
W h e r e there are joint promisees h a v i n g
* lib contract of employment previously entered Into In'tween parties l»y whliii defend- separate or severable rights, promisees may
tot lio<l tig reed to refrain from competition enforce, their rights separately unless some
• ithlii pit en urea for certain period upon obvious hardship or injustice is wrought
by such procedure, and suit by o n e promtrrmlniiiioii of employment.
isee is permissible even though other promJudgment nlliriued.
isee may be under disability to sue. U.C.A.
I. Appeal and Error C^1009(4)
191.1, 1 8 - 8 - 1 , 18 8 - 2 , I S - 8 - S .
On appeal in case of equitable c o g n i uncf, couit will l e v i e w evidence, hut it 5. Parties C=»6(l)
T h e reason that defendant has right
•ill not distiii h findings of trial court unless thry are clearly against weight of e v i - to have cause of action proscculed by real
party in interest is s o that judgment will
dence.1
preclude any action o n same demand by
I Corporations «=>6t2(4«/a), 667','j
another, and will permit defendant to asWhere proprietor of dancing studio
sert all d e f e n s e s or counterclaims available
brought action to enjoin defendant, w h o
against real o w n e r of cause.
• i$ formerly employed as dancing instructor, from teaching of darning and profrietor had licensing agreement with forMiner A Jones, Fsqs., Salt Lake City,
eign corporation which permitted her to
for appellant.
•se name, and methods of licensor, hut proRobert M. Ycatcs, and Cheney, Marr,
pietor was free to independently m a n a g e
•er own business, fact that foreign corpo- Wilkins & Cannon, all of Salt Lake City,
ntion compelled proprietor to comply with for respondent.
certain requirements and to make payment
fll percentage of gross receipts as condition to continuing privilege of license, did
cit compel conclusion that foreign corpo. ration was doing business in state by proI.
?3M\M-I7'4

C R O C K F T T , Justice.
Plaintiff procured an injunction against
the defendant from teaching dancing in
competition with her. T h e controversy on.

Stanley v. Stanley, 07 Utah 520, PI |\2«l IK5.
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this appeal is over an effort of the defendDefendant admits that Arthur Murray,
ant to get another plaintiff in, so she can Inc. is a foreign corporation and that it has
s h o w it is disqualified from suing her. not qualified to do business in the State of
A r a M. Dimoud ( n o w Jeppson) was Utah and docs not dispute that if such corhired a s a dancing instructor by the plain- I«»ration were Ihc real party in interest and
tiff, Jlclcnc S h a w . T h e contract of em- doing business in the State of Utah it
ployment provided that if she left plaintiff's ctmU^ , , ( ) l maintain this suit. First Nationemploy she would not teach nor dance for «' , , a " k o f l ' " e c v. Parker, 57 Utah 2'W
hire within a certain area, that is, in Salt , < ; * *'• ° ° , # l 2 A.L.R. 137J; Dunn v. Utah
l-akc County, or any county adjacent to it Serum Company, 65 U t a h 527, 2.1S P. 215;
o r within 25 miles o f any Arthur Murray I'Vauklin Building & l o a n Company v.
dance studio for a period of two y e a r s ; Peppard, "7 Utah 48.1, 9.1 l'.2d 1/25.
if she breached this covenant, she agreed
Consideration of the defendant's dialf 1) to pay on demand a promissory note in lenge that the plaintiff is not the real party
Ihc sum of $5(H) as compensation for danc- in interest in the suit requires a brief, facing instruction and training she would re- tual survey of the relationship h i l w c c u the
c c i v e ; and ( 2 ) that she recognized that parties as s h o w n by the contracts between
it would cause irreparable injury to the them and their methods of operation. The
plaintiff's business and consented to an in- plaintiff, l l c l c u c S h a w , has a licensing
junction against her breaching said cove- agreement with Arthur Murray, Inc. of
•unit. After approximately one and one- N e w York v e n n i t t i n g her to use the name,
half years employment, she quit without dances, instruction tmoks and methods of
Mating any reason therefore and began the licensor, but she is obliged tu do so
teaching dancing within the proscribed within certain limitations.
For this she
area.
pays 1(1% of her gross receipts, plus 5%
T h e plaintiff commenced this action seek- to go into a fund for advertising and ccring three t h i n g s : ( a ) to collect the promis- tain other contingencies,
sory note, (li) for money damages for vioT h e plaintiff is Ihc originator and entrc
laling the covenant, and ( c ) to enjoin her prencur of the business she is conducting.
from continuing lo do so. Upon ihc trial, She filed an affidavit that she personally
the parties stipulated that the defendant v v ; ,s doing business under an assumed
had breached the covenant; the plaintiff l l a l l l C | Arthur Murray Studios, and rtgis
waived any money damages caused prior t,. r rd that name for herself in the (Wf.ce
to the trial; and also waived any right to „t* the Secretary of St;ite. Slfe procured
collect on the promissory note.
I he only J u r o w n studio, made all the arrangements
issue presented w a s as to plaintiffs right a | , „ „ t rental, utilities and other incidentals
t o the injunction. T h e trial court ruled for w | , i c h it is her sole responsibility to pay;
the plaintiff and entered a decree ordering s | , c o w n s all of the assets of the business
the defendant to discontinue violation of including the furniture, fixtures, tiles, rccthc covenant. Defendant appeals.
, m , s a , „ l instruction hooks, the lease, ac
T h e defendant makes no claim that the counts receivable and the licensing agree,,uut
restriction is not a reasonable and lawful
referred lo. T h e hiring of personnel,
one and necessary to protect the good will l " c payment o f their salaries ami all of
|MC
of the plaintiff's business. T h e only deexpenses of the business is upon her.
fensc she asserts to the action is based 011 ' » ^ a c l » *»c " a s f"H responsibility for mana m
these t w o propositions: that plaintiff, Ilel- K l» n " p l u s e s o f the business, arrangecun S h a w , is not the real parly in interest menls for lessons, group dances, and coursbut that Arthur Murray, Inc., is such in cs. And it is she w h o g e t s the benefits uf
fact; and that it is a foreign c o l o r a t i o n amy profits made or suiters any loss that
d o i n g business in Utah without complying »» ;, y »c incurred in the business,
with Sections 18-8-1 and 2, U.C.A. 1V>4.1,
It is true that in order to protect the
and is therefore disqualified from suing name and good will of the licensor, the
herein by Section 18-K-5.
licensing agreement places some rcstric-
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tions upon the plaintiff in that Arthur Mur- ant could have held Arthur Murray, Inc
ray, Inc has the right to make certain re responsible for her wages or have imposed
qmrements with respect to t>pcs of dancing any other obligation upon it
taught, the character of the studio, salaries
f j p o n t n e facts as delineated above the
paid and not eniplo>mg personnel found to c o u r t f 0 „„,i that the plaintiff was not the
be objectionable It also requires plaintiff a | t c r 0 g O f agent, servant or employee of
to keep records and to make reports of a Arthur Murray, Inc , that such corpora
general nature showing the lessons taught t ion was not doing business in the State
and the gross receipts which is the basis ()f u , a n a m j r u | c j that the pi untiff in
of pa>mcnt for the license
I his report n c r o w l l r I g|, t w a s entitled to enforce the
does not show the wages paid nor the op- covenant against the defendant and upon
erating expenses in connection with the s u c n findings granted the injunction,
business because the licensor docs not
share in the profits and is not responsible
HI l h c t,l,asc o f t h l s c a s c u n ( , e r rc"
for the loss and therefore is not concerned v , e w . that , s ' pertaining to the injunction,
uhrlher the nl untiff s business is nrofita ' s equitable 1 hcrefore, although the court
Me or otherwise The contract expressly «•» r <* v , r w t h c evidence, it will not disprovides tint the licensor is not responsible t u r , ) l h e "»<"ugs of »hc trial court unless
for salaries or other debts incurred by the t , , c v * r c c , e a r , v *K*™* *" e " c , & h t o f t h e
plaintiff The evidence is that the licensor " i d u i c c Stanlc> v Stanley, 97 Utah 520,
his never exercised an> of its prerogatives -^ * * ( ' "*°5
of supervisory control over the plaintiff's
Where the plaintiff was thus free
[2]
business
Actually no representative of t 0 , m i t p endently manage her own bustArthur Murray, Inc has ever been at the n e s s > t | ) C fact t j l < l t t he licensor compelled
studio The fact is that it has no direct j , c r t o c o i n , » | y W I t |, CC rtain requirements
supervisory control over the plaintiff's a s a c o n ( |,t,on to continuing the privilege
business, the requirements imposed by the o f t h c | 1 C c n s e > ( i o c s „ o t | e a d to the concluSRreenicnt are conditions under which the s l o n t , n t t | , c | , c c l l s o r vvas doing business
plaintiff can continue to use the name and | n t , ) c S t a t e o f U t l h n> t l l c | I c c n S 0 c as its
methods of Arthur Murray, Inc, a breach a , t c r c g o o r a R c n t
McMaster, I n c , v.
of which could only become the basis of Chevrolet Motor Company, D C , 3 F 2 d
a cancellation of the license upon certain 4 6 9 t s , ^ t e x 1 o r < | M o t o r Company, 208
notice specified in thc contract Only in s C 3 ; ^ 3 8 s F 2d 242, which latter case
this indirect way of cancelling the license, d, s t, n g,„shcs between doing business in a
could licensor interfere with thc manage- s t a t e , n s u c h a I I l a i l , i e r a s to require a
ment and operation of the plaintiff's busi- c o r , , o r a t , o n to file its articles, pay fees and
ness
comply with the statutes to qualify to do
The defendant Ara M Ditnond Jeppson business therein, as compared with merely
is not a party to the license agreement and having an agent operating with sufficient
has no dircet contractual relationship with authority to render the corporation a m u u Arthur Muirav, Inc
1 be plaintiff hired Me to bcrvicc of process on him such as
the deftudmt, fixed hrr hours, specified the »n Inttr111t1011.il 1 cxt Hook Company v
terms ami conditions of employment and P'KK. 217 U S 91, 10 S Ct 481, 54 L Ud
set and agreed to i>av her salarv
The 6 7 8 . c«ted by plaintiff, where a corporation
defendant's contract with the plaintiff was " a s J u k l t o b e < lo, "S business in Kansas
one of employment for the plaintiff in con- through its agent who maintained an office,
nection with which the defendant agreed s o , ( l correspondence courses, collected and
to thc cov.nant we are concerned with remitted fees, made duly reports, received
The mutual obligations of the contract run a r c K t , , a r s a , a r > a , u l " , , c r e m a , V I* 0 P , C
between the plaintiff and the defendant, were currently taking courses
and Arthur Murrav, Inc is referred to in
Defendant claims that Golden v Amcriit as a third p i r t ) , md under its provisions, can Kceiic Cement el Phstcr Company, 98
there is no theory upon which the defend- Utah 23, 95 1*2(1 755, is a case squarely
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in point for her
Golden attempted to
foreclose a mortgage which had been taken in his name, it appearing that he was
in fact merely the alter cgo of California
Stucco Products Company, a foreign corporation There is a significant and controlling difference* Golden had no personal interest in thc cause of action whatsoever, such as Mrs Shaw has 111 the instant case.
There is no necessity for indulging in
niceties as to whether the plaintiff may
be an agent of Arthur Murray, Inc for
some purposes, as that is immaterial to the
issues in this case.
f3,4] Insofar as her right to sue is
concerned, the determination made is amply justified Thc plaintiff as the owner of
the business exacted this covenant from
the defendant for the purpose of protecting
her own interests She is entitled to enforce it on her own behalf She would not
be precluded from doing so merely because
a foreign corporation, disqualified from
suing, might also have an interest in the
contract and may incidentally derive an
indirect benefit from plaintiff's enforcement
of her own rights
The situation would be different if Arthur Murray, Inc were suing But it is
not, and is seeking nothing in this action
Whether it could or could not enforce this
covenant, were it qualified to sue, is of no
instant concern Under modern law there
is no question but that where there are
joint promisees, having separate or severable rights, they ma> enforce their rights
separately unless some obviems hardship or
injustice is wrought by such pioccdure,
see Vol 4 Corbin on Contracts, Sees 939
and 910 and numerous cases there cited
under Note 74 1 he author states in Sec
ov> >* * * * E v c n ,f l t , s a s , „ g | e a u t i
individual performance that is promised to
two or more promisees, and the promise
contains no words of 'severance', if breach
of the promise causes separate and distinct
injuries to thc promisees, justice and convenience may at times be served by permitting them to maintain separate actions
for damages * * • "
Suit by one promisee is permissible although the other may be under a disability

to sue It seems obvious that one who has
a right violated, should not be prevented
from redress merely because another, who
' m a y be disqualified or unavailable in the
suit, may share the right In thc case of
Hoyt v New Hampshire Fire Ins Co, 92
N i l 242, 29 A 2d 121, 148 A L R 484,
three owners of undivided interests in
property were insured against fire by a
single policy, it was held that two of them
could recover the amount of their loss according to their interest, even though the
third set the fire himself and could n cover
nothing See also Satler Lumber Co v
Exlcr, 239 Pa 135, 86 A 793
r 5 J The reason the defendant has the*
right to have a cause of action prosecuted
by the real 'party in interest is so that thc
judgment will preclude airy action on the
same demand by another and permit the
defendant to assert all defenses or counter
claims available against thc real owner of
thc cause Chickasaw Lumber Co v Kun
kel, 183 Okl 347, 82 P 2 d 1003, Meyers v
Bank of America Nat Trust & Savings
Ass'n, Cal App, C9 P 2d 868, subsequent
opinion, 11 Cal 2d 92, 77 P2d 1081 De
fendant will suffer no difficulty in tin* case
on tint score Her attempt to make Ar
thur Murray, Inc the plaintiff in this case
is not to guard against any such disadvan
tagc, but such eifort is apparently so she
could then contend that thc action may not
be maintained against her It is obvious
that plaintiff is much more vitally and di
rcctly affected by defendant teaching dancing in Salt Lake County in violation of the
covenant than is Arthur Murray, Inc The*
trial court correctly ruled that she was entitled to the 'injunction on her own behalf
Judgment affirmed

Cost*, to respondent

WADE, McDONOUGH
KIOD, )) , concur.

and

HEN-

VVOLrE, Chief Justice (concurring in
part—dissenting in part).
My concurrence is limited to the reason
stated by the majority opinion that "The
plaintiff as the owner of the business exacted this covenant from thc defendant for
the purpose of protecting her own interestt
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She is entitled to enforce it on her o w n proceeds of loan procured by Saunders, nt
bclnlf" In Allen v Rose Park Pharm- Simpson's request, In pledging the atitnmo
bile to a Hnniue eompanv as security
The
acy, Utah, 1951, 2V P 2 d 823, 826, w e held
corporation filed a (ross (oiiiplaint against
"Restrictive coven mts arc generally uphild
S m i i d e i s basing Its <lalm to indemnification
by the courts where the) arc neccssarv upon an nlhgcd joint ad\« uture relationship
for the protection of the business * * * between Simpson and Blunders
Ihe'Jhlrd
and no gicater restraint is imposed than is District Court, Salt l a k e < ounty, Hay Win
reasonably ncccss iry to secure such pro- Cott, J r , J , nnarilni judgmi nt against t lie
tection "
surct}, In fa\or of both plaintitT and Saint
The Su
But I am not prepared to concur in the ders, and the surety appealed
inference stated in the majority opinion pieme Court, Wolfe C J held lute r alia
that Arthur Murray, Inc of N e w \ o r l c that there waR no h gal theory upon whhli
City and I l c k t i c Shaw, d / h / a Arthur Mur- Simpsons fraudulent acts could be imputed
to Saunders hut that the trial (otnt had
ray Dtncc Studio of Salt l a k e O t \ , arc
erred in in< hiding the MIMP item of damages
joint promisees
T h e contract here being in both Its aw aid to plaintitT and its award
sued upon is a contract of cmplovmcnt to S iuud< rs
signed by H c l c n c S h a w and A r a M D i Keinanded with directions
mond [now Jeppson]
It w a s apparently
drafted by A i t h u r Murray, Inc and the I Licenses C=>26
In h i r e r ' s action and financier's crossrestrictive covenant here being enforced
»as obviously included for the protection action against seller's surety for losses
of Artlpir Murray, Inc as well as I l c l e n c sustained v»hcn seller failed to use proceeds
Shaw Arthur Murr ly, Inc may be a third of loan, procured by fimncier at seller's
party iHiicficiary, but it is not clear to mc request, to acquire title to automobile for
that it is a primary party to the S h a w - bu>er, it w i s error to require surety to
Jeppson contract
T o so infer seems un- pay both to bujer i n d financier, as item
necessary to this decision
T h i s proposi- of dam qn s, imoiint of c ish deposited by
b u j e r with seller to e o \ c r s des tax and fee
tion is not mentioned in the briefs.
for license plates
2. Joint Adventures C=H l t I 2
A joint adventure is in nature of pnrt
ncrship, and to estiblish joint adventure
there must be agreement, express or nn
plied, for sharing of profits *

BATES v. SIMPSON et al.
No. 7686.
Supreme Court of Utah
Jan 11, 1002
Haskell N Hates BUI d .Jluwnle Simpson W
J Stutmlcis, and tlie 1 tuploveis 1 lability
Afisurfftue (orporation l t d for looses SUM
Ulnod by mmon of .liminie S i m p s o n s fail
ure to p u x u i e title to an automobile he had
told to plaintiff
S i u m h i s H1C<1 a cross
complaint against HIP rorporitlon, as surety
on Simpsons bond, for losses "sustained by
8tumlers when Simpson failed to acquire ti
Uti to the automobile for plaintiff with the
I. Wnsntdi lawnhxlc I^oim (\> v Lewis
& Sharp, 84 Utuh 347, 35 P 2 d 835;

3 Joint Adventures C=>l 12
Seller's profit on s i l e of automobile
and earnings of i n d m d i i i l w h o fin meed
transaction, which e irniugs took form of
reserve credited to such individual s ac
count with finance c o m p a n ) , were t w o
different things, and faet that such* individ
ual realized profit in form of accumulated
reserve with fin mcc c o m p i m did iv>t make
such i n d i v i d u i l s relationship with seller
one of joint adventure
4. Joint Adventures C=>I.I2
Tact that two independently licensed
used automobile dealers shared a lot, the
building thereon and its furnishings, and
Kaiumiiifl v Wluto Star Gua & Oil C o ,
02 Utah 24, 03 P 2d 231
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Catherine Deon ALBRECHTSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Ray H. ALBRECHTSEN, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 10468.

L e o n I l a l g r c n , S a l t L a k e City, for
spondent.

ALBRECHTSEN v ALBRECHTSEN
Cite as 414 T 2d 070
re-

W A D E , Justice

Supreme Court of Utah.
J u n e 3, 100G

T h i s is an appeal from a n o r d e r q u a s h ing a w r i t of g a r n i s h m e n t , issued a n d s e r v ed upon t h e employer of R a y H A l b r e c h t scn by t h e a t t o r n e y w h o h a d obtained a div o r c e from h i m . for C a t h e r i n e D e o n A l b r c c h t s c n , in w h i c h suit she h a d been
a w a r d e d a sum of $250 for a t t o r n e y ' s fees

T h e T h i r d District C o u r t , Salt L a k e
County, M a r c e l l u s K S n o w , J , entered an
o r d e r q u a s h i n g a writ of g a r n i s h m e n t , a n d
a n appeal w a s taken 1 he S u p r e m e C o u r t ,
W a d e , J , held t h a t proper p r o c e d u r e would
h i v e been for vufc s attorney t o i n t e r v e n e
in her divorce action to h a v e a m o u n t a n d
e x t e n t of his a t t o r n e y ' s lien d e t e r m i n e d a n d
lien enforced, and h a v i n g failed to intervene, he h id no s t a n d i n g to appi il from
action of c o u r t in g a r n i s h m e n t p r o c e e d i n g
b r o u g h t in t i n t case, c \ c n t h o u g h motion to
quash writ w a s supported by wife's a f f i d a v i t t h a t i s s u i n c c of w r i t h a d not been a u thorized by h e r and t h a t attorney had been
paid.

W e h a v e not been f a v o r e d with a brief
from respondent
H o w e v e r , from the r e c o r d it a p p e a r s t h a t d e f e n d a n t a n d respondent h e r e i n , R a y H A l b r e c h t s e n , filed a m o tion to q u i s h t h e w r i t of g a r n i s h m e n t T h e
motion w a s s u p p o r t e d by t h e affidavit of
his f o r m e r wife t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y w h o c a u s ed t h e w r i t to be issued a n d served n o longer r e p r e s e n t s h e r in this c a s e ; t h a t the iss u a n c e of the w r i t w a s not a u t h o r i z e d by
h e r , and f u r t h e r , t h a t h e had been paid t h e
full a m o u n t of a t t o r n e y ' s fees he h a d a g r e e d
to accept for his services t o obtain t h e d i vorce*

A t t e m p t e d appeal dismissed

Divorce <S=>I78
P r o p e r p r o c e d u r e would h a v e been foi
wife's a t t o r n e y to intervene in h e r d i v o r c e
action to h a v e a m o u n t a n d e x t e n t of his
a t t o r n e y ' s lien determined and lien enforced,
a n d h i v i n g filled to intervene, h e h i d no
s t a n d i n g to appeal from action of c o u r t in
g i r n i s h m t n t proceeding b r o u g h t in t h a t
c isc, even t h o u g h motion to q u a s h w r i t w a s
supported by wife's affidavit t h a t issuance
of writ had not been a u t h o r i z e d bv l u r a n d
t i n t attorney h i d been paid Rules of Civil
1 l o c c d u r e , rule 7 3 ( a )

Stephen I
appdlaut
I

J o h n s t o n , Salt I a k c City, for

A f t e r a h e a r i n g upon t h e motion to q u a s h
t h e w r i t of g a r n i s h m e n t t h e motion w a s
granted and an order entered quashing the
writ
'Hits appeal is b r o u g h t by t h e a t t o r ney w h o r e p r e s e n t e d C a t h e r i n e D e o n A l b r e c h t s e n in t h e a b o v e entitled action
In
his brief t h e a t t o r n e y d e n i e s t h a t h e h a s
been fully paid a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n t r a c t
between himself a n d h i s f o r m e r client a n d
c o n t e n d s that h e h a d t h e r i g h t t o h a v e the
w r i t issued because h e b a d a n a t t o r n e y ' *
lien on the j u d g m e n t T h e r e c o r d does not
disclose a n y p r o c e e d i n g s taken or even a n
application to t h e c o u r t by t h i s a t t o r n e y t o
i n t e r v e n e in t h e above entitled action to
enforce an a t t o r n e y ' s lien for his fees w h e r e
the a m o u n t and c < t c n t of his lien, if any,
could h a v e been d e t e r m i n e d
Such would
h a v e been the p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e * It is icasonable to a s s u m e t h a t t h e plaintiff in the
above entitled case, w h o denies t h a t she authorized
the
garnishment
proceedings

7 \ m Tur2«1 p 215, S 304; Kourbotis v Nat'l Copper Bank of Salt Lake City, 71 Utnh 232,
p 2 IS. 204 I* 724.

a g a i n s t h e r f o r m e r husband, ,s not appealing from the j u d g m e n t of the court quashing those proceedings
H c r former a t t o r ney h a v i n g failed to i n t e r v e n e as a p a r t y
' " the original action for divorce to enforce
any hen he m a y h a v e for services rendered
' " t h a t case, h a s no s t a n d i n g to appeal from
2. Rule 73(a) U U C P .

Utah
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the action of the c o u r t in the g a r n i s h m e n t
p r o c e e d i n g s * b r o u g h t in that case.
T h e a t t e m p t e d appeal ,s dism.ssed

C R O C K E T T , a n d C A L L I S T E R , ]]
Conrur
' JJ > v v "
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and 2, the written contract was not an
integration as to this subject
Therefore,
whether the $17,000 was agreed to be re
payable by Ipsen and thus an "indebtedness" for which Stanger would be liable
l>ecame a question of fact and parol evi
dence was admissible While the evidence
was conflicting, Stanger adduced testimony
that the president and vice president of
Sentinel stated before the first payment
was made to Ipsen that it was not repayable because it was intended to assist him in
changing employers and to further the development of Sentinel s business in Arizona
There being competent evidence to support
the jury s finding on this issue, we will not
disturb it Moreover, tfiere was also testimony that Ipsen was not Stanger's subagent at the time the payments were made
and therefore the debiting of Stanger's
account would be improper under the Stanger Contract
(101 (4) $13,62885, representing Ander
ton's share of debit created while oj>erating
under the SMG Contract At the trial the
president of Sentinel agreed with Stanger
and Anderson that the repayment of this
amount was expressly covered by the Modification Agreement of January 13, 1969,
and that under the terms thereof only premiums paid on sales of insurance under the
SMG Contract prior to 1969 would be used
to reduce and eventually eliminate Anderson s debit balance The $13,62886 withheld from the "001" account represented,
according to the breakdown provided by
Sentinel, Anderson's share of debit created
while a partner under the SMG Contract
In view of this recognition by Sentinel, the
trial court could have ruled as a matter of
law that Sentinel's withholding of this
amount was improper
In sum, it was proper to admit parol
evidence extrinsic to the Stanger Contract
and the evidence so admitted clearly supports the factual findings of the jury that
Sentinel had no contractual rights to withhold any of the sums hereinabove referred
to from Stanger for the reasons we have
given As to Anderson, Sentinel conceded
it was not permitted to charge the "001"
account for funds advanced him during the

initial four >ear period of his relationship
with Sentinel The jury observed the witnesses, heard their testimony, and it was
their exclusive province to weigh the evi
dence in deciding in favor of one side or the
other

the district court to correct the incorrect
total amount of judgment, where the mistake is clear from the record, reflects no
more than what plaintiffs are entitled to
under the verdict Accord Fa} v Harm, 64
Ari7 10, 164 P2d 860(1945) *

We have reviewed Sentinel's contention
with res[>ect to the jury instruction on Sentinel's first hen right on all commissions for
debts due and the issues of estoppel and
waiver Inasmuch as the jury found, and
we have affirmed their finding, that Sentinel had no contractual right to sums withheld from commissions, that finding is dispositive of this appeal and we deem it unnecessary to address those issues

The judgment on the special verdicts is
affirmed in all respects The case is remanded to the trial court for the limited
purpose of correcting the amount of damages to reflect an award of $30,51640 to
each of the plaintiffs Costs awarded to
plaintiffs

[11] One point, however, remains to be
addressed As noted above, the jury utilized Sentinel's calculation of amounts withheld from commissions to arrive at an
award of damages of $27,01640 to each
Anderson and Stanger, based upon the total
of $54,032 80 shown in the above letter exhibit In fact, the correct total was $61,032 80, which would make a total award of
$30,516 40 to each of the two plaintiffs
Under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court may correct clerical mistakes in judgments at any time See
also Bagnall v Suburbia & Co, Utah, 579
P2d 917 (1978) In explanation of the intent of the identical Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure, the comment has been made
that "in this broad approach to correctibility under Rule 60(a), it matters little whether an error was made by the cour^ clerk, the
jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge
himself, so long as it is clearly a formal
error that should be corrected in the interest of having judgment, order, or other part
of the record reflect what was done or
intended" Annot, 13 A L R Fed 794
(1972) The definition of "clerical mistake"
thus extends to include the one here discovered "It is a type of mistake or omission
mechanical in nature which is apparent on
the record and which does not involve a
legal decision or judgment by an attorney "
In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp, 266
F Supp 605, 607 (1967) Our instruction to

HALL, C J , STEWART and OAKS, JJ ,
and DAVID SAM, District Judge, concur
DURHAM, J , does not participate herein
DAVID SAM, District Judge, sat

to tecover, it uas necessary to establish
that causal effect of defendant's conduct
outweigh* d combined effect of all other
causes, including conduct of plaintiff and
alienated spouse, (3) punitive damages
wen1 recoverable as long as plaintiff
showed circumstances of aggravation in addition to malice implied by law from conduct of defendant in causing separation of
plaintiff and his spouse, and (4) an award
of punitive damages could not be entered,
however, without first adducing evidence or
making findings of fact with regard to defendant's net worth or income
Reversed and remanded
Hall, C J , and Stewart, J , concurred in
part and dissented in part and filed separate opinions
Durham, J , concurred in result and
dissented in part and filed opinion

Brett W NELSON, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Jeff JACOBSEN, Defendant
and Appellant
No 17667.
Supreme Court of Utah
Aug 31, 1983
Action was instituted for alleged alienation of wife's affections The Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, Don V Tibbs,
J , entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant ap|>ea!ed
The Supreme Court,
Oaks, J , held that (1) notice of trial described nature of proceedings against unrepresented defendant in such ambiguous
terms that it deprived him of adequate time
to prepare for his defense in violation of his
right to due process, (2) an action for alienation of affections was still a viable cause
of action in Utah, but in order for plaintiff

1 ( onstitutional Law <J=»25I 6
A party is deprived of due process
where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to
inform a party of nature of proceeding
against him or is not given sufficient^ in
nhance of proceeding to j>ermit preparation U S C A Const Amend 14
2 Constitutional Law <&=>251 6
To satisfy an essential requisite of procedural due process, a "hearing' must be
prefaced by timely notice which adequately
informs the parties of the sj>ecific issues
they must prepare to meet
USCA
Const Amend 14
3. Constitutional Law «s»251 5
"Due process" is not a technical concept
that can IH> reduced to a formula with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and
circumstances, but is a concept which rests
uf>on basic fairness and demands a procedure that is appropriate to cise and just to
parties involved
U S C A Const Amend
14
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions
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4 Constitutional Law «=»314
Notice of trial given an unrepresented
defendant in form of an oral statement that
case had been set for "hearing" two weeks
later was not a clear notice that defendant,
who was uneducated and inexperienced,
had to be ready for "trial" on that date and,
hence, was so ambiguous as to deprive defendant of adequate time to prepare his
defense in violation of his constitutional
right to due process
U S C A Const
Amend 14
5 Attorney and Client «=»62
A layman is entitled to undertake his
own representation, but due to his lack of
technical knowledge of law and procedure,
he should be accorded every consideration
that may reasonably be indulged and,
though this would not include interrupting
course of proceedings to translate legal
terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise attempting to redress ongoing consequences
of layman's decision to function in a capacity for which he was not trained, it would
include informing layman of date of trial
more than two days b< fore it was to lugin
and advising him of such matters as his
right to a trial by jury and right to require
any previously retained counsel to provide
case file and other documents whose preparation had been covered by prior representation U S C A Const Amend 14
6 Husband and Wife *=»324, 325
Right to recover for alienation of affections now extends to both spouses equally
and, rather than l>eing based on premise
that either spouse constitutes the "property" of the other, is based on the premise
that each spouse has a valuable interest in
the marriage relationship, including its intimacy, companionship, support, duties, and
affection
7 Husband and Wife «=>322
A suit for alienation of affections does
not attempt to "preserve" or "protect" a
marriage from interference, but serves only
to compensate a spouse who has sustained
loss and injury to his or her marital relationship through the intentional interference of a third party

8 Husband and Wife <*=»323
Even if some alienation actions are motivated primarily by spite or extortion,
there is no basis on which to abolish cause
of action altogether, since a plaintiff who
institutes a groundless or collusive suit is
subject to a suit or counterclaim for abuse
of process or malicious prosecution, and
there can be no recovery against a defendant whose conduct is blameless or merely
negligent

sion in a marriage in an action for ahena
tion of affections just l>ecause the parties to
the marriage share some of the res|K>nsibih
ty for its demise

9 Husband and Wife *=>322
An action for alienation of affections is
an intentional tort and, if defendant has
actual notice of marriage, his or her continued overtures or sexual liaisons can be construed as something akin to an assumption
of risk that his or her conduct will injure
the marriage and give rise to an action

15 Husband and Wife «=>323
An action for alienation of affections is
still a viable cause of action in Utah, but in
order to recover, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant's acts constituted the
"controlling cause" of the alienation of affections, that is, that the causal effect of
the defendant's conduct outweighed the
combined effect of aJJ other causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and the
alienated spouse

10. Constitutional Law <*=>82(10)
An action for alienation of affections
does not unconstitutionally interfere with a
defendant's right of privacy in area of personal and sexual relationships between individuals since sexual relations are not a necessary element of such an action and, as
between two private individuals, a defendant's claim to sexual and reproductive
privacy is no greater than the plaintiffs
U S C A Const Amend 14
11 Husband and Wife *-334(1)
Recovery in an action for alienation of
affections cannot be denied when fact of
injury or loss can be proved simply because
there is difficulty in assessing amount of
that injury or loss
12. Husband and Wife <*= 334(1)
Rule affirming availability of a cause
of action for alienation of affections despite
uncertainties in assessment of damages is
implemented in context of appropriate jury
instructions and court's power to require
remittitur to restrain or reduce arbitrary or
excessive jury verd eta Rules Civ Proc,
Rule 59(a)(5)
13 Husband and Wife <*=>334(1)
It would be unjust to refuse to try to
measure the effect of a third party's intru-

14 Husband and Wife <&=»326
A recovery may not l>e had in action
for alienation of affections if the acts or
conduct of the plaintiff himself, or any other cause than the acts of the defendant,
constituted the controlling cause of plaintiff's loss of affections

16 Husband and Wife «=*322
A defendant sued for alienation of affei tions is proinrly chargtahlt with the effect of mere acquiescence in the overtures
of the alienated spouse where the defendant knows or has reason to know that such
acquiescence will damage the marital relationship
17. Husband and Wife *=> 334(1)
In trying to make the damages "proportionate" to the loss of the injured s|M>use
in an action for alienation of affections, the
trier of fact should consider the duration
and quality of the marriage relation, including the extent to which genuine feelings of
love and affection existed between the
spouses prior to the intervention of the
defendant
18. Husband and Wife <*=>332
Fact of marriage, plus assertion that
defendant willfully and intentionally alienated affections of plaintiff's sjwuse, resulting in loss of comfort, society and consortium of wife, are essential allegations of a
cause of action for alienation of affections
and, if punitive damages are sought, malice
must also l>e alleged

19 Husband and Wife «=»334(2)
In order to recover punitive damages
for the tort of alienation of affections, the
plaintiff must show circumstances of aggravation in addition to the malice implied by
law from the conduct of the defendant in
causing the separation of the plaintiff and
his or her spouse which was necessan to
sustain a recovery of compensatory damages
20. Damages «=>171
An award of punitive damages requires
consideration of man> factors, but since it is
primarily intended to punisn defendant and
thereby deter others similarly situated from
imitating his conduct, defendant's net
worth and income must be considered in
determining amount of punitive damages
21 Husband and Wife ®=»334(2)
An award of punitive dam iges should"
not !>c entered in an action for alienation of
affections without adducing evidence or
making findings of fact with regard to defendant's net worth or income

Craig M Snyder, IVovo, for defendant
and appellant
K L M< Iff, Richfield
res|M>ndcnt

for plaintiff and

OAKS, Justice
In a bench trial of this action for alicna
ti >n of a wife's affections, the plaintiff
husband obtained a judgment of $84,601)
against a defendant who was unrepresented
bv, counsel
On appeal, defendant seeks
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a
new trial
Plaintiff and Brenda Nelson were married July 15, W 8
He was 21 >ears old,
she was 18 They lived in Sahna From
the l>eginning, their marriage was characterized by turmoil ind violence
Brenda
testified that plaintiff frequently came
home drunk and abused her physically and
verbaffy His heavy drinking fed to numerous confrontations with the police, including
two arrests for drunk driving She also
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drank Within two months of marriage,
and long l>efore either party knew defendant, plaintiff told Rrenda he wanted a di
vorce
Rrenda Nelson first met defendant in the
fall of 1978 in the Safari Motel and Cafe,
which defendant managed for his parents
Defendant, who had been divorced, was
then 31 Plaintiff met defendant in January 1979 The three became friends
Brenda initiated most of the contact between herself and defendant
She first
made sexual advances toward him at a party in January 1979, hut they were unreciprocated at that time
In the next six
months, she frequently visited defendant at
his home in Axtell, "depending] on (plain
tiffs] work schedule," and she and defend
ant sometimes drove around together in her
truck
Plaintiff first Inname aware of Brenda's
involvement with defendant m early June
1979 1wue he came home early from his
night shift at the coal mine and discovered
the m tog« ther The second discovery gave
rise to a discussion that ultimately involved
both siwnises' parents, during which Br< nda
admitted seeing dcfcnelant and promised to
stop In late June, she talked with defend
ant at a beer party Seeing this, plaintiff
dragged her behind his truck and began
heating her When defendant intervened, a
fight ensued between plaintiff and defendant in which plaintiff was injured
Plaintiff quit the coal mine in July and
took a job with a trucking company in order
to spend more time with Brenda About
three weeks later, Brenda asked him to give
her 17 year old friend a ride home to Richfield on his way to work the night shift
Rather than driving the girl home, plaintiff
bought four six packs of l>eer, which the
two drank as they drove around in his company truck
Plaintiff made sexual advances toward her The two were seen
together, and when plaintiff arrived at
work he was summarily fired for drinking
and having an underage passenger in his
truck Returning home late that night, still
very drunk, he awakened Brenda with his
shouting and cursing
While repeatedly

lagging his hunting knife into the floor, he
threatened to break every bone in her body
if she didn't call her father to come for her
Brenda went to stay with her parents for a
week When the couple reconciled, Brenda's father counseled them both to stop
drinking if they wanted to save their marriage
Plaintiff's parents testified that plaintiff
became despondent and withdrawn after he
discovered Brenda's involvement with defendant, and that his drinking also increased
After being fired, plaintiff
worked irregularly driving trucks for various construction companies, but he was unemployed for lengthy periods, and his income fell to half of its prior level
In August 1979, Brenda told plaintiff she
wanted time to think about their marital
problems She persuaded defendant to take
her with him to Las Vegas, where they
stayed overnight Defendant testified that
Brenda slept in a motel while he gambled
all night in a casino (Defendant testified
that his relationship with Brenda did not
become romantic until several months after
plaintiff and Brenda were divorced, October
31, 1979)
U|>on her return, Brenda told plaintiff
she thought they could make their marriage
work, and they continued to live together
In late August, in response to plaintiff's
questioning, Brenda admitted that she and
defendant had had sexual intercourse
"probably around" eight to twelve times
Enraged, plaintiff gave her an especially
vicious beating
Injured and .suffering,
Brenda went to defendant's home for a few
days and then to her parents'
Within a week, Brenda returned to plaintiff and agreed to try again to make the
marriage work on condition that the drinking and beating stop However, she testified, plaintiff's promises were not kept and
after many attempts to mend her marriage
she finally left plaintiff because of his
drinking and his physical abuse of her
Plaintiff testified that although Brenda
came back to him in September, she seemed
"as if she had given up" on the marriage

In October 1979, the couple fought at a
party when Brenda discovered plaintiff in
the kitchen with another woman
Later
that month, Brenda moved out for the last
time and went to live with defendant
They were married Octobei 1, 1980
Plaintiff commenced this action on Sep
tember 27, 1979 Defendant had only a
limited education and no prior ex|>erience in
legal proceedings On the recommendation
of a friend, he retained a Salt Lake City
attorney to represent him Defendant paid
this attorney a retainer of $500 and an
additional $6,500, which the attorney said
he would hold in trust to pay additional
attorney fees and to negotiate a settlement
The remainder was to be refunded to defendant
Between March and July 1980,
the case was set for trial then changed to a
pretrial hearing, which was twice vacated
and rescheduled while the parties attempt
ed to negotiate a settlement After reach
ing a tentative settlcme nt, the parties stip
ulated on July 29, 1980, to a dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint with pre judice This
dismissal was entered Defendant's attor
ncy advised that the settlement amount
was $5,000 and asked defendant to send the
money When asked why he did not pay
this amount out of the trust fund, the attorney replied that his legal fees had depleted
almost the entire $7,000 previously paid
Defendant protested that he did not have
an additional $5,000 The attorney told him
he would not continue to represent him
without payment of additional attorney
fees to cover the cost of trial, but that if
defendant would discharge him he would
refund $1,300 from the trust fund
The
attorney also advised that defendant could
settle the case himself either by giving
plaintiff a promissory note for the $5,000
settlement amount or by negotiating his
own settlement
Defendant dismissed his attorney and demanded delivery of his file in the case,
including copies of all correspondence and
pleadings and the depositions of l>oth plainI

Defendant also urges error in plaintiffs fail
ure to gi\e him the statutory notice either to
appoint another atlorne> or appear in person

tiff and defendant Defendant represents
that his attorney never sent him the case
file and that the attorney did not advise
him concerning his rights as a litigant, the
risks of representing himself, or the possible
consequences of the attorney's withdrawal
The atte>rney withelrew with court approval
in early September 1980 and refunded
$1,300 to defendant
No further proceedings were initiated by
either part} for a j>criod of four months,
during which elefendant neither executed a
note ne>r paid plaintiff any money toward
the settlement Thereafter, the settlement
agreement hating failed, plaintiff petitionee! the district court to set aside its
earlier oreler of dismissal, reinstate the action, and set it for nonjury trial Having
l>een duly notified, defendant attended the
hearing without counsel The |>ctition was
granted, and the case was set for nonjury
trial two weeks later
The case was tricel on January 21, 1981
Defendant attempted to represent himself
at trial The tot il judgment taken against
him w »s $81,600 $59 000 f«>r past anel future loss of consortium and $25,000 in puni
live elamages Defendant's timely motions
for a new trial mel foi pielgment notwith
standing the ve relict were both elenied, and
this ap)>eal follow eel
I FAIRNESS OF TRIAL
Defenelant contends that his motion for a
new trial should have Ijcen granted because
he was denied due process of law in the
proceedings b> not l>eing given adecjuate
and timely notice of trial*
[1] Timol) anel aeleejuate notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
way are the very he art of procedural fair
ness Worm 11 v Ogilcn Cit\ Fire Department, Utah, 616 P2d r>98. 601 02 (1980).
Goss i Lo/wz, 419 U S 565, 579, 95 S C t
729, 738. 42 L E I 2<l 725 (1975) The muchciteel case of Mullnne \ Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Cn, 339 U S 306, 314, 70
U C A IQTi $ 78 51 "to In the view we take
of this case we need not reach thai contention
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S Ct 652, 657, 94 L Ed 865 (1950), sets out
the classic requirements of adequate notice
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections The notice must be of such
nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a
reasonable time for those interested to
make their apircamiKe [Citations omitted]
Many cases have held that where notice is
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party
of the nature of the proceedings against
him or not given sufficiently in advance of
the proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due process Graham v
Sawaya, Utah, 632 P 2d 851 (1981). Vhler
v Secretary of Health & Mental Hygiene,
45 MdApp 2S2, 412 A2*\ 1287 (1980),
Myers v Moreno, Mo App , 564 S W 2d 83
(1978)
Applying these standards to the record in
this case, we conclude that the notice of
trial was constitutionally deficient as to this
unrepresented defendant l>ecause it described the nature of the proceedings against
him in such ambiguous terms that it deprived him of adequate time to prepare his
defense
Plaintiff's petition to set aside the earlier
dismissal and reinstate the lawsuit was filed
on December 26, 1980 The petition was
heard on January 7, 1981 Defendant was
present in the courtroom without counsel,
plaintiff's counsel was temporarily absent
The record of the hearing reads as follows
2

Approximately twenty minutes later plain
tiffs counsel entered the courtroom and the
following transpired
(Plaintiffs counsel] Your Honor I was out
side Did you set 7928 Nelson v Jacobsen?
Ilie Court Did I set that one Carole'
The Clerk > es Your Honor You set it for
January 21st
{Plaintiffs counsel) Well I wasn t here so I
didn t know

The Court We are now on Civil 7928,
Nehon i s Jacobsen
Is [plaintiff's
counsel] here 7
The Clerk No, Your Honor
The Court Well, I'm going to set this
case for hearing on January 21st at
10 00 a m , following the Law and Motion matters You notify [plaintiff's
counsel] accordingly [Emphasis added]
The district court then proceeded to other
cases, and defendant left the courtroom*
The minute entry, dated January 8, 1981,
state'* that "[jijlaintiff's motion is granted
and this matter is set for hearing on Jan
21st, 1981, to follow the Law and Motion
Calendar as a non-jury trial " But there is
no indication in the record that defendant
ever saw or received a copy of the minute
order Hence, we must assume that the
on\y notice defendant received at this time
was the district court's oral statement that
the case had been set for "hearing" two
weeks later
The order of reinstatement scheduling
the case for trial on January 21 was executed January 14 and mailed to defendant
Januar) 15, 1981 On that same day, the
court clerk sent defendant a separate notice
that the matter was set for trial six days
later Defendant received the order and
the notice on January 19, just two days
before trial The record indicates that the
receipt of these documents constituted defendant's first notice that the January 21
event was to be a full scale "trial," rather
than a "hearing " Exactly two weeks after
the lawsuit was reinstated and two days
after he received notice of the date of trial,
the case went to trial Defendant represented himself The court awarded a judgment against defendant for $84,600
The Court I set the matter for January 21st
at 10 00 a m to follow the Law and Motion
matters |To the clerkj fWJill vou please
notify the Defendar of this hearing so he
wilt know that the matter is set
The Clerk I think his counsel has been dls
missed
The Court Well then notify him at his ad
dress in Salina or wherever he lives

[2] "To satisfy an essential requisite of
procedural due process, a 'hearing' must be
prefaced by timely notice which adequately
inform* the parties of the specific issues
they must prepare to meet" State v
Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 914, 500 P2d 209, 215
(1972) In casts where the notice is ambiguous or misleading, courts have found a
denial of due process In Watson v Washington Preferred Life Insurance Co, 81
Wash 2d 403, 502 P 2d 1016 (1972) (en banc),
notice of a shareholders' meeting "[t]o consider and vote upon a plan and agreement
of merger
[and to] transact
other
hijQi n«W WAO hpld constitutionally inadequate and violative of due process !>ecause
it failed to inform shareholders that those
not receiving the mailed notice would be
treated as "missing shareholders" and that,
should they fail to ap|>car at the shareholders' meeting, the court would appoint, ex
parte, a representative to vole their shares
502 P2d at 1020 Similarly, in City and
Count) of Denver v Eggert, Colo , 647 P2d
216 (1982) (en banc), the Colorado Supreme
Court held violative of due process notice of
a "hearing
to allow information regarding [a] landfill o|>eration to be made public
in the interests of the health, safety, and
welfare of [the county's] citi/ens" where it
was clear from the record that the plaintiffcity and its contractors "had no idea that
the result of the hearing would be a cease
and desist order effective almost immediately" against them 647 P 2d at 223 24
Finally, in State v Gibbs, supra, the court
held that an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and binding the juvenile over for trial
as an adult violated the juvenile's due process rights where it resulted from notice
which contained only allegations of the juvenile's unlawful acts and made no mention
that a primary purjnrae of the "interviews"
with a magistrate was to determine whether juvenile jurisdiction should be waived
[3] "Due process" is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a formula with
a fixed content unrelated to time, place,
and circumstances Rather, "the demands
of due process rest on the concept of basic
fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the

parties invoked " Rupp v Grants rile Cit),
Utah, 610 P2d 338, 341 (1980)
14J To a member of the bar or even to a
layj>erson ex|>ericnced with trial proceedings, setting a case for "hearing" could
have been understwnl as setting a case for
"trial " But to this uneducated and inex|>e
nenced defendant, a setting for "hearing"
was not a clear notice that the defendant
had to be ready for trial on that date
Indeed, defendant had earlier attended one
"hearing" in which plaintiffs petition to
reinstate was granted without evidence or
discussion, without requiring that plaintiff
or his counsel be present and without requiring any participation by defendant
Based on his experience at this earlier hearing, defendant could reasonably have con
eluded that the "hearing" set for January
21 would also l>e routine
[5J Defendant was entitled to undertake
his own representation
U C A , 1953
§ 78 51 25, Henthman \ Hatch, 13 Utah
2d 266 208. 372 P2d 990, 991 (1962) As a
general ruU, a part\ who represents himself will be lu Id to the same standard of
knowledge and practice as an> qualified
mem!>er of the bar, Manka v Martin, 200
Colo 260, 614 P2d 875, 880 (1980) (en bane),
cert denied, 450 U S 913 101 S Ct 1354, 67
h Ed 2d 338 (1981), Johnson \ Aetna Casualty & SureU Co, Wyo, 630 P2d 514, 517,
cert denied, 454 U S 1118, 102 SCt 961, 71
L Ed 2d 105 (1981). Smith \ Rabb, 95 Ariz
49, 53, 386 P2d 649, 652 (1963)
At the same time, we have also cautioned
that "because of his lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure [a layman acting
as his own attorney] should be accorded
every consideration that may reasonably l>e
indulged ' Htathmdn \ Hatch, 13 Utah 2d
at 268, 372 P 2d at 991 Reasonable consideration for a layman acting as his own
attorney does not require the court to interrupt the course of proceedings to translate
legal terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing consequences of the party's decision to function
in a capacity for which he is not trained
Judges cannot l>e e x a c t e d to perform that
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function In this case, the trial judge was
as considerate and helpful as he could be
expected to be during the course of the
trial.

trial advice described here. The judgment
must therefore be reversed and the cause
remanded J"or a new trial.

The deficiency in this case concerns what
happened before the trial. The vulnerability of a layman who is unrepresented as he
approaches a trial of the legal and factual
complexity of this case requires more judicial consideration than was extended here.
Most importantly, defendant was not clearly informed of the date of trial until two
days before it was to begin. That deficiency jeopardized one of the most important
ingredients of due process: time to prepare
a defense. In addition, in view of the nature of this action the court should have
advised the defendant prior to trial of his
right to a trial by jury. And, in view of the
fact that defendant had previously been
represented by retained counsel whom he
had discharged, the court might also have
taken steps to assure that defendant was
advised of his right to require that counsel
to provide the case file and other documents
whose preparation had been covered by the
prior representation In this case, plaintiff's counsel repeatedly used defendant's
deposition to impeach him during trial. Defendant apparently had no copy of that
deposition or of his former counsel's dejwsition of plaintiff for study prior to the trial.
In all the circumstances of this case, we
conclude that it was fundamentally unfair
to put defendant to trial on January 21
without counsel and without the other pre-

II.

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
Most of the briefing on this appeal concerns the issue posed by the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Defendant urges us to abolish the cause of
action for alienation of affections. We rule
on this issue for the guidance of the district
court on remand. Notwithstanding the
public policy grounds defendant advances,
we choose to retain this cause of action for
the reasons and with the limitations outlined below.
We have had no occasion for an in-depth
consideration of the common-law cause of
action for alienation o( affections (or nearly
thirty years. During that time, as defendant notes, this cause of action has fallen
from favor and has been abolished or restricted in a majority of jurisdictions.
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have alM)lished this cause of action by
statute 3 Two other states have abolished
it by judicial decision.4 Six jurisdictions
have statutes abolishing the cause of action
for money damages at law, but permitting
suits for injunctive relief in equity.5 The
statutes of two additional states have abolished the cause of action for alienation of
affections with only insignificant exceptions.* The appellate courts of three other

3. Am Rev Stat Ann §25 341 (Supp 1982
1983), Cal Civ Code § 43 5 (West 1982). Colo
Rev Stat § 13 20 202 (1973), Conn Gen Stat
§ 52 572b (1983), Del Code Ann tit 10,
§ 3924 (1974), DC Code § 16-923 (Supp
1978). GaCode Ann § 30 109 1 (1980), Ind
Code Ann § 34 4 + J (Burns Supp 1982). Mc
Rev Stat Ann tit 19. § 167(1964). Md Cts &
JudProcCode Ann § 5 301(a) (1980), Mich
CompLaws Ann. §600 2901 (1968), Minn
Stat § 553 02(1982), Mont Code Ann § 27 1
601 (1981). Nev Rev Stat § 41380(1979). Or
Rev Stat § 30840(1981). Va Code § 801 220
(1950). WVaCode § 56 3 2A (Supp 1983).
Wis Stat Ann § 768 01 (West 1980), WyoStat
Ann § 1-23 101 (1977)
4. Fundermann v Mickelson, Iowa. 304 N W 2d
790 (1981). Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash 2d 99.
105. 615 P2d 452. 455 (1980).

5. Ala Code § 6 5 331 (1975) (injunction permitted, see Logan v Davidson, 282 Ala 327,
330, 211 So 2d 461, 463 (1968)), Fla Stat.
§77101 (1981); N J Stat Ann §2A23-I
(West 1952). NY Civ Rights Law § 80-a
(McKinney 1976). Ohio Rev Code Ann
§2305 29 (Page 1981). Vt Stat Ann. tit. 15.
§ 1001 (Supp 1983)
6. Okla Stat Ann tit 76, § 8 1 (West Supp
1982-1983) (action permitted only if spouse
was incompetent or minor at time of alleged
alienation). Pa Stat Am tit 48, § l70(Purdon
1965) (action permitted if defendant is blood
relative of plaintiff)
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states have voiced their dissatisfaction with
the cause of action,' and three others have
enacted legislation shortening their statutes
of limitation to one year.* Louisiana has
never recognized this cause of action.* We
note that with but two exceptions, when
this cause of action has been alwlished it
has been by legislative rather than judicial
action.
[6] Defendant argues that a cause of
action for alienation of affections is based
on the obsolete and fictitious assumptions
that "the wife is one of the husband's chattels, and that her companionship, her services and her affections are his property."
Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 175, 115
So. 447, 450 (1927). While the archaic notion of "wife as chattel" may have served
as the historical foundation for this cause of
action, its modern content bears little resemblance to that notion. The right to
recover for alienation of affections now extends to both spouses equally. See, e.g,
Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C.App. 521, 265 S E.2d
434 (1980); Burch v. Goodson, 85 Kan. 86,
116 P. 216 (1911). Moreover, an action for
alienation of affections is no longer based
on the premise that either spouse constitutes the "property" of the other, but on
the premise that each spouse has a valuable
interest in the marriage relationship, including its intimacy, companionship, support, duties, and affection. Note, "The
Case for Retention of Causes of Action for
Intentional Interference with the Marital
Relationship," 48 Notre Dame Law. 426,
430-31 (1972).

The law protects many relational interests. L. Green, "Basic Concepts: Persons,
Proj>erty, Relations" in The Litigation Process in Tort Law 413, 418-24 (1965). We
have recently recognized a plaintiff's right
to recover for the loss of prospective economic relations. Leigh Furniture & Carpet
Co. v. Jsom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293 (1982). We
recognize a cause of action against a defendant who intentionally interferes with a
contractual relation. Bunnell v. Bills, 13
Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597, 602 (1962)
(inducing breach); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 766 (1977). Our wrongful death
statutes have long recognized the value of a
plaintiff's interest in his or her relationships
with family members. U C.A., 1953, §§ 7811-6, 7&-11-7. We have repeatedly sustained a plaintiff's right to recover for "the
loss of society, love, companionship, protection and affection which usually constitute
the heart of the action " Jones v. Carvell,
Utah, 641 P.2d 105, 108 (1982). Accord, In
re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 159-60, 213
P.2d 657, 661 (1950).'° The marital relationship is entitled to as much protection as
these.
[7] Second, defendant contends that
there is no proof that an action for alienation of affections achieves its intended purpose of protecting and preserving the marriage. In contrast, he argues, "the very
nature of the action serves as a destructive
influence on the marriage." This argument
misperceives the purpose of the action. It
makes little sense to speak of actions growing out of injuries to relations as intended
to "preserve" or "protect" those relations.

7. Femter v Daniel O'ConnelVs Sons. Inc. 381 9. Moulin v Monteleone. 165 La 169. 115 So
Mass 507, 1980 Mass Adv Sh 2075, 413 N E.2d
447 (1927). Ohlhausen v Brown. LaCtApp,
690. 694 (1980) (action disfavored). Dube v
372 So 2d 787, 788(1979).
Rochette, 110 N H 129. 130. 262 A 2d 288, 289
(1970) (susceptible to abuse but legislative 10. The value of affection in such familial relajudgment to allow action respected). TTiomptionships was even recognized implicitly b> a
son v Chapman, 93 N M 356. 358, 600 P 2d
court that abolished a cause of action for alien302, 304 (N M Ct App 1979) (court would abolation of affections between spouses Despite
ish tort if it had authority to do so)
its strident language on the abolition, the court
expressly retained a cause of action for aliena8. Ark Stat Ann § 37 201 (Supp 1983), Ky
ting the affections of a child Wyjnan v WalRev Stat § 413.140(l)(c) (Supp 1982) (includes
lace, 15 Wash App 395. 400 & n 4, 549 P2d
alienation action, see Skaggs v Stanton, Ky.Ct.
71, 74 & n 4 (1976). affd, 94 Wash 2d 99, 615
App, 532 SW.2d 442, 443 (1975)); R.I Gen
P2d 452 (1980) (after initially reversing in 91
Laws § 9-1-14 (Supp 1982).
Wash 2d 317, 588 P.2d 1133 (1979))
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Actions for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations or for inducing breaches of contract are not intended to
reestablish those relations or reinstate those
contracts but to compensate plaintiffs for
their loss. Actions for wrongful death obviously do not restore the plaintiffs' relationships with the deceased; the law seeks only
to com|>ensate for losses. Similarly, a suit
for alienation of affections does not attempt to "preserve" or "protect" a marriage from interference, but only to com|>ensate a spouse who has suffered loss and
injury to his or her marital relationship
through the intentional interference of a
third party.
Third, defendant contends that the threat
of an action for alienation of affections is a
powerful tool of extortion since "there exists such potential to damage reputations"
that at least one court and one commentator have characterized alienation actions as
"legalized blackmail " Wyman v. Wallace,
15 Wash.App 395, 397, 549 P.2d 71, 72
(1976), aff'd, 94 Wash.2d 99, 615 P.2d 452
(1980); M. Grossman, The New York Law
of Domestic Relations § 313 (1947). While
it cannot l>e gainsaid that many types of
litigation place private facts in a public
light, an action for alienation of affections
is no more "extortive" in this sense than an
action for criminal conversation, which has
adultery as its operative element, Cahoon v.
^ Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 231, 342 P.2d 94,
98-99 (1959), or a suit to change the custody
of children on the basis of the parental
deficiencies of the custodian, or a defamation action in which the defense of truth
puts the plaintiff's reputation in question.
See, eg., Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122,
247 P.2d 264 (1952). If, as defendant
claims, it is "[glreed, revenge, spite and a
desire to humiliate others" that encourages
a plaintiff to sue for alienation of affections, the plaintiff must surely be dissuaded
to some extent by the knowledge that his or
her own foibles, failures, and inadequacies
as a marital partner may be given public
exposure by a defendant seeking to disprove causation or to mitigate damages.

[8] In any case, even if some alienation
actions are motivated primarily by spite or
extortion, that is no basis on which to abolish the cause of action altogether.
First, the very purpose of courts is to
separate the just from the unjust causes;
second, if the courts are to be closed
against actions for . . alienation of affections on the ground that some suits
may be brought in bad faith, the same
reason would close the door against litigants in all kinds of suits, for in every
kind of litigation some suits are brought
in bad faith; the very purpose of courts
is to defeat unjust prosecutions and to
secure the rights of parties in just prosecutions . . .
Wilder v. Reno, 43 F.Supp. 727, 729 (D.Pa.
1942). It is noteworthy that our research
has disclosed only one case in which there
was evidence that the plaintiff and the
"alienated" s"pouse colluded for purposes of
extortion, and in that case recovery was
denied. Wilson v. Aylward, 207 Kan. 254,
484 P.2d 1003 (1971).
In truth, "procedural limitations and judicial discretion have been deemed adequate
safeguards against abuse in other areas of
the law vulnerable to bogus claims," and
"[t]here is no reason to assume that they
cannot be used to similar advantage in this
area." Note, 48 Notre Dame Law., supra,
at 430. Moreover, the courts will not tolerate waste or abuse of judicial resources, and
a plaintiff who institutes a groundless or
collusive suit is subject to a suit or counterclaim for abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v.
Isom, 657 P.2d at 308-09; W. Prosser,
Handlyook of the Law of TorU §§ 120, 121
(4th ed. 1971). Finally, abolishing a cause
of action for alienation of affections will
not eliminate or even reduce extortion
(which can still be accomplished by threatening to expose a person to his family or
colleagues or publicize his indiscretions in
other ways), but it will surely close the
courthouse doors to at least some deserving
plaintiffs.
[91 Defendant's contention that an action for alienation can be used to victimize

innocent and unsuspecting defendant* is answered by the fact that this is an intentional tort. There can be no recovery against a
defendant whose conduct is blameless or
merely negligent (such as a person who is
not aware that the object of his or her
attentions is married). On the other hand,
the element of intent can be proved where
the defendant's actions are the product of
choice. See Note, 48 Notre Dame Law.,
supra, at 431. In fact, where a defendant
has actual notice of the marriage, his or her
continued overtures or sexual liaisons can
be construed as something akin to assumption of the risk that this conduct will injure
the marriage and give rise to an action.

argues, judgments in this area of the law
are frequently arbitrary and excessive.
But the injury in this action seems no more
"intangible" and no more difficult to value
than pain and suffering in a personal injury
action or the loss of comfort, society, and
companionship in an action for wrongful
death. The emerging law of intentional
infliction of emotional distress attests to the
law's willingness to have juries and judges
put monetary values on psychic and emotional harm. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Association v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d
330. 337-39. 240 P.2d 282. 286 (1952) (en
banc) (Traynor, J.).

[10] Fourth, relying on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct 1678, 14
L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Bairtl,
405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349
(1972), defendant contends that "an alienation of affections action unreasonably, and
perhaps unconstitutionally, interferes with
and impinges u|K>n [a] defendant's right of
privacy . . . in the area of personal and
sexual relationships between individuals."
This argument is misplaced for two reasons.
Griswold and Eisenstadt are inap|K>site l>ecause sexual relations are not a necessary
element of alienation of affections. Cahoon
v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d at 231, 342 P.2d at
98-99; Trainor v. Deters, 22 Ohio App.2d
135, 139-40, 259 N.E2d 131, 135 (1969).
Second, while both Griswold and Eisenstadt
were said to involve "unwarranted governmental intrusion" into sexual relations and
reproductive choices, Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at
453, 92 S.Ct. at 1038 (emphasis added), a
cause of action for alienation of affections
involves interference by a private individual. As between two private individuals,
defendant's claim to sexual and reproductive privacy can be no greater than plaintiff's, and neither can claim constitutional
immunity to use his or her own "rights" to
invade the "privacy" of the other.

[11,12] It would be anomalous and unjust to deny recovery where the fact of
injury or loss can be proved simply because
there is difficulty in assessing its amount
Cf. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, Utah,
664 P.2d 1161, 1165-66 (1983) (lost profits
from new business venture). In Jones v.
Carvell, Utah, 641 P.2d 105 (1982), we discussed the application of this principle to
the recovery of damages for wrongful
death, concluding as follows:
To be sure, the making of such judgments
is not easy and requires great understanding of those human values which
can make interpersonal relationships so
precious. Yet, the process, difficult as it
is, must be tempered and confined so as
to strike a just balance. The process is
not unique to wrongful death cases.
Id. at 108. The rule that affirms the availability of a cause of action despite uncertainties in the assessment of damages is of
course implemented in the context of appropriate jury instructions and the court's power to require remittitur to restrain or reduce arbitrary or excessive jury verdicts.
Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5); Cahoon v. Pelton, 9
ULih 2d at 227, 342 P.2d at 95; Ruf v.
Association for World Travel Exchange, 10
Utah 2d 249, 351 P.2d 623 (1960); Tice v.
Mandel, N.D., 76 N.W.2d 124 (1956).

Fifth, defendant urges us to abolish all
actions for alienation because it is difficult
to determine the intangible injuries involved. Since there is no standard of measurement for the trier of fact, defendant

Defendant's final argument is both more
subtle and more persuasive. He contends
that the only marriages which are vulnerable to the depradations of a third party are
those in which there is already discord from
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other causes
He cites the difficulty of
proving causation in actions for alienation
of affections
He then concludes that
where the alienation is attributable to any
significant degree to the plaintiff's own
conduct or to the conduct of the alienated
spouse, it would be unjust to permit the
recovery of damages from a third party
[13] While conceding the difficulty of
proving causation, we conclude that it
would be unjust to refuse to try to measure
the effect of a third party's intrusion in a
marnage ju«*t because the parties to the
marriage share some of the responsibility
for its demise Even relatively "good" marriages have intermittent difficulties upon
which a predatory defendant might capitalize
And even where sjwuses are estranged, there is merit to the argument
that "each has a right to seek a rapprochement that should be protected against those
who would cut it off" Note, 48 Notre
Dame Law , supra, at 432 We are unwilling to adopt a rule of law that would fore
close all remedies on the questionable assumption that any plaintiff whose marriage
has gone agTound "must have deserved i t "
We prefer to consider the state of the mar
nage and the actions of !>oth spouses as
relating to causation and damages
(141 We outlined such an approach in
the leading case of Wilson v Oldroyd, 1
Utah 2d 362, 267 P 2d 759 (1954) There, in
discussing the element of causation, we
stated
If the acts or conduct of the plaintiff
himself, or any other cause than the acts
of the defendant constituted the controlling cause
of plaintiff's loss of affections, then he could not recover, and
the same would be true "if the plaintiff's
wife fell in love with defendant without
any affirmative inducement or encouragement from the defendant
"
[Emphasis added ]
II

Kansas and Hawaii have gone even further
Building on a well developed body of case law
\t\ ih* ai*a of ahenation Long v Fischer 210
Kan 21 25 26 499 P 2d 1063. 1067 (1972)
redefined the element of causation to make it

Id at 374, 267 P 2d at 768 On the issue of
damages, we stated "It is true that there
may l>e great or little affection and that the
damages should be pro|>ortionate to that
which is taken away from the [injured
spouse]" Id
In an apparent effort to improve the
fairness of this cause of action, recent cases
in other jurisdictions have raised the plaintiff's burden of proof on the issue of causation and redefined the factors bearing on
damages For example, Heist v Heist, 46
N C App 521, 265 S E2d 434 (1980), which
affirmed the plaintiff wife's recovery for
alienation of affections, specifies the following considerations as bearing on those issues
In order to sustain a cause of action for
alienation of affections, the plaintiff
must show the following facts
(1) that she and her husband were happily married and that a genuine love and
affection existed between them,
(2) that the love and affection so existing
was alienated and destroyed,
(3) that the wrongful and malicious acts
of defendant produced and brought
about the loss and alienation of such
love and affection
The wrongful and malicious conduct of
the defendant need not be the sole cause
of the alienation of affections It suffices, according to the rule in a large majority of the cases, if the wrongful and
malicious conduct of the defendant is the
controlling or effective cause of the alienation, even though there were other causes, which might have contributed to the
alienation [Citations omitted, emphasis
added ]
46 N C App at 523, 265 S E 2d at 436 Accord, Thomson v Chapman, 93 N M 356,
357 58, 600 P 2d 302, 303 -04 (N M Ct App ),
cert denied, 92 N M 675, 593 P2d 1078
(1979)"
practically impossible for a plaintiff to sustain
the necessary burden of proof This Kansas
rule was adopted verbatim in Hunt v Chang
60 Hawaii 608 594 P2d 118 (1979)

[15,16] After considering the various
definitions enunciated in other states since
our decision in Wilson v Oldroyd, we are
content to reaffirm the rules we established
in that case, subject to the two following
clarifications and elal>oralions
First, the requirement that the do
fendant's acts must have constituted the
"controlling cause" of the alienation of affections means that the causal effect of the
defendant's conduct must have outweighed
the combined effect of all other causes,
including the conduct of the plaintiff spouse
and the alienated spouse For this purpose,
a defendant is properly chargeable with the
effect of mere acquiescence in the overtures
of the alienated spouse where the defendant knows or has reason to know that such
acquiescence will damage the marital relationship

willfulness and maliciousness are, in effect
part of the cause of action for alienation of
affections,' 2 persuade us to require something more with respect to this tort To
avoid a circumstance in which punitive
damages are automatically available in ev
ery such cause of action, we hold that in
order to recover punitive damages for the
tort of alienation of affections the plaintiff
must show "circumstances of aggravation
in addition to the malice implied by law
from the conduct of defendant in causing
the separation of plaintiff and [his or her
spouse] which was necessary to sustain a
recovery of compensatory damages " Hejst
v Heist. 46 N C App at 527, 265 S E 2d at
438, 41 AmJur2d Husband and Wife
§ 485 (1968)

[20,21] Second, the award of $25,000 in
punitive damages in this case could not be
[17] Second, in trying to make the dam- sustained in any event because it was enages "proportionate" to the loss of the in- tered without adducing any evidence or
jured sjwuse, the trier of fact should con- making any findings of fact regarding desider the duration and quality of the mar- fendant's net worth or income While an
riage relation, including the extent to which award of punitive damages requires considgenuine feelings of love and affection exist- eration of many factors, it is primarily ined between the spouses prior to the inter- tended to punish the defendant and thereby
deter others similarly situated from imitatvention of the defendant
ing his conduct Leigh Furniture & Carpet
Co \ Isom, 657 P 2d at 312, First Security
III PUNITIVE DAMAGES
For the further guidance of the district Bank of Utah v J BJ Feedyards, lnc, 653
court on remand, we add two rulings on the J P2d at 598 99 Thus, the defendant's net
law of punitive damages as applied to this worth and income are always relevant in
determining the amount of punitive damcase and this cause of action
ages that would be appropriate for punish[18-19] First, punitive damages can be ment We have expressl} held "that it is
recovered for the tort of alienation of affec- pioper to receive evidence and consider the
tions Wilson v Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d at 370, wealth of the defendant as bearing upon
267 P 2d at 765 As a general rule, punitive the issue of punitive damages" both in acdamages are available where the defend- tions for alienation of affections, Wilson v
ant's conduct was "wilful and malicious" Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d at 372, 267 P2d at 766,
Kesler v Rogers, Utah, 542 P 2d 354, 359 and criminal conversation, Cahoon \ Pel(1975) However, our commitment to "cau- ton, 9 Utah 2d at 232, 342 P 2d at 99 To
tion" in the application of punitive dam- the contrary, where a trial record contained
ages, First Security Bank of Utah v JBJ
no evidence of the defendant's net worth or
Feedyards, Inc, Utah, 653 P 2d 591, 598 income, we have, or our own motion, re(1982), and the fact that the elements of duced a judgment of punitive damages to
12 The tort of alienation of affections requires
proof that the defendant * wilfully and Inten
tionally alienated the spouse s affections Wil
son v Oldroyd 1 Utah 2d at 367 267 P 2d at

763 and the nature of the wrong inflicted is
such that malice is in effect a necessary
ingredient of the tort Birch field \ Birch field
29 NM 19 24 217 P 616,619(1923)
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permit an award of no more than $6,000
Cru7 x Montoya Utah, 660 P2d 723, 727
(1983)
The judgment is reversed, and the case JS
remanded for a new trial in accordance
with this opinion Costs to appellant
HOWE, J , concurs
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and dissenting)
I concur in the opinion of the Court insofar as it retains alienation of affections as a
viable cause of action in the state of Utah,
and insofar as it refuses to sustain the
award of punitive damages (Parts II and
III) However, I dissent from that portion
of the opinion which remands the case for a
new trial based on the conclusion that the
defendant was denied due process of law
Defendant claims that he was denied a
fair trial because he was not afforded timely notice dm\ was thus denied an op|K>rtum
t) to be heard in a meaningful way His
contention that he did not realize until two
days before the trial tx.gan that he was to
be prepared for trial and not merely for a
4
hearing, is simpl) not borne out by the
record On the contrary, it is clear that his
alleged lack of knowledge stems not from
an absence of notice and opportunity to be
heard, but from his voluntary choice not to
retain a new attorney and to represent himself
On January 7 1981, the trial judge set
aside the earlier order of dismissal of the
complaint, reinstated the action and set the
case for trial on January 21, 1981 Defendant porsonall> appeared at that time, without counsel, and heard the date being set
Defendant claims that he was misled by the
use of the word "hearing" rather than "trial" and therefore was not given actual notice that he must face trial on January 21
This is a SJK?CIOUS argument
Defendant's
brief acknowledges that had defendant had
1

See aho Heathman \ Hatch
268 372 P2d 990 991 (1962)

2

See eft Manka v Martin 200 Colo 260 614
P2d 875 880 (1980) (en banc) Mai in v lid
die 102 Idaho 705 619 P 2d 3 4 (1981) John

an attorney representing him, the attorney
would have understood that he was facing a
trial ami not merely a hearing Therefore,
the resolution of this question hinges not on
what defendant did know, but on what he
should have known
Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution
and U C A , 1953, § 78 51 25 guarantee a
party to a civil action the right to represent
himself'
However, as the main opinion
points out, the general rule is that a party
appearing pro se is held to the same standards of knowledge, rules and procedures as
would l>e a qualified attorney * In fact, if a
litigant, for whatever reason, sees fit to
rely on himself as counsel, he must be prepared to accept the consequences of his
mistakes and errors 3
Defendant voluntarily chose to appear at
the January 7 hearing without an attorney,
he did not question the judge as to exactly
what would happen on January 21, as was
his right ami his duty if he was going to
represent himself, and he did not thereafter consult an attorney as to the proper steps
to l>e taken He merely showed up at trial
on January 21 and acknowledged that he
intended to represent himself
That the defendant had made the decision to represent himself in the trial l>efore
the court and that he was prepared to proceed without a continuance are clearly reflected in the record
THE COURT Mr Jacobsen 7
MR JACOBSEN Yes, Your Honor
1 HE COURT Are you representee! by
an attorney Mr Jacobsen 7
MR JACOBSEN
No, Your Honor
I'd like to offer a brief explanation of my
ajK)logy for that
I was unable to
acquire legal counsel localise of financial
difficulties, so I spoke to Mr Brown, the
Prosecuting Attorney of Sanpete County,
and he went over everything with me and
advised me that because of my financial
son i Aetna Casualty & Surety Co of Hart
ford Wyo 630 P 2d 514 517(1981)

13 Utah 2d 266

3

Minka

v Martin supra n 2 at 880
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situation, I'd better defend myself, so I'm
prepared to do that
THE COURT You understand, of
course, that it's the Court's obligation to
hear the evidence and make a ruling
based upon the evidence and be fair to
both parties under the law, do you understand that 7
MR JACOBSEN Yes, I do, Your Honor I hope you'll bear with me in the fact
that I'm not versed in any Court procedures or anything like that but—
THE COURT You have a right to
represent yourself and likewise I have to
rule and make certain rulings that you
might not understand
MR JACOBSEN I understand The
terminology and everything will probably
be—
THE COURT Alright, are you prepared to go forward, Mr Jacobsen 7
MR JACOBSEN Yes, I am
At this point, it would have l>een but a
simple matter for defendant to protest to
the trial judge that he needed more time to
prepare or to retain a new attorney, that
his files and depositions were still in the
possession of his former attorney and thus
not available to him in preparation of his
defense, or that he wanted a jury trial
Had he but raised any of these questions to
the trial court, we might have a different
case here

judge carefully explained the procedures to
be followed during the trial As the trial
went on, he further explained ptocedures,
the bases for objections and the way to cure
those objections The judge also raised objections himself when plaintiffs counsel
was pursuing an improper line of questioning And finally, he occasionally overruled
objections of plaintiff's counsel, explaining
THE COURT I know but he isn't a
lawyer so I've got to be liberal with him,
Mr Mclff, so your objection's overruled
I realize it's not proper but I feel like I've
got to give latitude
The mam "p:n ,rt n, however, suggests that
this is not enough and requires the trial
court to caution the pro se litigant as to the
risks of representing himself and to apprise
the litigant of his available legal options
Heretofore there has been no requirement, in either the federal courts or the
state courts, that a party appearing pro se
in a civil trial must be cautioned as to the
dangers and disadvantages of self representation, nor must he be given a laundry list
of all of his available legal options While
it is true that this caution must be given to
pro se defendants in criminal trials, 5 the
standard in civil trials is not nearlv so stringent In fact, the federal courts have held
that there is no constitutional right to counsel at all in civil trials *

But he did not raise these questions and
went forward with the trial In so doing,
he accepted the consequences of that action,
ignorance of the law notwithstanding

Thus, the main opinion im|>oses an entirely new and rigid procedure on trial judges
who are faced with pro se litigants I believe that this stricture is neither necessary
nor pro|>cr in civil trials

The main opinion points out that this
Court has said that a layperson acting as his
own attorney "should be accorded every
consideration that may reasonably be indulged " # The record shows that the trial
judge did make every effort to accommodate defendant's lack of legal knowledge
during the trial Preceding the trial, the

The instant case is a good case in point
Having seen fit to retain counsel initially,
defendant was obviously aware of the benefits to be derived from representation by
counsel Conversely, he had to have been
aware of the hazards of going it alone
Having seen fit to discharge his former
counsel, for whatever reason, and to pro-

4

6

5

Supra n 1, 372 P 2d at 991
Faretta v California 422 U S 806 95 SCt
2525 45 LEd2d 562 (J975) State v Donvn
guez. Utah, 564 P2d 768 (1977)

Boulware \ Battagha 344 F Sopp 889 affd
478 F2d 1398 (D Del 1972) US ex rel Stuart
v Yeager 293 F Supp 1079 (D N J 1968) aWd
419 F2d 126 (3rd Cir I960) cert denied 197
U S 1055, 90 S Ct 1400 25 L Ed 2d 673 (1970)
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ceed with the trial acting as his own attorney, he cannot l>e heard to complain now
that he was deprived of due process of law
because of results directly attributable to
his own actions
I believe that the trial judge exercised
sound discretion in permitting the trial to
go forward and that the defendant was not
deprived of any constitutional protections
STEWART, Justice (concurring and dis
senting)
I concur in Parts I and III of the majon
ty opinion However, I dissent from Part
II for the reason that the majority fixes the
limitations of the tort of alienation of affections more broadly than I think justifiable
When defined broadly the tort of alienation of affections largely ignores the almost
invariable contributing influences of both
the plaintiff and the plaintiff s estranged
spouse in contributing to, if not creating in
the first instance, a disharmonious relation
ship, which sometimes results in one or both
of the unhappy spouses seeking other intimate relations with another |>crson, however unjustifiable that may be The deli
cate and often fragile bonds that unite a
husband and wife can only flourish in an
atmosphere of reciprocal tenderness Yet
marriage l>onds are constantly subject to
innumerable tensions and threatening
forces that can never be measured junsticall) in any realistic way The power of
such forces is demonstrated in the fact that
some 40% of the marriages in this country
end in divorce And it is not often that full
responsibility for the breakdown of a marriage can be attributed with any great de
gree of assurance to one or the other of the
parties, let alone solely to the conduct of a
third person
We do not live in a day, if ever there
were one when male or female Casanovas
cast a spell that all but nullifies the will
power of a member of the opposite sex
Persons who have been married do not generally fall prey to overwhelmingly seductive
powers of another like some inert piece of
iron drawn inexorably into the ever-stronger field of power of a magnet The affec-

tion of married |>ersons for each other is
usually alienated by their own conduct or
misconduct
Nevertheless, the tort of alienation of
affections may provide a projier remedy for
certain conduct that interferes with the
marital relationship
Sex is a powerful
force There are those in social positions
of power, status, or authority who may
illicitly use sex to satisfy their own passions
or for otherwise improper ends There are
any number of such relationships, i e , professors and students, physicians and patients, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, or psychologists and clients, and employers ami
employees
Those who use positions of
|>ower or authority for the purpose of obtaining sexual favors and produce an alienation of affections between the one in an
inferior position and his or her spouse,
abuse and o\erreach any legitimate power
Ihty nmy have In <*uch CHSC% the coniequi nee may IK. not only the breakup of one
or |>erh ips two marriages, but also unforeseeable consequences in the future lives of
the children from such marriages
In other cases, where there is no abuse of
power or authority, I think the tort of alienation of affections will cause much more
harm than any good it may do The judicial invitation to often vindictive persons,
who usuall) have not perceived the mote in
their own eyes, to use the courts to lash
back at paramours of their spouses, Hometimes simply as a means of blackmail, will
provide little protection to the marriage
relationship, and never be a force for reestablishing that relationship The ugliness
of the inevitable disputes over fault m divorce cases will only be magnified in most
alienation of affection cases and will not be
offset by any countervailing good I see
little reason to promote such unseemly disputes when so little is likely to lie gained,
except in those types of cases where one
person abuses his or her power or authority
DURHAM, Justice (concurring in result
and dissenting)
I join in the reversal of this judgment,
but dissent from Part II of the majority
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opinion because I believe that the cause of of legitimate offspring was of crucial imaction for alienation of affections should be portance to inheritance laws
See, eg,
abolished It is an anachronistic holdover Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium,"
from a bygone era which modern rational!
30 Colum L Rev 651, 655 (1930), Comment,
zations have failed to justify The majority "Piracy on the Matrimonial High Seas—The
opinion identifies and addresses in turn six Law and the Marital Interloper," 25 Sw L J
arguments presented by the appellant for 594 (1971)
abolition of the cause of action Although
However, although the marriage relationthe majority opinion rejects each of the
appellant's arguments separately, it fails to ship "was founded on contract [in the midthe rights and duties involved
set forth any affirmative reasons in policy dle ages],
or precedent for the retention of this cause in the relationship were fixed to a large
of action in Utah The majority opinion extent by law and not by the agreement of
goes on to make the requirements for re- the parties, and the consequences of creatcovery so difficult that it is unlikely anyone ing the relationship might affect third per" 2 Holdsworth, supra, at 463
will ever pursue this cause of action in sons
court again By this approach, I believe the The marriage created a newjstatusjfojMiajch
majority acknowledges that the cause of of the parties The importance of status in
action is defective in its weak theoretical medieval society can scarcely be overembasis and the numerous opportunities it of- phasized
That there were different classes of
fers for abuse However instead of eliminattng the cauie of action in a forthright
society which should be governed by difmanner, the majority opinion preserves the
ferent laws would have apj>cared a
cause of action in a way that insures that
truism to the mediaeval legislature
its most likely use will be outside of the
The king, the |»eer, the knight
all
courtroom, as a tool to extort "settlements"
occupied definite and legally fixed places
from prospective defendants The cause of
in the hierarchy of society
[I]n the
action for alienation of affections should be
Middle Ages the difference in legal rules
abolished t>ecause there is no longer any
was conceived of as depending upon the
legal basis for its retention It protects no
necessary and natural differences in the
interest and furthers no policy not better
structure of society
served by other means A brief review of Id at 464 Individuality, as we now value
the history of alienation of affections re- that concept, would have !>een regarded as
veals why this is so
akin to anarchy, placing a person outside of
In the early days of the common law, the benefits and protection of the law and
marriages were entered into for economic, denying him or her a position from which to
diplomatic or dynastic reasons and were, interact with society As far as the law
indeed, bargains with specific terms set by was concerned, a person's status and a perthe families of the bride and groom See, son's identity were the same individual
eg, Schultz, "Contractual Ordering of Mar- characteristics were irrelevant
riage A New Model for State Policy," 70
A wife in this system occupied a particuCalLRev 211,224 25(1982) Considera- lar status as a female and as a married
tion was offered by each party the groom person Bracton described three categories
agreed to protect and support the bride and of human beings "There is also another
her children, and the bride agreed to bear division of human beings, that some are
heirs for the groom, educate them and ad- male and other female, and others hermaminister the household Individual mar- phrodites And fenmles differ from males
riage contracts and the rights of marriage in many respects, because their condition is
were valuable incidents in feudal tenure worse than that of males" 1 Bracton,
both economically and imhtanly See, eg, IJSHS ami Customs of England * 36 (Twiss
3 Holdsworth, History of English IMW, 61 ed 1879) Thus, as a female, the wife was
(3d ed 1923) In addition, the identification considered her husband's inferior by her
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nature Canon law im|M>sed the view that a
husband and wife were one flesh and one
person in the law and that the pei-son was
the husband Therefore, during coverture,
even the woman's separate status as an
inferior female was subsumed in the conju
gal unit In this setting, a cause of action
for the abduction of the wife, the ancestor
of the cause of action for alienation of
affections, recognized a challenge to the
status of both husband and wife and vindicated real damage to contractual and feudal
rights Because of the wife's legal disability, her actual consent or lack of consent
was not considered
The action was
brought by the husband against the third
party, regardless of the issue of the wife's
consent Under the feudal system, society
at large had an economic, military and JK>
litical interest in the enforcement of the
marriage contract and the status of the
married parties
In the feudal era l>ccausc of the intercon
nections between interests in property and
virtually all other as|>ects of society, "the
law of proj)erty, and the remedies for the
infringement of proprietary rights, were
then much more highly developed than the
law of contract, and the remedies for
breach of contract" 8 Holdsworth, supra,
at 427 The "law of crime and tort was
narrow" and "permeated by the idea of
trespass—by the idea, that is, of forcible
damage to |>erson or pro|>crty " Id at 421
In this era, taking into consideration the
emphasis and development in the law, the
highly structured nature of society, the accepted concept of the conjugal unit, and the
inferior status of women, it is understandable that the husband's interest in his wife
and their relationship was expressed as a
proprietary interest and that it therefore
sup|>orted an action in trespass against a
third party
Although the "bargamed-for" contractual
aspects of marriage declined and the Renaissance concept of individuality eventually
replaced the feudal concept of societal sta
tus, the common law forms of pleading
preserved the husband's action for damage
to his marital rights as an action in trespass The husband was said to have the

exclusive and legally enforceable right to
his wife's services and company The action was brought in trespass by the husband
with a "per quod consortium amifit," i e ,
'whereby he lost the company [of his
wife]," and was for "the loss and damage of
the husband " not for damage suffered by
the wife or the conjugal unit See Hyde v
Sc) ssor. 79 Eng Rep 462 (1620) The action
was likened to the action "brought by the
master for the battery of his servant, per
quod servitium amisit," i e , "whereby he
lost the service [of his servant]" Id By
Blackstonc's time, the husband's legal
rights with respect to his wife were described by the term "consortium" and included
her society and services See Feinsinger,
"legislative Attack on 'Heart Balm,'" 33
Mich LRcv 970, Q89 (1935) The husband
had a cause of action for an intentional
interference with those rights Under the
title Injuries Affecting a Husband," Blackstone desenlnid abduction of the wife as
follows "[Allnluction or taking her away
may either l>e by fraud and persuasion, or
o|>en violence though the law in both cases
sup|K>ses force and constraint, the wife having no power to convent
" 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *139 (1768) (emphasis
added) This action was exclusively the
husband's to compensate him for his injuries The wife had no similar cause of
action, as traditionally she had no right to
her husband's "services" but rather a right
to his protection and support—unenforceable because of her legal disability
This
disability was not viewed as an injustice in
mid eighteenth century England
Blackstone commented that "we may observe,
that even the disabilities, which the wife
lies under, are for the most part intended
for her protection and benefit So great a
favorite is the female sex of the laws of
England" See 1 Blackstone, wpra, at
•445 Thus, the proprietary cause of action
originally reflected widely accepted views
of status and legal rights in a society where
contractual and legal obligations incident to
marriages were part of a system of political, military and property obligations The
remedy provided by the law for violation of

those rights and obligations addressed injury to the society's interest in those obligations
Moral infractions were separate
matters left to the ecclesiastical courts
This cause of action for abduction gradually
evolved into a personal tort action vindicating the husband's legal, not contractual,
rights to his wife's services and society,
called consortium Parallel to this evolution, it may be seen that the rationale for
the procedural disability of the married
woman had broadened from the canonical
"one flesh" to include the Blackstonian
"protect"*" and bcnef.t" rationale
The more modern form of the action for
abduction apj>eared in England in 1745
when the court recognized a husband's right
to recover for the "enticement" of his wife
away from their home See Wmsmore v
Grecnhank, Willes r»77, 125 Eng Rep 1330
(1745) In the United States, the common
law action for abduction or enticement of
the wife was adopted in every state but
Louisiana See Feinsinger, supra, 33 Mich
L Rev at 992jjnd n 17, Note, "The Suit of
Alienation of Affections Can Its Existence
Be Justified Today?" 56 N D L Rev 239,
241 (1980) The definition of consortium,
originally the husband's right to his wife's
services and company, was gradually broadened to include love, affection and in general, good relationships in the family
For
example, in Jacohwn v Siddnl, 12 Or 280, 7
P 108 (1885), the court declared that "[tjhe
injury done the husband consists in the
dishonor of his marriage bed, the loss of his
wife's affection, and the comfort of her
society, as u ell as an) i)ccuntary injury for
/oss of services"
Id at 285, 7 P at 111
(emphasis added)
The growing unpopularity of the husband's proprietary rights in his wife's services was probably accelerated by the advent
of the Married Women's Acts in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, which removed the married woman's inability to sue
and be sued See, eg, Comment, supra, 25
Sw L J at 59&-97 Courts were forced to
re-examine the basis for the cause of action
in order to decide whether the husband's
cause of action was now extinguished, or
whether the cause of action could IKJ ex-

tended to wives The resulting discussions
are notable for their variety
"While
agreeing that the action was based primarily on loss of consortium, courts have
defined the consequences variously as an
injury to projKjrty, to the person, to personal rights, or to feelings " Feinsinger, supra,
33 Mich L Rev at 993 Some courts found
that the wife had no right to sue for criminal conversation or alienation of affections
In Knoessin v Keller, 60 Minn 372, 62 N W
438 (1895), the Minnesota court refused to
find a wife's right to bring an action for
criminal conversation, stating that the gist
of the action was the possibility of illegitimate children and jiouUing out that ' the
wife whose husband commits adultery suffers no 'disgrace' and that in any event a
woman [defendant} charged vuth adultery
in all probability was not the seducer ' Id
at 991 In DufficH v Duffies 76 Wis 374,
45 N W 522 (1890), the Wisconsin court
refused to find an iction for alienation of a
husband's affections The court explained
that such a ciuse of action would lead to a
multitude of actions because a husband may
be expected to jield to worldly temptations
to which he is daily exposed, whereas a
wife, with her purer nature, is occupied at
home and not subject to such enticements
Id at 993 See also Prosser, Law of Torts
§ 124, at 881 (4th ed 1971)
The great majority of the states, how
ever, sustained the right of the wife to
maintain an action for criminal conversation and alienation of affections Ste, eg,
Feinsinger supra, 33 Mich L Rev at 99 J
In order to do this, courts were forced to
define consortium to include more than the
husband's well established right to services,
and to declare that the wife now had an
equal right to consortium See, eg OpfM.ii
heim v Kridel, 230 N Y 156, 140 N E 227
(1923) Man> opinions, finding the proprietary interest distasteful, denied the clear
historical basis of the husband's action in
trespass, holding that the wife had an equal
right to maintain the action because the
enabling statutes removed the only barrier
to her action, l e , her legal disability to sue
or be sued See, e g, Clow v Chapman, 125
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Mo 101, 28 S W 328 (1894) The wife's
legal disability was not, of course, the only
reason she had possessed no cause of action
in the common law In the common law,
she had no legally recognized right to her
husband s services the basis for the action
was the injur} to the husband's legal right
to his wife's services Ironically, it is this
very proprietary interest, rejected by the
courts as "archaic," which was granted to
the wife
By force of the marriage contract, husband and wife are each entitled to the
society and comfort of the other,—the
one to as great an extent as the other
As a wife is now placed on an equality
with her husband in respect of her property and personal rights, and as a husband may have his action, as against a
third person, for enticing away his wife,
the wife has her action against third |>er
sons for enticing away her husband
Id at 107, 28 S W at 330 Thus, while the
courts of the era criticized the idea of a
proprietor} interest in the wife, the decisions gave the concept new life by granting
to the wife the same propnetar) right to
sue for the loss of consortium
See
Lippman, supra, 30 Colum L Rev at 664
In spite of the broadened definitions of
consortium, it is clear that the term continued to denote a property interest In Tinker \ Coin ell, 193 U S 473, 24 S C t 505, 48
L E d 754 (1904) the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of
u hether a judgment for criminal conversation against the appellant had been discharged in bankruptcy Under the bank
ruptcy act, a judgment could be discharged
unless it had l>een recovered in an action
"for wilful and malicious injuries to the
person or property of another " The appellant argued that the judgment had been
discharged because criminal conversation
was not an injur) to the r e s i d e n t ' s "|>erson" and that the gravamen of the action
was loss of consortium, not injury to the
property of the respondent
The Court
held
We think it is made clear by these
n ferences to a few of the many cases on
this subject that the cause of action by

the husband is based upon the idea that
the act of the defendant is a violation of
the marital rights of the husband in the
person of his wife, to the exclusion of all
others, and so the act of the defendant is
an injury to the person and also to the
pro/Krty rights of the husband
Id at 485, 24 S Ct at 508 (emphasis added)
The same result was reached on the same
question by the Kansas Supreme Court,
where the judgment for alienation of affections was obtained by a wife See Leicester
v Hoadley, 66 Kan 172, 71 P 318 (1903)
In Sullivan v Valiquette, 66 Colo 170, 180
P 91 (1919), the Colorado Supreme Court
recognized "the right of the plaintiff to the
body of his wife, and
to her mind,
undiluted " Id at 172, 180 P at 91 In a
suit brought by a wife against her fathcrin law, tht Connecticut Supreme Court declared that the "gist" of the action was loss
of consortium described by the court as "a
property right growing out of the marriage
relation
" Hudima v Hudyma, 131
Conn 281, 283 84, 39 A 2d 890, 891 (1944)
Another irony in the cases of this era lies
in the fact that although the wife's legal
disabilities were statutorily removed, the
law continued to treat the wife as incapable
of initiating or consenting to her own
change of affections or seduction
For the purpose of maintaining the action, it is regarded as an actual trespass
upon the marital rights of the husband
although the consequent injury is really
to the husband on account of the corruption of the body and mmd of* the wife,
and it is in this view (that it is a trespass
upon the rights of the husband) that it is
held that the consent of the wife makes
no difference, that she is incapable of
giving a consent to an injury to the husband
Tinker v Coin ell, supra, 193 U S at 483, 24
S C t at 507 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added) Thus, the alienated wife's active
participation in a relationship with the defendant is considered to be irrelevant in
most cases The defendant bears the entire
burden of having alienated the wife's affec-

tions, even where the facts reveal her willing, if not eager, cooperation
Wilson \
Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P 2d 759 (1954),
cited by the majority opinion as Utah's
leading case, and the instant case t>oth illustrate this judicial tendency to ignore the
wife's volitional capacity
The de facto retention of the assumption
that a wife is unable to consent to an injury
to her husband is an anomaly not present in
those cases where the wife is the plaintiff
To the contrary, in actions brought by
wives, it was commonly held that it was a
good defense to show that the alienated
husband was the enticer and that the defendant had merely yielded to his "seductive arts " Romatne v Decker, 11 App Div
20, 43 N Y S 79 (1896) "The law imputes
to (the defendant] no fault liecause of her
attractiveness, nor liecause she may have
been pleased with the admiration of plaintiff's husband" Whitman v Egbert, 27
App Div 374, 50 N Y S 3 (1898) In a
peculiar Vermont case, the court commented that a wife could have no recovery
against a prostitute for alienating the affections of her husband "A single instance
of adultery, had by a man accustomed to
marital infidelities, with a common prostitute, who serves his purpose on a chance
occasion, does not constitute the enticement
and alienation essential to a recovery"
Nieberg v Cohen, 88 Vt 281,287,92 A 214,
217 (1914) Thus, when the defendant was
a woman, she was frequently excused from
liability by reason of a remnant of the old
procedural disability in the form of judicial
stereotyping which viewed men as aggressive and women as passive
During the 1930s, there was widespread
discussion regarding the so called "heart
balm" actions, which included breach of
promise to marry, alienation of affections,
seduction and criminal conversation The
abolition of these actions became a "cause
celebre" in many states As noted in the
majority opinion, a majority of jurisdictions
has eliminated the actions by statute or
judicial decision It was widely felt that
such suits served no constructive purpose
and, in fact, were vehicles for blackmail,
extortion or coerced marriages Although

the majontv opinion finds it "noteworthy"
that research uncovers only one case in
which there was evidence of collusion and
extortion, one would not realistically expect
rejKjrted cases to reveal this sort of abuse
Frequentlv, the threat of filing such a suit
would suffice to extract payment from a
potential defendant
The instant case
would not be before us now if the defendant had paid the proposed $5,000 "settlement" to this plaintiff, whose wife, often
beaten and abused, left him by her own
free will and choice It is no answer to
claim that groundless or collusive suits may
be countered by actions for abuse of process
or malicious prosecution
Even setting
aside the burden and difficulty of bringing
such suits successfully, that argument suggests that th( re is some {Hunt in locking the
barn door aftir the horses are out It is
true, as the majont> opinion points out
that there arc other tauses of action where
the parties' private lives are displajed for
public Mew, dnd that this asjwtt of such
aetions alone is not a sufficient basis for
their demise
However, in child custody
cases, the best interests of children are felt
to counterbalance the sacrifice of parental
privacy and dignity, and in defamation
cases it is the plaintiff himself who puts his
reputation on the line in order to defend it
In a cause of action for alienation of affections, the plaintiff assaults the privacy and
reputation of the defendant for no justicia r y defendable purjK>se
It is for this reason that I strongly urge
the abolition of the cause of action for
alienation of affections this is an action
without legal content, signifying nothing
but the desire to wring money and revenge
from the pain of a failed relationship The
old common law cause of action had real
content in the days when the husband had a
legally recognized right to his wife's services Although we now find the concept
repugnant, in the past those legal rights
accurately reflected the order and concensus of society regarding the status of married persons In that society, it was logical
that a court could find a third party responsible for damage to the husband's man til
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rights l>ecause the wife had no legally recognised existence apart from her husband,
and was generally considered more passive
and persuadable by nature Those days and
those rights have passed and this cause of
action should be gone with them
The modern action for alienation of affections has become an action for interference with the mental and emotional attitude of one spouse toward the other See,
eg, Wyman v Wallace, 94 Wash 2d 99, 615
P 2d 462 (1980), Prosser, supra, at 876
The majority opinion posits no basis in statute or common law to support such an
action The argument is made that "[t]he
marital relationship is entitled to no less
protection than" other relational interests,
referring to causes of action for loss of
prospective economic relations, interference
with a contractual relation and wrongful
death However, this analogy fails to recognize inherent differences between the
marital relationship and other types of relationships The relationship between married people does not resemble that between
parties who undertake a commercial transaction based on pecuniary interests In the
usual contractual setting, the times at
which the contract will begin and end and
expectations for performance are identified
and limited by the parties themselves If
the parties have dealt at arm's length, and
there have been consideration and a meeting of minds, the law will both enforce the
contract and protect its performance from
third party interference Our legal system
is capable of this task because the obligations and the adequacy of their performance may be ascertained with a reasonable
degree of accuracy Therefore, if A is damaged in his contractual relationship with B,
A has a cause of action against B if B has
breached, or against C if C has wrongfully
interfered with A's or B's performance, or
against B and C if together they have damaged A See, eg, Bunnell v Bills, 13 Utah
2d 83 368 P 2d 597 (1962) It should be
noted that if C interferes with the performance of the contract between A and B with
out their cooperation, either A or B could
have a cause of action against C

The relationship between a husband and
wife bears no resemblance to the contractual paradigm which is the legal basis for loss
of prospective economic relations and interference with a contractual relationship Although we speak of the marriage "con
tract," it has been centuries since marriage
has involved true contract principles in
Western cultures The purposes of marriage are not pecuniary In our society, it
is now widely accepted that men and women enter marriage to seek personal JujfiIIment and happiness See eg, Schultz, supra, 70 Cal L Rev at 250 51 Furthermore,
unlike the parties to a contract, parties who
wish to marry do not make their own law
The state, not the parties, controls who may
marry, what procedure must be followed,
and how and why the marriage may be
terminated
In Utah, each S|>ouse is required to support the other financially
when necessary, see U C A , 1953, §§ 78
45 3 & 4, and neither may recover for loss
of consortium when the spouse is injured by
another Sie U C A , 1953, § 30 2 4, Tjas
v Proctor, Utah, 591 P 2d 438 (1979) However, the statutes are silent regarding additional legal obligations of one spouse to the
other Our legislature has not seen fit to
bestow a legal right on either partner to
any quantum of love, devotion, companionship or commitment from the other Neither has our legislature prescribed how long
a neglected spouse must hope, how long a
bored spouse must be patient, or how long
an abused s|>ouse must endure Possibly,
our legislature recognizes that commitment
to the married state must be generated by
the individual and cannot be enforced by
law Therefore, a person has no action
against his spouse in law or equity for insufficient love and affection, for emotional
neglect or even for abuse, apart from the
criminal law Where the State has mandated no condition which the married parties
must satisfy, the law will give no cause of
action for "breach" but only specific
grounds for divorce This is in accord with
the longstanding "hands-off" policy in the
law regarding interference with matters between husband and wife See, eg, Schultz,
supra, 70 Cal L Rev at 232 34
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Therefore, in our society, which recognizes husbands and wives as separate individuals, which recogni7es that devotion and
commitment are personal and perhaps moral obligations but not legal obligations,
which refuses to recognize a cause of action
by one spouse against the other for failure
to love, there is no ground in law or logic
for recognizing a cause of action by one
spouse against a third party to whom the
other spouse has voluntarily transferred his
affections The comparison of the action
for alienation of affections to actions pro
tecting contractual relationships is superficial and misleading
A similar point was made by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in a suit brought
by some children for alienation of the affection of their mother The court noted that
the mother's love and devotion were "mil
ters within her keeping The measure of
their contribution is controlled by htr willingness and capacity " Htnwm v Thomas
231 N C 173, 175, 56 S E2d 4*2, 414 (1949)
The court continued
Since the mother, who is a free agent,
committed no legal wrong for which redress may be had in a court of law, it
cannot be said that the defendant, who
allegedly induced her to l>e remiss in her
domestic duties, incurred any greater liability than the law attaches to her act
To hold otherwise would mean that every time a person persuades or induces a
mother to engage in other activities to
such an extent as to cause her to neglect
her children, he commits a tort for which
he may be compelled to respond in darnages
Id (emphasis added) The majority opinion
declares that "a defendant is properly
chargeable with the effect of mere acquiescence in the overtures of the alienated
spouse where the defendant knows or has
reason to know that such acquiescence will
damage the marital relationship " This will
surely be construed to mean that any person who acquiesces in the advances of another, whom he knows to be married at the
time, may be held accountable at law for
the subsequent failure of the marriage

There is no basis in law for our courts to
make such a judgment Accountability for
this t>|>e of relationship is better left to
courts competent to render moral, rather
than l( gal, judgments If the law is to give
a remedy against third parties who thus
'intrude ' into a marriage with harmful ef
feet, we mav next sec a caust of action
against demanding employers distributors
of lascivious movies and books, or even the
producers of Monday night football, all of
which damage many marriage relationships
It should l)c noted that the comparison of
the action foi alienation of affections with
r e n «/ry for loss of consortium in a wrong
ful death action is equally superficial In a
wrongful death action, the loss of consort!
urn, i e , loss of lo\t, affection and society is
simpl\ one way to measure the immeisun
bit ont valut oi a lift is the ihility to form
relationships ind to give and rteeive afft e
lion 1 litre is ample b isis in statutory and
common law for the protection of life In
an iction for alienation of affection the
loss of love AIU\ affection lb the loss of the
rel itionship itself
As already discussed,
neither statutory nor common law imposes
any obligation on married persons to maintain love or affection for each other There
is no legal basis for one spouse to sue the
other or a third party for the failure of the
relationship
The comparison with a
wrongful death action is invalid
No one can seriously argue that a hus
band or wife, even in a troubled marriage,
is helpless in the face of temptation If a
spoiise is pursued by an aggressive third
party, as postulated by the majority opinion, and rejects those advances to no avail,
he or she can obtain an injunction against
harassment, as did the husband in Wthlxsr
v Gray, 228 Ark 289, 307 S W 2d 80 (1957)
The action lies with the pursued or annoyed
husband or wife, however, not with the
spouse for an injury to a legal right If the
husband or wife does not reject those advances, the betrayal is by the participating
spouse against whom the law grants no
remedy based on the marital relationship,
save divorce Perhaps the individual whose
s{>ouse has left him may have an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress
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riage on the flimsiest of evidence of genuine love and affection, disregarding evidence of longstanding disaffection and minimal tolerance between the husband and
wife As illustrated in Heitt and in the
instant case, and in every case predicated
on alienation of affections, there is an inherent danger that a verdict will rest on the
subjective judgment of the factfinder, rather than law In the present case, the trial
judge apparently ignored evidence of the
plaintiff's violent treatment of his wife, and
her independent decision to seek out the
company of the defendant At the close of
trial, the judge declared
The Court finds that marriage and famiDevoid of any real basis in law, the action
ly—that marriage is a sacred institution
for alienation of affections is frequently
and that anyone who interferes with that
upheld instead by moralizing
should suffer the full consequences of the
The injury for which it was recovered is
law and I'm just telling you, Mr Jacobone of the grossest which can l>e inflicted
sen, at this time that this Court nearly
upon the husband, and the |)erson who
every week is having criminal trials
perpetuates it knows it is an offense of
when. |>eople steal money from other peothe most aggravated character,
ple and in my opinion you've stolen someTinker v Col*ell. supra, 193 U S at 489 90,
thing far more than money, you have
24 S Ct at 509 10
interfered with the whole basic fabric of
Three thousand dollars is a small sum for
society and when you tell me it's a [plasuch a case A confessed adulterer who
tonicj relationship, I just say it's nonhas enticed away his neighbor's wife is in
sense I don't buy it at all and I don't
no position to say much about excessive
want you to think I do I don't know
damages
how they're going to collect any money
Su//ivan v Vahquette, supra 66 Colo at 172,
judgments that I give against you but
180 P at 92
they're certainly going to get one against
The grievance is one of a social character,
\ou and I hope this gets well publicized
of course
The incidence is too deep,
because I d like everyone to know that if
however, to be
left to the non curial
a case like this comes into my Court, that
efforts of society itself to correct the
they can expect to suffer
antisocial tendencies and activities of its
The people of the State of Utah do not
members, the slow-curing and festering
wounds which leave cicatricial marks in need this cause of action It surely falls
among those which do not "necessarily ofthe wake of the marauder
Henson v Thomas, supra, 231 N C at 178, fer effective or efficient means of achieving
the public good" Bok, "A Flawed Sys56 S E 2 d at 436 (Seawell, J , dissenting)
Often, the moralizing or prejudice operates tem," Harv Mag 38, 40 (May-June, 1983)
more subtly The majority opinion quotes Advocating the reduction of volume and
from Heist v Heist, 46 N C App 521, 265 cost of litigation, the author of that article
S E 2 d 434 (1980) In North Carolina, a points out that "[b]y complicating the rules
plaintiff must show that the s|>ouses ' were and insisting on an adversary process conhappily married and that a genuine love ducted by the parties, judges can under" hi at 42 That is
and affection existed
" Id at 523, 265 mine justice
S E 2d at 436 The court in tfe/st found the precisely what the majority opinion promisdefendant liable for the failure of the mar- es to do the final deaththrows of a broken

against that spouse or against the spouse
and the third party See Stoker v Stoker,
Utah, 616 P 2d 590 (1980) (confirming wife's
right to an action against her hustmnd for
the intentional infliction of personal mju
nes) If the husband and wife have con
tracted with each other regarding specific
marital obligations in addition to those imposed by law, perha|>s a remedy for breach
of that agreement may be sought by the
party wronged
In either case, such an
action would be brought as any tort or
contract action and would not be derived
from the marriage relationship itself as
alienation of affections purports to be
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marriage are to be preserved with a more
ngorous and technical set of requirements
for recovery Innocent parties must defend
themselves, and then assert their right to IKJ
free of such actions b) suing in separate
actions for malicious prosecution or abuse
of process
Nowhere does the majority
point to a basis in law or a benefit to
society to justify such a cost to the parties
or to our judicial system
As the court stated in Henson v Thomas,
supra, "The mutual rights and privileges of
home life grow out of the marital status
Such obligations
are not legal in nature
and may not be made the subject of commerce and bartered at the counter" hi
231 N C at 175, 56 S E 2d at 433 It is time
that we acknowledge the operation of the
process spoken of by Justice Holmes whereby the customs and needs which give rise to
a rule disappear but the rule remains, justified by some new |M>licy based on new IK?
Iiefs and customs Holmes, Ihe Common
La* 5 (1881) This old "rule" does not have
a basis in todiiy's beliefs and customs Its
existence now testifies only to the |>ersistence of an old form of action in our common law system and to the understandable
but regretable human desire for revenge
and a greenback poultice This was a judicially instituted cause of action and should
be judicially extinguished, especially since
our legislature has never provided a statutory basis for it See Wjman v Wallace,
wpra It should not IHJ said of Utah that it
is a place
Where juries cast up what a wife is
worth,
By laying whate'er sum, in mulct they
please on
The lover, who must pay a handsome
price,
Because it is a marketable vice
(Byron, Don Juan, Canto I, Ixiv )
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Jerry R JARAMILLO, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, a corporation, and State Farm Insurance Co.,
a corporation. Defendants and Appellant
No 18019
Supreme Court of Utih
Sept 1, 1983

Tort victim brought action to recover
balance claimed due under terms of settlement agreement reached in compromise of
!>ersonal injury action The Third District
Court, Salt Lake Count), Jay E Banks, J ,
entered judgment in favor of tort victim,
and tort feasor's insurer appealed The Supreme Court, Hall C J , held that settlement agreement, by which tort-feasor's insurer agtced to pa) tort victim and tort
victim's insurer for its payment to tort victim of no fault lienefits, was valid and binding on tort victim, therefore, tort victim
was not entitled to amount tort-feasors
insurer intended to pay tort victim's insurer
Reversed and remanded
Stewart, J , dissented and filed opinion,
in which Durham, J , concurred

1. Insurance «=>579
Fro|Misition that Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act does not confer a no-fault
insurer right of subrogation to funds received by its insured in subsequent action
against tort-feasor does not preclude habili
ty insurer from negotiating settlement with
tort victim which compromises both its own
liability and that of its insured
U CA
1953, 31 41 1 et seq
2 Contracts <s=»14
Unexpressed intentions do not affect
validity of contract
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GRIBBLE v. (HUBBLE
Cite as 583 P.2d

opinion that if those interests are weighed
in their proper relationship to each other,
and to the evidence in this case, considerations of justice and equity lead to the conclusion that what happened to Ms. Alsop
was the result of other factors involved in
her employment and her relationship to it,
hut was not attributable to her employer
unlawfully discriminating against her on
account of sex; and that therefore that
finding and the judgment thereon should
not l>e permitted to stand.

his agreement to pay proper share for child
support.
Reversed and remanded.

O ! Hit HUMBIR$»$![*>

Emmame GR1BBLE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Michael CRIBBLE. Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 15453.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 21, 1978.

Wife brought divorce action against
husband, and husband counterclaimed that
he was entitled to reasonable visitation
rights with his wife's child by a previous
marriage, i. e., his stepchild. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, David K.
Winder, J., held that stepfather was not
entitled to hearing on issue of visitation,
and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J., held that stepfather was entitled
to hearing to determine whether he stood in
loco parentis to his stepchild and if so
whether it was in child's best interest to
grant him right of visitation, and further,
whether that right was to be conditioned by

1. Divorce «=»299
Statute providing guidelines regarding
visitation in divorce actions, as amended in
1975, codified traditional common-law rules
permitting an equitable investigation into
whether it was in welfare of child that
parents, grandparents or other relatives be
accorded visitation rights and indicated legislative intent to protect relationships which
affect child whose parents are being divorced and to be sensitive to fact that relationships beyond those of parent-child may be
important enough to protect vis-a-vis visitation. U.C.A.1953, 30 3 5.
2. Divorce «=> 298(1), 299
In proceedings to determine custody
and/or visitation, welfare of a minor child
is of paramount importance, and divorce
courts have broad equitable powers in safeguarding this interest. U.C.A.1953, 30 3 5.
3. Divorce «=»299
For stepfather to assert visitation
rights with respect to his ex-wife's child, he
had to stand in relationship of parent,
grandparent or other relative to child, keeping in mind paramount concern of child's
welfare. U.C.A.1953, 3f> 3 5.
4. Parent and Child «=>14
At common law, stepparent and stepchild relationship conferred no rights and
imposed no obligations.
5. Parent and Child *»15
Term "in loco parentis" means in place
of a parent, and a "person in loco parentis"
is one who has assumed status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
6. Parent and Child *=»15
Whether or not one assumes status of
"person in loco parentis" depends on whether person intends to assume that obligation.

7. Parent and Child *=*15
Whore one stands in loco parentis to
another, rights and liabilities arising out of
that relation are, as words imply, exactly
the same as between parent and child.
8. Constitutional Law <3=»251.6
Implicit in due process clause of State
Constitution is that jwrsons be afforded a
hearing to determine their rights under the
law. Const, art. 1, § 7.
9. Parent and Child «=»15
Common law concerning termination of
loco parentis status is that only surrogate
parent or child is able to terminate status at
will, ami rights, duties and obligations continue as long as they choose to continue
relationship.
10. Parent and Child -8=2(8)
There is a presumption that best interest of child is for him to IK? reared by his
natural parent, although this presumption
is one of fact and not of law and may be
overcome by sufficient evidence, and welfare of child is controlling.
11. Divorce «=»299
Statute providing guidelines regarding
visitation in divorce actions conceivably allows visitation where custodial rights would
not exist; for example, where two natural
parents divorce, with custody of their child
granted to mother and visitation rights
granted to father, and mother then dies,
custody would go to father absent evidence
of his unfitness, incapacity, etc., as against
child's maternal grandparents, hut maternal grandparents would have visitation
rights which they previously did not have,
assuming that court found it was in child's
l>est interest. U.C.A.1953, 30 3 5.
12. Divorce «3=>299
Stepfather was entitled in divorce proceeding to hearing to determine whether he
stood in loco parentis to his wife's child ami
if so whether it was in child's best interest
to grant him right of visitation, and further, whether that ri#ht should he atmlitioned upon his agreement to pay a proper
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share for child support Const art. 1, § 7;
U.C.A.1953, 30 3 5.

Jonathan H. King, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant
J. Douglas Kinateder, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
This cusv arises out of a divorce action
filed by the respondent against the appellant Respondent has a minor child, her
offspring by a previous marriage, l>orn
alM)ut two months l>cfore his mother's marriage to the appellant. Although four children were born to the resj>ondent and the
appellant during the time they were together, all four died either at birth or in their
infancy. Because of this and because the
appellant, the child's stepfather, had imvvr
formally adopted him. respondent did not
seek child sup|M>rt in her divorce complaint
Appellant counter-claims that he should be
entitled to reasonable visitation rights with
res|>ondenfs son. He claimed that he has
treated the child as his own son, feels wry
close to him, and is concerned about his
future welfare. Appellant further offered
to pay fifty dollars a month into a trust
account for the child's l>enefit until he
reaches eighteen years of age. Appellant
lived with the child from the time he was
two months old until the respondent and
the ap|»ellaiit separated, roughly four years
later, and it is uncontested that the child
has had no contact with his biological father.
Respondent objected to visitation rights
being awarded to the appellant The trial
court held as a matter of law that the
appellant (stepparent) was not entitled to a
hearing on the issue of visitation. The sole
issue raised on appeal, therefore, is whether
the appellant stepfather is entitled to a
hearing on the issue of visitation rights.
/J-3j Utah CWe Ann., Sec 30 3 5
(1953), as amended, provides guidelines re-
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garding custody and visitation in divorce
actions:
When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and
the maintenance of the parties and children, as may l>e equitable. The court
shall have continuing jurisdiction to make
such subsequent changes or new orders
with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support and maintenance, or the distribution of the property
as shall lie reasonable and necessary.
Visitation rights of parents, grandparents
ami other relatives shall lake into consideration the welfare of the child. I Emphasis added.)
The 1975 Legislature amended Sec. 30 3 5
to include the last sentence, thereby codifying traditional common law rules permitting an equitable investigation into whether
it is in the welfare of the child that parents,
grandparents, or other relatives be accorded
visitation rights. In proceedings to determine custody and/or visitation, the welfare
of a minor child is of paramount importance, 1 and divorce courts have broad equitable powers in safeguarding this interest. 1
The last sentence of Sec. 30 3 5 indicates
the legislative intent to protect the relationships which affect the child whose parents
are being divorced, and to be sensitive to
the fact that relationships beyond those of
parent-child may be important enough to
protect vis-a-vis visitation. For the appellant to assert visitation rights, he must,
therefore, stand in the relationship of parent, grandparent, or other relative to this

child, keeping in mind the paramount concern of the child's welfare.
| 4 | At common law, the stepparent and
stepchild relationship conferred no rights
and imposed no obligations.* In some
states this rule has been statutorily amended to require stepparents to provide for
their ste|>children so long as the relationship continues. 4 The Colorado Supreme
Court in In re Estate of latino* went so far
as to conclude that the word "stepchild" in
an inheritance tax statute included the former ste|)children of a marriage that ended
in divorce prior to the stepparent's death.
15,6] Utah has no statutory provision
obligating stepparent support, however;
and if nothing more existed in the relationship between the appellant and respondent's child, the apjiellant would not have
standing to assert his claims. However, it
appears that the ap|)ellant may have assumed the status of one in loco parentis to
the child which would put him in a different position. The term "in loco parentis"
means in the place of a parent, and a "|>erson in loco parentis" is one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption.* Whether or
not one assumes this status depends on
whether that person intends to assume that
obligation.7
[7] "Where one stands in loco parentis
to another, the rights and liabilities arising
out of that relation are, as the words imply,
exactly the same as between^ parent and
child." 8 The Washington Supreme Court
in l/i re Hudson,9 discussed the rights of
parental custody and control and classified

1. Arends v Arends. 30 Utah 2d 32ft. 517 P 2d
1019 (1974). Robinson v Robinson. 15 Utah 2d
293. 391 P2d 434 (1964)

6. Workman v Workman. 498 P.2d 1384 (Okl.
1972); Sturrup v. Mahan. 261 Ind. 463, 305
N.E.2d 877 (1974).

2. Dehm v Dehm, Utah, 545 P.2d 525 (1976);
Mecham \ Mecham. Utah. 544 P.2d 479 (1975).

7. Fevig v. Fevig. 90 N.M. 51, 559 P.2d 839
(1977). See also 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent & Child,
§ 88.

3. Estate of Smith v. Nicholson. 49 Wash.2d
229. 299 P2d 550 (1956).
4. Estate of Gntfen v Haugland. 86 Wash.2d
223. 543 P2d 245 (1975); State v Gillaspie. 8
Wash App. 560. 507 P 2d 1223 (1973).
5. 542 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1975).

8. Sparks v. Hinckley. 78 Utah 502, 5 P 2d 570
(1931). see also In re Tanner, Utah. 549 P.2d
703 (1976).
9. 13 Wash 2d 673. 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
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parental rights and those of |>ersons in loco
parentis together as having apparent equivalent status:
Parents or those standing in
loco parentis to minor children primarily
have the constitutional right to the custody and control of such minor children and
may give to those children such attention
and training as in the judgment of such
parents or guardians may seem best for
the welfare of the child or children and
for the good of society.'• [Emphasis added.l
In the instant case, the "•Piclaims to have lived with his stepson since
the child was two months old, treated him
"as his own son," and feels concerned al>out
his future. Ff these claims are true and if
they indicate his desire to stand in the place
of a parent, then appellant's relationship
may entitle him to the same rights accorded
to natural parents. Implicit in the due
process clause of our state Constitution " is
that persons IK? afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law. If we are
to find that the status of loco parentis
confers the same rights U|Kin a stepparent
as those enjoyed by a natural parent, then a
fortiori, the rights of the stepparent cannot
lie terminated without an opportunity to IK?
heard on the matter.
19] The
terminated,
termination
only in the

loco parentis status has lieen
however, by divorce,12 although
by divorce has l»een determined
context of the |>erson in loco

parentis making the choice to terminate the
status; and not, as here, in the context of
the one in loco parentis wishing to continue
the status against the wishes of the natural
parent. The common law concerning termination of the loco parentis status is that
only the surrogate parent or the child is
able to terminate the status l3 at will, ami
the rights, duties, and obligations continue
as long as they choose to continue the relationship.14
(10,111 This is an unusual case. Respondent even admits that the appellant
loves the chiid. There is a presumption
that the l>est interest of a child is for it to
l>e reared by its natural parent, although
this presumption is one of fact and not of
law and may be overcome by sufficient
evidence; l5 and, as stated previously, the
welfare of the child is controlling. Important also is that the appellant does not seek
custody; he wishes only to exercise visitation privileges. Because Sec. 30 3 5 conceivably allows visitation where custodial
rights would not exist,1* this Court feels
that there is greater flexibility in determining visitation than there is in determining
custody.
A case in point is that of S/x'/As v.
Sjtells,l7 a Pennsylvania decision concerning
the right of a stepfather to seek visitation
rights with his ex-wife's children. The
court there said:
It is our l>elief that a stepfather may not be denied the right to visit

10. Id.. 126 P2d at 775.

16. For example, two natural parents divorce,
with custody of their child granted to the mother and visitation rights granted to the father.
The mother then dies. Custody would go to
12. Franklin v. Franklin. 75 Ariz 151. 253 P 2d the father absent evidence of his unfitness,
337 (1953).
incapacity, etc. as against the child's maternal
grandparents
Fven though the maternal
13. Taylor v. Taylor. 58 Wash 2d 510. 364 P.2d
grandparents would not have a custodial right
444 (1961); Chestnut v. Chestnut, 247 S.C. 332.
as against the father, they would have visita147 S.E.2d 269 (1966).
tion rights which they previously did not have,
assuming
the court found it in the child's best
14. See the discussion re stepparents as standinterest to give visitation rights to the granding in loco parentis in 59 Am Jur 2d, Parent and
parents.
Child. Sec. 91.
11. Utah Constitution. Art. I. SPC. 7.

15. Walton v Coffman. 110 Utah I. 169 P.2d 97
(1946); Baldwin v. Nielson. 110 Utah 172. 170
P.2d 179(1946).

17. 250 Pa.Super. 168. 378 A.2d 879 (1977).
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his stt|>children merely because of his
lack of a blood relationship to them
( learly, a stepfather and his young stepihildn n who live in a family environment
may dew lop deep and lasting mutual
bonds of affection
Courts must ac
knowltdgc the faet that a stepfathir (or
stepmother) may be the only parent that
tin child has truly known and loved during its minority A stepparent may be as
devoted and eoncerned al>out the welfare
of a supthiM as a natural parent would
be Rtji < tion of \ isitation prmhges can
not /*> grounded in the mere status as a
stepparent
I Emphasis added )

Case law is ckar that 'the guiding star
for the court in coming to a conclusion (in
a child custody case) is the welfare of the
child To this the rights of parents and
all other considerations are subordinate'
Thus it is clear that visitation
rights of a parent not in custody must l>e
ciri fully guard! d
Aecordingly, whin a sttppirent is 4in loeo parentis
with his stepehildren, eourts must jeal
ouslv guard his rights to visitation
The Pennsylvania court remanded the case
to tlu trial court in ordi r to determine
whether or not the stepfather actually
stood in loco parentis to his stepchildren,
and if so to permit the stepfather to demonstrate that his interest in visitation
should be prott < ted
Wi Mieve this is a sound view and one
which we should adopt
| I 2 | In view of the foregoing, it ap|>ears
that the appellant may !>e in loeo parentis
to rcsponde nt s child and that only he or the
child and not the respondent, can terminate
t h i t relationship If appellant is in loco
parentis he should IK considered a parent
for purposes of Sec 30 3 5 It is consistent with both the statutory intent and with
the requirements of due process that he,
like a natural pirent, grandparent, or any

other relative, have a hearing to determine
his rights to visitation
The appellant made no offer to pay child
supjmrt, and certainly he has no legal duty
to do so He did offer to set up a trust
fund on behalf of the child and to make
monthly contributions to that fund It may
be that if a stepfather standing in the status of loco parentis is given the opj>ortunity
to seek visitation rights as a right afforded
a natural parent, that he should not be
|>ermitted to eseape the duties and obligations of the loco parentis status as long as
that relationship remains intact A hearing
eould determine not only the right to visitation, but could determine whether that
right should l>e conditioned on a requirement that the stepfather accept an obligation to assist in the support of the child
This is not only consistent with the concept
of loco parentis but may well be necessary
to the child's welfare Loco parentis does
not envision that a stepparent be permitted
to enjoy the rights of a natural parent
without also accepting the responsibilities
that are ineurred
The case is reversed and remanded to the
trial court for a hearing to determine
whether the appellant stands in loco parentis to his stepchild and if so, whether it is in
the child s best interest to grant the appellant a right of visitation, and, further,
whether that right should l>e conditioned by
appellant's agreement to pay a pro|>er share
for child support No costs are awarded
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN,
and HALL, J J , concur
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Kenneth E PIERREN, Defendant
and Appellant
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v
EAGLE BOOK, IN( and Arthur Adalid,
Defendants and Appellants
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v
EAGLE ROOK, INC and Luana Hall
Haig, Defendants and Appellants
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
EAGLE BOOK, INC and Willie Williams,
Defendants and Appellants
Nos 14912, 15108, lr>l09 and 15114
Supreme Court of Utah
Jul> 2b, 1978
Defendants wire eonvuted in the
Seeond Distnet Court, Weber Count), John
P Wahlquist, J , of distribution of pornographie mat!rial, and they appealed The
Supreme Court, Hall, J , held that (1) statute prosenbing distribution of pornographic
material is constitutional, (2) defendants
were not deprived of effeetive assistance of
counsel, (3) courts did not err in fading to
define geographieal limitation of "community standard" (4) court did not abuse its
diseretion in refusing to grant ehange of
venue, ami (5) persons aged 18 to 20 are not
An identifiable group the exclusion of whieh
renders jury list nonrepresentative of community ami violati\e of Fifth and Sixth
Amendments
Affirmed
Wilkms, J , eoncurred and dissented
and filed statement in which Maughan, J ,
concurred

I Obscenity «&=»2
Statute proscribing distribution of i>ornographic material is constitutional U C
A 1953, 76 10 1204
2 Obscenity «=»5
In order for material to be found |>ornographic it must be found to be appealing
to prurient interest, depicting sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and lacking in serious literary, artistic, political, or
seientific value
U C A 1953, 76 10 1204
3 Criminal Law <s=*64l 13(1)
Counsel has substantia! latitude in selecting trial strategy
4 Criminal I*w «=>641 13(1)
To show inadequate or ineffective
counsel, record must establish that counsel
was ignorant of facts or law, resulting in
withdrawal of crucial defense, reducing trial to a farce and sham
5 Criminal U w «=»641 13(2)
In prosecution for distribution of |>or
nographie material, closing remarks made
by defense eounsel admitting that alleged
tomographic material depicted sexual conduct in patently offensive wav and was
lacking m serious literar\, artistic, pohtieal
and scientific value and basing defense on
argument that material was not appealing
to thej prurient interest did not deprive tie
fendants of effective assistance of counsel
U C A 1953, 7(> 10 1204
6 Obscenity «*=»18
For purposes of prosecution for distribution or |>ornographic material, jury is ex
elusive judge of what contcm|M>rary community standards of intended anil probable
recipient group is, and in determining contemporary community standard of said
group jurv, may consider divergent ages
educated and uneducated, religious and
irreligious men and women, and anv other
charaetensties which go to make up an average j>erson of intended and probable recipient group U C A 1953 76 10 1204
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%1 130 A 2d 6 (1957) cited m the main
opinion
In the instant case however valuation at
fair nnrket value is mandated by article
XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitu
tion and its requirements cannot be re
laxed in an effort to obtain uniformity and
equality also mandated by section 3 In
the context of this case, the principle can
have no application
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and dis
senting)
I join the ( ourt in declaring the roll back
provisions of U C A , 1953, § 59-5-109
(Supp 1981) unconstitutional on their face
However, for the same reasons I also view
as unconstitutional on their face the provi
sions of U C A , 1953, § 59-5-4 5 (Supp
1981) which reduce the value of taxable
real property assessed by the counties by
209?

Article XIII sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution of Utah in unequivocal Ian
guage require that all non exempt tangible
property both real and personal be as
sessed at a ' uniform and equal rate " and
that it be assessed and taxed according to
its \alue in money "

The defendants recite the legislative his
tory of the subject statute, which reflects
that a disparity was found to exist in the
valuation of county assessed and state as
sessed property The disparity was appar
ently octasioned by the different valuation
methods employed by the state and the
counties The counties generally utilized a
comparable sales method that readily re
fleeted the effect of inflation upon market
value
However, the state continued to
inflexibly follow its usual cost, income,
stock and debt approaches to market value
and failed to in any way compensate for
the effects of inflation This caused con
siderable consternation on the part of coun
ty assessors who were compelled to assess
the property of their constituents at sharply increasing values while state assess
ments lagged far behind It was to relieve
this iniquity in assessment that the Legis
lature enacted the subject statutes How
ever well intentioned the legislative enact
ments were, they nevertheless do not meet
constitutional muster

It is thus to be seen that § 59-5-4 5 is
unconstitutional on its face in that it directs
the county assessor to assess and tax coun
ty assessed property at 80% of its "reason
able fair cash value ' rather than at 100%
of its value This is precisely the sort of
inequality and lack of uniformity that vio
lates the express provisions of article XIII
sections 2 and 3 supra

Article XIII, section 3, supra, confers
upon the Legislature the obligation and
duty to * provide by law a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation" and
to prescribe by law such regulations as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of
such property ' However, that authority
must be read in light of the overriding
concept espoused by the constitution i e ,
that all property be assessed at a "uniform
and equal rate," and that it be taxed "ac
cording to its value in money " The case
of United States Smelting, Refining &
Mmt?ig Co v Haunes,3 relied upon by the
defendants does not hold to the contrary
Rather, it is supportive of this basic propo
sition This is to be seen in that no matter
which method or yardstick the legislature
chooses to determine the valuation of prop
erty in money the end result that must be
achieved is just that, i e , "according to its
value in money "

I

State i Thomas 16 Ulah 86 SOP 61S (1897)

3

2

kenttecott Copper Corp \ Salt Lake Count),
122 Ulah 431 250 P 2d 938 (1952)

1 his Court has long heretofore interpret
ed the term according to its value in mon
ev as the full cash value of the property '
Also the term 'full cash value ' has been
determined to be synonymous with the
terms actual cash value,' mirket value "
' reasonable fair cash value and value in
money 2

111 Utah 172 176 P2d 622 (1947)
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Viewed in light of what has just been
said, the subject legislation causes state as
sessed and county assessed property to be
assessed at unequal rates and at \alues
other than actual market talue Further
more, the legislation tends to compound
rather than alleviate the problem of dispari
ty in assessed valuation This it does by
leaving in place and thereby sanctioning
the erroneous assessment practices of the
state that fail to assess property according
to its actual value Rather than legislating
so as to insure that the assessment prac
tices of the state be revamped so as to
bring them in conformity with constitution
al mandate the legislation directs the coun
ty assessor to also violate the constitution
by assessing property at a rate 20% less
than actual value
I would reverse the decision of the trial
court in its entirety

Gladys Fay WELLS, Guardian ad litem
for Dennis Edgar Wells, J r . a minor
over the age of 14 years, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v
CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OF UTAH
Successor in Custody of K B , Mother
of Infant H , and K I I , Defendants and
Appellants,
v
John DOE and Mary Doe and Robert D
Maack, Esq , Guardian ad litem for Infant B , Intervenors and Appellants
No 18537
Supreme Court of Utah
March Z3, 1984
Unwed minor father brought action
through guardian ad litem seeking custody
of newborn child that had been released to
state adoption agency and subsequently to
adoptive parents, after father failed to
make timely filing of his acknowledgment
of paternity as required by statute The
Seventh District Court, Grand County

Boyd Bunnell J , granted custody of child
to father on grounds that statute could not
constitutionally be applied to him and
mother, agency and adoptive parents appealed The Supreme Court, Oaks J held
that (1) statute specifying procedure for
terminating parental rights of unwed fa
ther is constitutional under due process
clause of United States Constitution, (2)
such procedure is consistent with due pro
cess requirements of Utah Constitution,
and (3) agency correctly applied statute on
facts of case and did not violate father s
federal or state due process rights
Judgment reversed,
with directions

case remanded

1 Children Out-of-Wedlock <S»20
Parent and Child *=»2< 1)
The relationship between parent and
child is protected by Federal and State Con
stitutions, these protections include the fa
thcr of an illegitimate child
2 Infants «=»I55. Ir>6, 157
Constitutionally protected
parental
rights can be lost the) tan be surrendeml
pursuant to statute they c tn be lost
through abandonment of the child by mac
tion or course of (onduct for which partnt
is personally responsible, such rights can
also be tcrmin ited through pirental unfit
ness or substantnl neglect
UCA19 r >i
78-10-4(1 2) 78-30-5
3 Adoption <s=ll
To serve its purpose for welfare of
child determination tint newborn ehild ( in
hi adopt* d must In final as we 11 as imnudi
ate
1 Adoption <s=*7 2H)
The state s strong interest in immedi
ate secure adoptions for eligible newborns
provides a sufficient justification for signif
icant variations m parental rights of unwed
fathers who in contrast to mothers are
not automatically identified by virtue of
their role in the process of birth
r
> ( onstitutionnl I aw c=>242 1(l)
Infants <3=»1J2
Statute specifying procedure for tenni
nating parental rights of unwed father
requiring father to file acknowledgment of
patcrmt\ prior to elate child is released to
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requiring father to file acknowledgement
of paternity prior to date child is released
to state adoption agency, was not arbitrary
under rule of Lehr v Robertson,
thus,
statute was constitutional under due pro
cess clause of United States Constitution
U S C A Const Amends 5, 14
12 Constitutional Law <3=>274<5)
To avoid unwarranted intrusion on fundamental rights of parenthood, state's due
In sustaining constitutionality of a process clause requires higher level of
statute under due process clause, the Su
scrutiny than is exercised to determine vapreme Court must consider both possibility lidity of economic regulation, the propothat statute is invalid on its face and possi
nent of legislation infringing parental
bility that statute is invalid as applied
rights must show a compelling state interU S C A Const Amends 5, 14, Const Art
est in the result to be achieved and that the
1 § 7
means adopted are narrowly tailored to
7. Constitutional Law «=>2«»i 6
achieve basic statutory purpose
UlA
The test of procedural due process con
1953, 78-30-4(3), Const Art 1, § 7
cerning validity of rules regarding notice
13 Constitutional Law «=>271(5)
and opportunity to be heard is fairness
In determining validity under State
U S C A Const Amends 5, 14, Const Art
Constitution, pursuant to substantive due
1. § 7
process analysis, of statute providing that
8 Constitutional Law <s=>252 5
an unwed male parent could lose his paren
Substantive due process concerns con
tal rights in a newborn infant for failing to
tent of rules specifying when a right can be file timely notice of his claim to paternity,
lost or impaired, this question can arise in
the Supreme Court measured the statutory
context of a hearing where procedural for
specification for termination against tests
mahties were observed
U S C A Const
of compelling state interest and narrowly
Amends 5, 14, Const Art 1, § 7
tailored means
U C A 1953, 78-30-4(3),
9 Constitutional Law e=>252 5
Const Art 1, § 7
A due process question can arise when
14. Constitutional Law «=274(5)
a statute provides that a particular right is
Due process does not require that the
automatically lost or impaired in specific father of an illegitimate child be identified
circumstance, without any notice or hear
and personally notified before his parental
ing, except insofar as may be involved in right can be terminated, as such a require
an after the fact declaration that circum
ment would frustrate compelling state in
stances have occurred and right has been terest in speedy determination of those per
lost or impaired U S C A Const Amends
sons who will assume a parental role over
5, 14, Const Art 1, § 7
newborn illegitimate children and would
10 Constitutional Law «=»274('5)
threaten privacy interests of unwed moth
A ternrnation of parental rights must ers U C A 1953, 78-30-4(3), Const Art 1,
be tested against a more stringent stan
§ 7
dard than that used to determine the vahdi
15 Children Out-of-Wedlock «=>20
ty of economic regulation under substan
Constitutional Law «=>274(5)
tive due process U S C A Const Amends
In light of compelling hiate interest in
5, 14, Const Art 1, § 7
summary determination prescribed in stat
11 Children Out of-Wedlock «=»20
ute and of fact that statutory terms were
Constitutional Law «=»274(5)
narrowly tailored to achieve basic statutory
Statute specifying procedure for termi
purpose, statutory provisions for terminat
nating parental rights of unwed father, ing parental right of unwed father of new

state adoption agency does not violate
equal protection clause as there is rational
basis for distinguishing between unwed
mothers and fathers and between fathers
who file and fathers who do not, classifica
tions are reasonably calculated to serve
proper governmental objective
II C A
1953, 78-30-4(3), U S C A Const Amend
M
6 Constitutional Law <3=>I7
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born infant requiring father to file ac
knowledgement of paternity prior to date
child is released to state adoption agency,
were facially valid under due process
clause of State Constitution U C A 1953,
78-30-4(3), Const Art 1, § 7
16 Constitutional Law «=*271<5)
Where birth of child occurred in same
state as unwed father's residence, neither
child's mother nor state adoption agency
was involved in any effort to prevent him
from learning of birth or from asserting
his parental rights, neither mother nor
agency knew at time child was relinquished
that father was seeking to or intending to
assert his parental rights, all father needed
to do to assert his rights was to file claim
of paternity prior to date mother rehn
quished child, and father had sufficient op
portunity to do so and had advice of coun
sel on filing required form, agency, in ap
plying statute allowing such procedures,
did not violate father's federal or state due
process rights
U C A 1953, 78-30-4(3),
Const Art 1, § 7, U S C A Const Amends
5, 14

six days earlier, she had traveled from
Moab to Ogden, where the child was born
September 23, 1981 She had previously
arranged with appellant Children's Aid Society, a licensed agency, to receive the child
for adoption immediately after its birth
On September 24, K B signed the con
sent and release that placed the child in the
custody of Children's Aid On September
23, 24, 25, and 28, representatives of Chil
dren's Aid contacted the office of the regis
trar of Vital Statistics in the Department of
Health by telephone to determine whether
an acknowledgment of paternity form had
been filed regarding the child They were
informed each time that no form had been
received On September 25 Children's Aid
placed the child Infant B , in the home of
mtervenors John and Mary Doe for pur
poses of adoption On September 28, the
Department of Health issued its official
certificate of search verifying that no ac
knowledgment of paternity had been filed
This certificate assured both Children's Aid
and the adoptive parents that the child
could be adopted without notice to the nat
ural father '

Jane A Marquardt, Salt kike City, for
K B & Children's Aid
Tim W Healy, Ogden, for John & Mary
Doe

On September 30, the Department of
Health notified the Children s Aid Society
that they had received an acknowledgment
of paternity form signed by Dennis E
Wells, J r , the plaintiff in this case The
form arrived by mail at the Department's
office in Salt Lake City on September 30 in
an envelope post marked Moab, Utah, Sep
tember 23 Children's Aid took no action
to alter the child's placement for adoption

Robert D Maack, pro se
Paul Gotay, Midvale, for plaintiffs and
respondents
OAKS, Justice
This appeal involves the constitutionality
of U C A , 1953, § 78-30-4(3), which ternu
nates the parental rights of the father of
an illegitimate child if he fails to give the
required timely notice of his claim of pater
nity The district court concluded that the
notice requirement could not constitutional
ly be applied to this father because he was
denied a reasonable opportunity to comply
We reverse
K B , a 16 year old unmarried girl resid
ing in Moab, gave birth to a child About
t

The certificate of search is requirtd before a
court can grant a final decree of adoption it is

Dennis filed this action, through his
guardian ad litem, on October fi, 1981, seek
ing custody of the child The complaint
alleged that Children's Aid and K B had
fraudulently concealed the facts surround
ing the infant's birth to deprive him of his
parental rights
The evidence at trial showed that Dennis
and K B , who were both sophomores in
high school, had sexual relations in the fall
of 1980, the last occurring on December 23,
not a prerequisite to the phtement of a child in
an adoptive home § 78 30-4(3)(d)
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1980 In January of 1981, K B informed
Dennis that she thought she was pregnant
Thereafter he refused to speak to her and
they ceased dating
K B did not begin
dating anyone else until approximately one
month later
K B ' s pregnancy was not
medically confirmed until August At that
time K B ' s boyfriend informed Dennis of
the pregnancy, and Dennis discussed it
with his parents He never discussed the
pregnancy or had any other communica
tions with K B
Gladys Fay Wells, Dennis s mother,
learned about the pregnancy on September
2 She immediately contacted the physi
cian who had confirmed the pregnancy and
he advised her that the probable date of
birth was September 22 or 21 Mrs Wells
was very concerned about the child On
September 4 she contacted K B and of
fered financial support and help with the
child s upbringing When K B expressed a
desire to put the child up for adoption, Mrs
Wells attempted to dissuade her In mid
September, Mrs Wells also contacted an
attorney in Moab to determine what steps
were required to obtain the child if Dennis
decided to assert his parental rightsA She
and Dennis were informed about the need
for filing an acknowledgment of paternity
certificate and were instructed to obtain
forms from the Department of Social Ser
vices On September 15 Mrs Wells met
with Walter Miller, a social worker with
that department and they discussed the
need for filing the certificate Miller ob
tamed the forms and gave them to Mrs
Wells on September 17 On September 14,
Mrs Wells and Dennis had met in Moab
with ( olleen Burnham of C hildren s Aid
Socittv Mrs Wills expressed a desire to
raise the child if K B decided to relinquish
it but Dennis who remained mostly silent
at this meeting was equivocal never indi
eating positively whether or not he desired
to assert his paternal rights
On September 17 Mrs Wells learned
that K B had gone to Ogden to have the
baby The baby was born on September
23 and Mrs Wells and Dennis learned of
the birth that same day Although Dennis
had signed the form on September 18, he

did not mail it until September 23, the day
before K B relinquished custody to Chil
dren's Aid Dennis claimed that he waited
to ensure that the baby was his, since if the
baby had been born any later he believed
that someone else would have been the
father
After a nonjury trial, the court granted
custody of the child to Dennis Although
Dennis did not make a timely filing of his
acknowledgment of paternity as required
by § 78-30-4(3)(b), the court held that this
statute could not constitutionally be applied
to him because he was "denied a reason
able opportunity to file his acknowledg
ment of paternity prior to placement of the
child by Children's Aid Society " However,
judgment for Dennis was stayed pending
appeal, and the infant remained with the
adoptive parents
I

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF THE FATHER
[t | The relationship between parent and
child is protected by the federal and state
constitutions In ie JP, Utah, 648 P 2d
1364 (1982) These protections include the
father of an illegitimate child Id at 137475, Stanley v Illinois, 405 U S 645, 92
S Ct 1208, 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972) Miller v
Miller, 504 F 2d 1067 (9th Cir 1974) Insofar as it suggests otherwise, Thomas v
Children s Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah
2d 235, 239, 364 P 2d 1029, 1031-32 (1961),
has now been overruled Also see State tn
Interest of M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 107, 476
P2d 1013, 1016-17 (1970) (first recognition
of a "statutory parent child relationship m
unwed father who acknowledges paterili
ty)
(2J Although parental rights have their
origin in biological relationships, those rela
tionships do not guarantee the permanency
of parental rights Constitutionally protected parental rights can be lost They
can be surrendered pursuant to statute
U C A , 1953, § 78-30-4(1), (2) They can
be lost through abandonment of the child
by "inaction or a course of conduct for
which the parent is personally responsible "

In re J Children Utah, 664 P2d 1158,
1159 (1983), § 78-30-5 Parental rights
can also be terminated through parental
unfitness or substantial neglect Eg, In
re Castillo, Utah, 632 P 2d 855 (1981)
II THE STATE'S INTEREST
There are special problems in defining
parental rights over newborns who are ille
gitimate The identity of the father may
be unknown The mother ma> desire to
give the child up for adoption The state
has a strong interest in speedily identifying
those persons who will assume the parental
role over such children, not just to assure
immediate and continued physical care but
also to facilitate early and uninterrupted
bonding of a child to its parents The state
must therefore have legal means to ascer
tain within a very short time of birth
whether the biological parents (or either of
them) are going to assert their constitution
al rights and fulfill their corresponding re
sponsibilities or whether adoptive parents
must be substituted
131 To serve its purpose for the welfare
of the child, a determination that a child
can be adopted must be final as well as
immediate Thus, in rejecting a mothers
attempt to recover her child about eight
months after she had given it up for adop
tion, this Court declared
It is and should be the policy of the law
to so operate as to encourage the finding
of suitable homes and parents for chil
dren in that need
It is obvious that
persons who might be willing to accept a
child for adoption will be more reluctant
to do so if a consenting parent is permit
ted to arbitrarily charge (change] her
mind and revoke the consent, and thus
desolate the plan of the adoptive parents
and bring to naught all of their time,
effort, expense and emotional involve
ment
A moment's reflection will
reveal that to the degree that such com
mitments are given respect and solidan
ty, so they can be relied upon, persons
desiring children will be willing to accept
and give them homes Conversely, to
the degree that such commitments can

easily be withdrawn and the adoptive
plan thus destroyed, such persons will
tend to be discouraged from doing so
In re Adoption of F—, 26 Utah 2d 255,
262 488 P 2d 130 134 (1971) Acroid Mat
ter ofS, Utah, 572 P 2d 1370 (1977) These
considerations obviously set limits to the
rights of fathers as well as mothers
141 The state s strong interest in imme
diate and secure adoptions for eligible new
bonis provides a sufficient justification for
significant variations in the parental rights
of unwed fathers, who, in contrast to moth
ers, are not automatically identified by vir
tue of their role in the process of birth
Relying on leading decisions in the United
States Supreme Court, we have said that
fathers who have "fulfilled a parental role
over a considerable period of time are enti
tied to a high degree of protection,' where
as unwed fathers "whose relationships to
their children are merely biological or very
attc nuated" are entitled to a lesser degree
of protection In re J P 648 P 2d at 1175
1 he United Stites Supreme Court applied
a rationale of variable parental rights in
Leln i Robertson — U S
lOJSCt
2985, 2991, 77 I Ed 2d 614 (198 J) where it
referred to the fact that "the rights of the
parents are a counterpart of the responsi
bihties they ha\e assumed" I*Uer in its
opinion the Court elaborated this idea and
applied it to an unwed father who had no
custodial, personal or financial relationship
with the infant involved in that case
When an unwed father demonstrates a
full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to par
ticipate in the rearing of his child," his
interest in personal contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under the
due process clause
Rut the mete
existence of a biological link does not
merit cqunalent constitutional
protec
tion
Id 103 SCt at 2993 (Emphasis added,
citation omitted ) While Lihr involved a
two year old rather than a i wborn it is
the closest United States Supreme Court
case on its facts and its reasoning is per
suasive on the issue before us
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III. THE STATUTE
In § 78-30-4(3), our Legislature has undertaken to resolve the competing interests
of the newborn illegitimate child and the
man who claims to be its father. This
statute provides a means (1) of promptly
determining whether there is a man who
will acknowledge paternity and assume the
responsibilities of parenthood and, if not,
(2) of speedily making the child available
for adoption. Subsection (a) provides:
A person who is the father or claims to
be the father of an illegitimate child may
^ claim rights pertaining to his paternity of
the child by registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department
of health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his
willingness and intent to support the
child to the best of his ability.
Subsection (b) provides that the notice
"may be registered prior to the birth of the
child but must be registered prior to the
date the illegitimate child is relinquished
or placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services . . . . " (Emphasis
added.) Subsection (c) then provides as
follows:
Any father of such child who fails to
file and register his notice of claim to
paternity and his agreement to support
the child shall be barred from
thereafter
bringing or maintaining any action to
establish his paternity
of the child.
Such failure shall further constitute an
abandonment of said child and a waiver
and surrender of any right to notice of or
to a hearing in any judicial proceeding
for the adoption of said child, and the
consent of such father to the adoption
of such child shall not be required.
(Emphasis added.)
On appeal from the district court's decision not to apply the foregoing statute in
this case, the parties have joined issue on
the constitutionality of § 78-30-4(3), on its
face and as applied to the circumstances of
this case.
151 In Ellis v. Social Services Department, Utah. 615 P.2d 1250 (1980), we sustained § 78-30-4(3) against a claim that it

violated the Equal Protection Clause. Implicit in that decision was the holding that
there are reasonable bases for the classifications in the statute (between unwed
mothers and fathers and between fathers
who file and fathers who do not) and that
these classifications are reasonably calculated to serve a proper government objective.
[6] The claim that this statute was facially invalid under the Due Process Clause
of the federal or state constitutions was
not resolved in Ellis, because the Court
found that in any event the statute violated
due process as applied to terminate the
father's parental rights on the facts of that
case. In this case, where we sustain the
statute in its termination of the father's
rights, we must face both possibilities of
unconstitutionality under due process: invalid on its face and invalid as applied.
IV.

DUE PROCESS

A. In General
( 7 | Most due process cases concern
procedural requirements, notably notice
and opportunity to be heard, which must be
observed in order to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property.
E.g., Nelson v. Jacobsen, Utah, 669 P.2d
1207 (1983); State v. Casarez, Utah, 656
P.2d 1005 (1982); Concerned Parents of
Stepchildren v. Mitchell, Utah, 645 P.2d
629, 636 (1982); Lindon City v. Engineers
Construction
Co., Utah, 636 P.2d 1070
(1981). The general test for the validity of
such rules, the test'of procedural due process, is fairness.
I8J Substantive due process concerns
the content of the rules specifying when a
right can be lost or impaired. This question can arise in the context of a hearing
where the procedural formalities were observed. Thus, in In re J.P., supra, the
statute was unconstitutional on its face
because it provided that a judge could deprive parents of their parental rights "without a showing of unfitness, abandonment,
or substantial neglect
" 648 P.2d at
1375. That holding assumed that the

judge's hearing met all the requirements of
procedural due process, but concluded that
the statute wa6 invalid in its substantive
content.
191 A due process question can also
arise when a statute provides that a particular right is automatically lost or impaired
in a specific circumstance (without any notice or hearing, except insofar as may be
involved in an after-the-fact declaration
that the circumstances have occurred and
the right has been lost or impaired).1 Section 78-30-4(3). challenged in this case, is
such a statute. Whether a due process
challenge to this common type of legislation is procedural because the statute omits
notice and hearing or substantive because
it specifies a particular substantive rule is
comparatively unimportant.
The almost universal opinion that substantive due process was abused in invalidating economic regulations in the first
third of this century has culminated in a
rational basis test so tolerant that the substantive content of economic statutes rarely violates due process. See generally
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup.Ct.Rev. 34, 39; R. Lee,
A Lawyer Looks at the Constitution, 16467 (1981). Our own decisions illustrate this
conclusion. E.g., Committee of Consumer
Services v. Public Service
Commission,
Utah, 638 P.2d 533, 536 (1981); Banberry
Development Corp. v. South Jordan City,
Utah, 631 P.2d 899 (1981); Redwood Gym
v. Salt Lake County Commission, Utah,
624 P.2d 1138, 1142-43 (1981); Baker v.
Matheson, Utah, 607 P.2d 233, 244 (1979);
Magleby v. State Department of Business
Regulations, Utah, 564 P.2d 1109, 1110
(1977). The presumption of constitutionality applied in these cases is further assurance that economic regulations will rarely
be upset as violative of substantive due
process.
2.

For example, in Freeman v. Centervitle City,
Uiah, 600 P.2d 1003 (1979). we rejected a properly owner's contention that our annexation
statutes violated the due process clause in Art. 1,
§ 7 of the Utah Constitution because they did

110| In contrast to the test used to determine the validity of the economic regulations involved in the foregoing cases, a
termination of parental rights must be tested against a more stringent standard, as
discussed below. See generally Developments in the Law—the Constitution
and
the Family, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1157, 1167
(1980).
B.

United States Constitution

In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92
S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a statute terminating parental rights of ail unwed fathers
without a hearing violated due process.
Statutes like § 78-30-4(3) are responses to
that decision, attempting to specify procedures by which the parental rights of
unwed fathers can be terminated and the
rights of adoptive parents can he assured
in a manner consistent with due process.
In Lchr v. Robertson, — U.S.
, 103
S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), the United States Supreme Court had its most
recent opportunity to review such a statute. Under New York law, as the trial
court had held, the rights of natural parents are terminated by a final decree of
adoption. In re Adoption of Martz, 102
Misc.2d 102, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979), affd
sub nom. Lehr v. Robertson, supra. On
appeal, the unwed father attacked a decree
granting adoption of his two-year-old
daughter. The father argued that he had
received no notice of the adoption proceeding. The statute provided for notice to an
unwed father, but only if he had filed a
notice of intent to claim paternity with the
putative father registry of the Department
of Social Services, which this appellant had
not done. Rejecting appellant's claim that
the statute was a procedurally inadequate
means to terminate parental rights of this
character, the Supreme Court held the statute constitutional.
not require that affected property owners be
given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to elect whether their property should be
made subject to taxation and other burdens in
the annexing city.
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The New York legislature concluded that
a more open-ended notice requirement
•would merely complicate the adoption
process, threaten the privacy interests of
unwed mothers, create the risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair the desired finality of adoption decrees. Regardless of whether we would have done
likewise if we were legislators instead of
judges, we surety cannof
characterize
the state's conclusion as arbitrary.
Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2995 (emphasis added).
(11) Measuring § 78-30-^(3) against
the precedent and standard established in
Lehr v. Robertson, we hold that the procedure it specifies for terminating the parental rights of an unwed father is not "arbitrary" and is therefore constitutional under
the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution.
C.

Utah Constitution

We likewise hold that § 78-30-4(3) is
consistent with the due process requirements of Art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution.
(12) In this instance we apply a more
stringent standard of review than "arbitrariness" or the rational basis test applicable to economic regulation challenged as
violative of due process. In re J.P., supra,
identified parental rights as "fundamental"
for purposes of due process. 648 P.2d at
1372-74. In the context of alleged vagueness in statutory language, we have held
that "[wjhen state action impinges on fundamental rights, due process requires standards which clearly define the scope of
permissible conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights." In re
Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (1981).
Similarly, "to avoid unwarranted intrusion"
on the fundamental rights of parenthood
we hold that Utah's Due Process Clause
requires a higher level of scrutiny than is
exercised to determine the validity of economic regulation. By analogy to the tests
employed in judging the validity of alleged
infringements on other fundamental rights,
we hold that the proponent of legislation
infringing parental rights must show (1) a

compelling state interest in the result to be
achieved and (2) that the means adopted
are "narrowly tailored to achieve the basic
statutory purpose." Id. at 1090.

bonding and if prospective parents are to
rely on the process in making themselves
available for adoptions, such determinations must also be final and irrevocable.

In re J.P., supra, established a general
rule against the termination of parental
rights, except for designated causes. We
explained the basis for exceptions to this
fundamental right as follows:
The principle that "the welfare of the
child is the paramount consideration"
means that parental rights, though inherent and retained, are not absolute; that
the state, as parens patriae, has the
authority and obligation to assume a parental role after the natural parent has
been shown to be unfit or dysfunctional;
and that parental prerogatives cannot, at
that extreme point, frustrate the state in
discharging its duty.
648 P.2d at 1377.

I l l ) Section 78-3(M(3) is narrowly tailored to achieve the purposes identified
above. No infringement of the unwed father's rights not essential to the statute's
purposes has been identified. Due process
does not require that the father of an illegitimate child be identified and personally
notified before his parental right can be
terminated.
In the common cases of
unwed fathers without desires to assume
the responsibilities and to claim the rights
of parenthood, such a requirement would
frustrate the compelling state interest in
the speedy determination described above.
It would also threaten the privacy interests
of unwed mothers and frustrate the other
interests the United States Supreme Court
cited in Lehr v. Robertson, supra, quoted
in Part IVK.

1131 The question in this case is whether the constitutional right we recognized in
In re J.P. permits the exception inherent in
§ 78-30-4(3)'s provision that an unwed
male parent will lose his parental rights in
a newborn infant for failing to file a timely
notice of his claim to paternity. We treat
/ that question in light of our earlier holding
| that an unwed father's right to his relationj ship with his newborn is a provisional right
I by comparison with the vested right of a
\ parent who has fulfilled a parental role
! over a considerable period of time. In re
, J.P., 648 P.2d at 1374-75. We measure the
I statutory specifications for the termination
of that provisional right against the tests
of compelling state interest and narrowly
tailored means.
For the reasons already reviewed in Part
II, the state has a compelling interest in
speedily identifying those persons who will
assume a parental role over newborn illegitimate children. Speedy identification is
important to immediate and continued
physical care and it is essential to early and
uninterrupted bonding between child and
parents. If infants are to be spared the
injury and pain of being torn from parents
with whom they have begun the process of

|l. r i| In view of the compiling state interest in the summary determination prescribed in the statute and of the fact that
the statutory terms are narrowly tailored
to achieve the basic statutory purpose, we
hold that 5 78-30-4(3)'s provisions for terminating the parental right of the unwed
father of a newborn infant are facially
valid under the Due Process Clause in Art.
1, s 7 of the Utah Constitution.
D. Constitutionality as Applied
Finally, we inquire whether the statute
was constitutionally applied in the circumstances of this case.
At the outset, it is clear that the exception defined in Ellis v. Social Services Department, supra, is inapplicable. In that
case, the parents of the illegitimate child
both lived in California. A few days before
she was to give birth, the mother left California without the father's knowledge and
came to Utah. In this state, she gave
birth, declared the father to be unknown,
and relinquished the child to an agency for
adoption. Immediately upon learning of
her whereabouts and within six days of the

child's birth, the father notified the agency
by phone that he intended to assert his
parental rights. Within two weeks thereafter, he filed the statutory notice in Utah
and filed suit to secure his rights. This
Court held that the statute could not be
applied to deprive this father of his parental rights without a hearing at which he
would have "an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he
could not reasonably have expected his
baby to be born in Utah." 615 P.2d at
1256. The Court explained the limits of its
ruling as follows:
In the usual case, the putative father
would either know or reasonably should
know approximately when and where his
child was horn. It is conceivable, however, that a situation may arise when it is
impossible for the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the
statutory bar, through no fault of his
own. In such a case, due process requires that he be permitted to show that
he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute.
Id. at 1256 (emphasis added).
(16) In sharp contrast to Ellis, this case
does not involve circumstances where
through no fault of his own it was
"impossible" for the father to file the required notice. Here the birth occurred in
the same state as the father's residence,
and neither the child's mother nor the
agency was involved in any effort to prevent him from learning of the birth or from
asserting his parental rights. Neither the
mother nor the agency knew at the time
the child was relinquished that the father
was seeking to or intending to assert his
parental rights. All the father needed to
do to assert his rights was file his claim of
paternity with the Utah Department anytime prior to September 24, the date the
mother relinquished the child to the agency. He had sufficient opportunity to do so
in this case, including ample advance notice
of the expected time of birth and the fact
that the mother intended to relinquish the
child for adoption, advice of counsel on
filing the required form, and a copy of the
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form provided hy a social worker for the
department
These opportunities exceed
what is necessary to contradict either one
of the two essential elements of the Ellis
exception it was (1) "impossible" for the
father to make a timely filing of the re
quired notice (2) "through no fault of his
own '
In apparent reliance on the Ellts state
ment that due process requires that the
father be allowed to show "he was not
afforded a reasonable opportunity to com
ply with the statute," the district court held
mai s 7n-ju~4*3i could not be applied to
terminate the father's parental right in this
case Such an interpretation overlooks the
fact that the "reasonable opportunity" re
ferred to in the quoted sentence only ap
plies "in such a case," i e , when it is first
shown that it was "impossible" for the
father to file "through no fault of his
own ' Otherwise, the need to prove in
each adoption case that the unwed father—
whoever he may be—had a "reasonable
opportunity" to file the required notice of
paternity would frustrate the statute's pur
pose to facilitate secure adoptions by early
clarification of status
In Lehr i Robertson, supra, the United
States Supreme Court rejected a similar
argument that the unwed father should
ha\ e received special notice of the adoption
proceeding because, on the facts of that
case, the trial court and the parties knew
that he had filed a separate proceeding to
establish his parental rights The Supreme
Court declared
This argument amounts to nothing more
than an indirect attack on the notice pro
visions of the New York statute The
legitimate state interests in facilitating
the adoption of young children and hav
ing the adoption proceeding completed
expeditiously that underlie the entire
statutory scheme also justify a trial
judge's determination to requite all in
feres ted parties to adhere precisely to
the procedural
requirements
of the
statute
Since the New York stat
utes adequately protected appellant's in
choate interest in establishing a relation

ship with Jessica, we find no merit in
the claim that his constitutional
rights
were ofjended because the family court
strictly complied with the provisions of
the statute
103 S C t at 2995 (emphasis added)
In
applying that reasoning, the Court also not
ed that the right to receive notice of the
adoption proceeding "was completely with
in appellant's control " Id
We agree with the reasoning in Lehr v
Robertson, and we therefore hold that the
agency correctly applied § 78-30-4(3) on
the facts of th»s case and did "ot violate
federal or state due process rights
The judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded with directions to enter judg
ment for the defendants
Each party to
bear own costs
HALL, C J , and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ , concur
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Nolan W. MARSHALL. Plaintiff,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION O F the
STATE OF UTAH, Emery Mining C o ,
(Employer), a n d / o r the State Insurance
Fund of Utah, and the Second Injury
Fund, Defendants.
No 19153.
Supreme Court of Utah
April 5, 1984
Mine employee denied permanent total
disability benefits after work related acci
dent when he was 67 years old sought
review of decision of the Industrial Commission denying him such benefits
The
Supreme Court, Durham, J , held that (1)
total disability for workers' compensation

purposes does not mean total physical mi
pairment, and (2) denial of permanent total
disability benefits to mine employee, based
almost entirely on size of employee's per
centage of impairment and fact that em
ployee was eligible to retire, rather than on
evidence of employee's wage earning ca
pacity, was unsupported by the Commis
sion's findings of fact, and would be set
aside

Reversed and remanded
Hall C J , dissented and filed an opm
ion in which Howe, J , joined
1. Workers' Compensation $=»803
' Disabilitv " under the worker s com
pensation laws, is loss of ability to earn
U C A 1953, 35-1-67
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions

2 Workers' C ompensation «=»836
An undisputed physical impairment
may not always result in a disability for
worker's compensation purposes
3 Workers' Compensation <S=»803
In assessing loss of earning capacity
from an injury for workers' compensation
purposes, a constellation of factors must be
considered, only one of which is physical
impairment of the worker, other factors
are age education, training and mental ca
pacity
4 Workers* Compensation «=>817
Total disability for workers' compen
sation purposes does not mean total physi
cal impairment U C A 1953, 35-1-67
5. Workers' Compensation «=»847
Whether an employee falls into the
odd lot category, under which total disabili
ty for workers' compensation purposes
may be found in the u s e of workers who,
while not altogether incapacitated for
work, are so handicapped that they will not
be employed regularly in any well known
branch of the labor market, depends on
whether there is regular, dependable work
available for the employee, who does not

rely on sympathy of friends or his own
superhuman efforts
6 Workers' Compensation «=>1377
Once an employee who has suffered a
work related accident has presented evi
dence that he can no longer perform the
duties required in his occupation and that
he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden
shifts to the employer to prove the exist
ence of regular, steady work that the em
ployee can perform, taking into account the
employee's education, mental capacity, and
age to avoid finding that the employee is
total'y a r ' ' per r n a n e n t'y d«sahl*»d under the
odd lot doctrine U C A 1953, 35-1-67
7 Workers' Compensation «=»1947
Supreme Court may set aside an In
dustnal Commission's award in a workers'
compensation case if the Commission's
findings of fact do not support the award
U C A 19r>3, 35-1-84
8. Workers' Compensation «=»1653
Mine employee who injured his back in
work related accident at age 67, after a
40 year history of heavy labor in the mines,
who had less than a high school education,
and who presented uncontroverted evi
dence of his impairment and his inability to
perform work required by his job, along
with an opinion of the division of vocational
rehabilitation that he could not be rehabili
tated, presented a prima facie case that he
fell into the odd lot category for an award
of workers' compensation, even though his
combined impairment totaled only 267<U C A 1953, 35-1-67
9 Workers' Compensation <S=»1639
Where Industrial Commission's denial
of permanent disability benefits to 67 year
old mine worker injured in a work related
accident appeared to rest almost entirely on
si/e of employee's percentage of impair
ment and on fact that employee was ehgi
ble to retire, rather than on evidence of
employee s wage earning capacity, such de
nial of permanent total disability benefits
was unsupported by findings of fact U C
A 1953, 35-1-67, 35-1-84
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Rule 17

UTAH RLLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur 2d. — 62A \m Jur 2d Pretrial
Conference and Procedure * 1 et ^eq
C.J S — $8 C J S Trial * 17t2)
A.L.R. — Failure of partv or his attorney to
appear at pretrial conference 55 A L R 3d 303
Propriety of allowing state court civil htigant to call nonexpert witness whose name or
address was not disclosed during pretrial discoverv proceedings 63 A L R 4th 712
Consideration or submission at trial under
Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of

issues not fixed for trial m pretrial order 11
A L R Fed 736
Validitv and effect of local district court
rules providing tor use of alternative dispute
resolution procedures as pretrial settlement
mechanisms 8b A L R Fed 211
Imposition ot sanctions under Rule 16(0
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for tailing: to
obev scheduling or pretrial order 90 A L R
Fed 157
Key Numbers. — Trial s» 9<1)

PART IV.
PARTIES.
Rule 17, Parties plaintiff and defendant
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted m the name of
the real party in interest An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may
sue in that person s name without joining the party for whose benefit the
action is brought and when a statute so provides an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah No action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest, and such ratification, joinder or substitution shall
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent
person who is a party must appear either b\ a general guardian or by a
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the
action is pending A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian
and may have appeared by the guardian In an action in rem it shall not be
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might
be a minor or an incompetent person
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by
a court must be appointed as follows
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if
the minor is of the ase of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the
application of a relative or friend of the minor
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if
the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after
the service of the summons or if under that age or if the minor neglects so
to apph then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or
of any other paru to the action
60
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(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such
minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general
or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is
none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such
minor, if over fourteen years of age. or, if under fourteen years of age, by
such service on the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad
litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days after appointment in which to plead to the action.
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding.
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or
more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a
partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business
under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or
not, they may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained
against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the
same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their
joint liability. The separate property of an individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a
party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member.
le) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of
Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade
name, and the business is conducted under the supervision of a manager,
superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any
action arising out of the conduct of the business.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
<d> has been changed to conform to the holding
in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 767 P.2d 499
'Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated
association to sue in its own name. The rule
continues to allow an unincorporated association to be sued in its own name. The final sentence of paragraph (d> was added to confirm
that the separate property of an individual
member of an association may not be bound by
the judgment unless the member is made a
party.
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the
rule make the terminology gender neutral. In
part (c) the word "minor" has replaced the
word "infant," in order to maintain consistency
with recent changes made in Rule 4<e)<2). In
Rule 4 an infant is defined as a person under
the age of 14 years, whereas the intent of Rule
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17(c) is to include persons under the age of 18
years.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective September 1, 1991, substituted
"minor" for "infant" throughout Subdivisions
(bi and <c); in Subdivision <d), substituted "sue
or be sued" for "be sued" in the heading and
the first sentence, divided the former language
into the present first two sentences, in the second sentence substituted "the association" for
"the defendant" and "parties" for "defendants,"
and added the third sentence; and made stylistic changes throughout the section.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 17, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5101 et seq.
Service of process. Rule 4.
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Rule 24

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action barred.
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of wrongful act.
Class action distinguished.
Action barred.
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of
wrongful act.
Shareholders' action against former corporate directors and officers for alleged conversion of corporate assets and for breach of fidu-

ciary duties was barred by this rule where the
shareholders did not acquire their stock until
after the events complained of and the shares
did not devolve on them by operation of law.
Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1984).
Class action distinguished.
Action by corporate shareholders which alleged injury to the corporation only, and not to
them as individuals, was a derivative action
and could not be brought as a class action.
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d
636 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations
§ 2250.
C.J.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 564 to
566.
A.L.R. — Communications by corporation as
privileged in stockholders' action, 34 A.L.R.3d
1106.
Allowance of punitive damages in stockholder's derivative action, 67 A.L.R.3d 350.
Application to derivative actions for breach

of fiduciary duty, under § 36(b) of Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 USC 5 80a-35(b)), of
requirement, stated in Rule 23.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that complaint in derivative actions allege what efforts were made
by shareholders to obtain desired action or reasons for failure to do so, 65 A.L.R. Fed. 542.
Key Numbers. — Corporations «» 206, 207.

Rule 24. Intervention.
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for
ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered
by a governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order,
the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in
the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state the
grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the
claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

shall direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only
from the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered.
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
rule covering this subject matter.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge everything merged m and adjudicated
by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v Keith
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916).

ANALYSIS

Court.
—Duty.
Attachment.
Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment.
Owner or attorney
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
Court.
—Duty.
Attachment.
Court had duty to make order directing partial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805 (1906).
Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment.
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-

Owner or attorney.
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor. Utah C V.
Fed Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 979 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
186
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(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial. § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial,
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.

Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
—Sufficiency.
Excessive or inadequate damages.
—Punitive damages.
Failure to object to findings of fact.
Filing of affidavits.
Grounds for new trial.
—Particularization in motion.
Incompetence or negligence of counsel.
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Key Numbers. — New Trial <s= 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect: (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action: <5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application: or (7^ any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion

to set aside judgment. §§ 78-3-16.5, 7S-4-24,
78-6-14; Appx. D. Code of Judicial Administration.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
"Any other reason justifying relief.'
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Real party in interest.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.

—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
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Rule 4-504

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments,
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small
claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court
and counsel within five days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement
and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the
social security number of the judgment debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was
made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.
972
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(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court,
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to writing.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes, — The 1990 amendment inserted "civil proceedings in" and "except small claims" under "Applicability" and
made minor stylistic changes in the Statement
of the Rule.

The 1991 amendment added the final sentence to the Intent paragraph, deleted "and not
of record" following "courts of record" in the
Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivision (10).

Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits in support
of attorneys' fees.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must be filed with
the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of
the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute
the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage
for which attorneys' fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the
fees for comparable legal services.
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed.
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred
in pursuit of collection:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT."
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they
conform to the provisions of this rule and to state statute and case law.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "be filed with the court and" in
Subdivision (1), deleted the former Subdivision
(2), requiring descriptions of fee arrangements
other than hourly rates, added the designation

(2) to the former last sentence of Subdivision
(1), and in Subdivision (4) inserted the subdivision designation and the phrase beginning
"and" at the end.
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ment would in effect be a reversal of the judgment and contrary to principle.
It has even been held that money paid on a void judgment may not be recovered where the payment was voluntary, but under a misapprehension as to
the legal rights involved." But there is authority that where money has been
paid under a judgment the execution of which would be enjoined if no payment had been made, restitution may be granted in equitable proceedings directly
attacking the judgment.*
As to a recover)' from a clerk of court or his surety, it has been held that the
failure of a clerk to enter upon the docket of a judgment the fact of payment,
as required by statute, when the money is paid to him under statutory authority,
leaves the title to the money in the judgment debtor, so that in case of its misappropriation by the clerk, the debtor has a valid claim against his surety. In
such case, the death of the clerk prior to the discovery of the default does not
defeat the claim. 10 On the other hand, there is authority that an action for
restitution does not lie against any officer who, acting in good faith and in
conformity with process which, although invalid, is fair on its face, has received
payment and has paid it over to the person specified in the process.11

47 Am Jur 2d

JUDGMENTS

§ 1000

§ 1000. Jurisdiction and authority of courts.
Although in some jurisdictions the matter of setoff as between judgments
is materially affected" or expressly authorized by statute,1* it is less dependent
upon statute than is the jurisdiction to order setoffs generally," and courts do
have jurisdiction in cases of setoff independent of statute." Indeed, the authority
to set off one judgment against another is ancient and well established" under
principles of common law, 80 as an inherent power of the court. 1 The exercise of
the power depends mainly on the general jurisdiction of the court over suitors,*
process,8 and judgments.*
It is the modern view that although the right to offset judgments is of an
equitable nature, courts of law may exercise the right.* Thus, the right to set
off one judgment against another may be exercised in courts of law.* This rule
has even been applied as to judgments rendered by different courts. 7 Thus, it is
not necessary that the court to which the application is made have control over
the judgment to be used as a setoff.*
As to the authority of appellate courts, although a setoff of one judgment

B. SETOFF OF JUDOMENTS
1. I N GENERAL

§ 9 9 9 . Generally."
The satisfaction of a judgment may be wholly or partly produced by compelling the judgment creditor to accept in payment a judgment to which he is
subject," since it is a general rule that when mutual claims of parties have
passed into judgments, one judgment may be set off against the other. 14
7. D P Medina v Grove, 10 Q B 172, 116 Eng
Reprint 67 (Ex C h ) .
Annotation:
9 ALR 400.
In Ro>al Indent. Co v Sangor, 166 Wis
140, 164 NW 821, 9 ALR 397, it was held
that money paid under a judgment rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction may not
he recovered simply because it is afterward
discovered not to be due.
A person who has conferred a benefit upon
another by complying with a judgment, or
whose properly has been taken thereunder, is
not entitled to restitution while the judgment
remains valid and unreversed, merely because
it was improperly obtained, except in a proceeding in which the judgment is directly
attacked. Restatement, RESTITUTION § 7 2 ( 1 ) .
8. Boggs v Fowler, 16 Cat 559; Elston v
Chicago, 40 III 514. See also Boas v Updegrove, 5 Pa 516.
Annotation:
53 ALR 949, 961.
9. Restatement, RESTITUTION $ 7 2 ( 2 ) .
also § 7 3 ( 1 ) .

See

10. State ex rel Oilmore v Walker, 195 NC
460. 142 SE 579, 59 ALR 53.
11. Restatement, RESTITUTION
94

§73(2).

12. As to equitable relief from a judgment
for the purpose of permitting a setoff, see
$ 868, supra.
As to the effect of an attorney's lien on a
judgment on the right of setoff, see 7 Am
Jur

2d, ATTORNEYS AT L A W $

290.

13. Vcrry v Barnes, 154 Minn 252, 191
NW 5»9, 31 ALR 707 (holding that if a
judgment debtor wishes to avail himself of the
right to have his judgment against the judgment creditor treated as payment pro tanto,
he should apply to the court to have one
judgment set off against the other, and not
levy on the judgment against himself); Zinn
v Dawson, 47 W Va 45, 34 SE 784.
14. Scott v Rivers (Ala) 1 Stew & P 2 4 ;
Coonan v Loewenthal, 147 Cal 218, 81 P
527; Porter v Liscom, 22 Cal 430; Skrine v
Simmons, 36 Ga 402; Puett v Beard, 86 Ind
172; Benson v Haywood, 86 Iowa 107, 53
NW 85; Ballinger v Tarbell, 16 Iowa 4 9 1 ;
Alexander v Clarkson, 100 Kan 294, 164 P
294; Jeffries v Evans, 45 Ky (6 B Mon) 119;
Collins v Campbell, 97 Me 23, 53 A 837;
Smith v Washington Gaslight Co. 31 Md 12;
Verry v Barnes, 154 Minn 252, 191 NW 589,
31 ALR 707; Hunt v Conrad, 47 Minn 557,
50 NW 614; Tice v Fleming, 173 Mo 49, 72
SW 689; Hovey v Morrill, 61 N i l 9; Chandler

v Drew, 6 NH 469; Murray v Skirm, 73 NJ
Eq 374, 69 A 496; Dc Camp v Thomson, 159
NY 144, 54 NE I I ; Cleveland v McCanna, 7
ND 455, 75 NW 908; Barbour v National
Exih. Bank, 5(1 Ohio St 90. 33 NE 512;
Johnson v Noble, 179 Okla 256. 65 P2d 502,
121 ALR 474; Johnson v Johnston, 123 Okla
2"3. 254 P 494, 51 ALR 1265; Whclan v
M i M a h a n . 17 Or 37. 82 P 19; Leitr v I tollman, 207 Pa 2119. 56 A 868; T h r o p p v Susquehanna Mut. F. Ins. Co. 125 Pa 427. 17 A
473; Simmons v Reid, 31 SC 389, 9 SE 1058;
Ziun v Dawson, 47 \V Va 45, 34 SE 784.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 480.
15. Annotation:

121 ALR 478, 480.

16. Cleveland v McCanna, 7 NI) 455, 75
NW 908 (denying the setoff under the cirrumstaiHes of the particular rase).
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 487.
In Blount \ Windley, 95 US I 73, 24 L Ed
424, it was held that the extent to whirh
a right of setoff may be asserted against a
judgment may be regulated by the legislature.
17. Annotation:

121 ALR 478, 479.

18. Scott v Rivers (Ala) 1 Stew & P 24;
Puett v Beard, 86 Ind 1 72; Collins v Campbell,
97 Me 23, 53 A 837; Franklin Co. v Buhl
Land Co. 264 Mich 531, 250 NW 299; Hovev
v Morrill, 61 N H 9; Barbour v National Exoh.
Bank, 50 Ohio Si 90, 33 NE 542; Ramsey's
Appeal ( P a ) 2 Watts 228; Simmons v Reid, 31
SC 389, 9 SE 1058; Citizens Industrial Bank
v Oppenheim (Tex Civ App) 118 SW2d 820,
error dismd; Zinn v Dawson, 47 W Va 45, 34
SE 784.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 485.
19. Franklin Co. v Buhl Land Co. 264 Mich

531, 250 NW 299; Barbour v National Exrh.
Bank. 50 Ohio St 90, 33 NE 542; Ramsey's
Appeal (Pa) 2 Watts 228.
20. Franklin Co. v Buhl Land Co 264 Mich
531, 250 NW 299; Barbour v National F.xcli.
Bank, 50 Ohio St 90, 33 NE 542; Simmons
v Reid, 31 SC 389, 9 SE 1058.
1. Pu.tt v Beard, 86 Ind 172; Franklin Co.
v Buhl Land Co 264 Mich 531, 250 NW
299; Harbour v National Exch. Bank, 50 Ohio
St 90, 33 NE 542; Leitz v I tollman, 207 Pa
289, 56 A 868.
2. Scott v Rivers (Ala) I Stew & P 24;
Coonan v Loewenthal, 147 Cal 218, 81 P 527;
Poricr v Liscom, 22 Cal 430; Puett v Beard,
86 Ind 172; Franklin Co. v Buhl Land Co.
264 Mich 531, 250 NW 299; Barbour v National Extb. Bank, 50 Ohio St 90, 33 NE
542.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 485.
3. Scott v Rivers (Ala) 1 Stew & P 24;
Porter v Liscom. 22 Cal 430; Franklin Co. v
Buhl Land Co. 264 Mich 531, 250 NW 299.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 485.
4. Coonan v Loewenthal, 147 Cal 218, 81
P527.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 485.
5. La Fleur v Schiff, 239 Miss 206, 58 NW
2d 320.
6. Murray v Skirm, 73 NJ Eq 374, 69 A
496; Ramsey's Appeal ( P a ) 2 Watts 228.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 488.
7. § 1008, infra.
8. SchauU v Kearney, 47 N J L 56.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 505-507.
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against another has been refused by a court on the ground that its jurisdiction
was essentially appellate in character,* other appellate courts have in fact granted
a setoff as between judgments. 1 0
§ 1001. — C o u r t s of equity.
T h e right to set off one judgment against another may be exercised in courts
of equity. 11 Indeed, jurisdiction to order a setoff as between judgments was
originally exercised exclusively by courts of equity, 1 1 and even today there are
cases where a court of equity will allow a setoff of judgments, where a court of
law would not do so. 1 ' T h e latter rule is particularly applicable where the judgments involved were rendered by different courts. 14
O n the question whether a court of equity will exercise its jurisdiction to set
one judgment off against another in a case in which such relief could be obtained by motion in an action at law, there is a diversity of opinion. 1 * In some
cases, relief in equity is denied because of the adequacy of the remedy at l a w , "
while in others, it is declared that the assumption of jurisdiction by courts of
law did not oust the pre-established authority of courts of equity in those cases
to which its extraordinary jurisdiction applied. 17
jj 1002. Nature and purpose of remedy.
T h e right to set off one judgment against another is not generally statutory,
but is an incident of the general jurisdiction of the court over its suitors and is
of an equitable nature. 1 1 T h e power to set off one judgment against another
is a remedy essentially equitable, 1 9 governed by equitable principles, 10 and in
courts of equity such setoffs are allowed by the courts in the exercise of their
equitable jurisdiction. 1
T h e purpose of permitting a setoff as between judgments has been declared
to be the avoidance of multiplicity of suits or circuity of actions, 1 and of needless
9. Tenant v Marmaduke, 44 Ky (5 B Mon)
76.
10. Irvinr v Myers, 6 Minn 562, Gil 398;
Sneed v Sneed, 82 Term (14 Lea) 13; Welsher
v Libby, 107 Wis 47, 82 NW 693.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 491.
11. Hollomon v Humber, 180 Ga 470, 179
SE 365; Hovey v Morrill, 61 NH 9; Murray
v Skiun, 73 NJ Eq 374, 69 A 496; Johnson
v Noble, 179 Okla 256, 65 P2d 502, 121 AI.R
474.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 489.
12. See Haskins v Jordan, 123 Cal 157, 55
P 786
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 488.
13. Coonan v Loewenthal, 147 Cal 218, 81
P 527.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 489, 490.
14. H 1008, infra.
15. Annotation:
96

121 ALR 478, 490.

16. Whclan v McMahan, 47 Or 37, 82 P 19;
Zinn v Dawson, 47 W Va 45, 34 SE 784.
Annotation:
121 ALR 478, 490.
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expenses or costs' incident to the issuance and levy of executions in favor of the
respective parties. 4
T h e setofT of judgments is sometimes regarded as distinct from the setoff
of claims not reduced to judgment, and as standing upon entirely different
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